Published online by Cambridge University Press: 10 December 2007
This paper discusses human error from two perspectives: errors made by operators on the one hand and errors made by designers and manufacturers of technological aids on the other. The question of operators' reliance on technological aids is discussed, as well as the concept of “overreliance” in connection with technologically aided presentation of navigational information. The accident investigation report following the grounding of the M/V Royal Majesty in 1995 is taken as an example. In that and many reports, designers and technology were not investigated as carefully as the operators on site. In that report, total responsibility for the accident was attributed to the mariners, while unreliable, incorrectly designed or incorrectly mounted technological aids, as well as the constructors, manufacturers and technical expertise behind it, were not investigated. This biased praxis when investigating human error is questioned and another investigative approach is suggested, in which operators and technology are treated equally and where the people behind the technologies can also be scrutinised. Such an approach would have a great beneficial impact on safety at sea.