Hostname: page-component-78c5997874-fbnjt Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-11-13T10:30:50.211Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

Lawmaking in American Legislatures: an empirical investigation

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  18 January 2018

Joshua D. Clinton
Affiliation:
Department of Political Science, Vanderbilt University, USA E-mail: josh.clinton@vanderbilt.edu
Mark D. Richardson
Affiliation:
Department of Political Science, James Madison University, USA E-mail: richarmd@vanderbilt.edu

Abstract

Given pervasive gridlock at the national level, state legislatures are increasingly the place where notable policy change occurs. Investigating such change is difficult because it is often hard to characterise policy change and use observable data to evaluate theoretical predictions; it is subsequently unclear whether law-making explanations focusing on the US Congress also apply to state legislatures. We use several measures of state policy outcomes to examine lawmaking in state legislatures across nearly two decades, and we argue for using simulation studies to connect theoretical predictions to empirical specifications and help interpret the theoretical relevance of estimated correlations. Doing so reveals that the observed law-making outcomes we study are most consistent with law-making models emphasising the importance of the chamber median and the powers of the governor rather than those that focus on the preferences of the majority party.

Type
Research Article
Copyright
© Cambridge University Press, 2018 

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

Aldrich, J. H. (1995) Why Parties? The Origins and Transformation of Political Parties. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.Google Scholar
Aldrich, J. H. and Rohde, D. W. (1997) The Transition to Republican Rule in the House: Implications for Theories of Congressional Politics. Political Science Quarterly 112(4): 541567.Google Scholar
Aldrich, J. H. and Rohde, D. W. (2000) The Republican Revolution and the House Appropriations Committee. The Journal of Politics 62(1): 133.Google Scholar
Anzia, S. F. (2011) Election Timing and the Electoral Influence of Interest Groups. The Journal of Politics 73(2): 412427.Google Scholar
Anzia, S. F. and Jackman, M. C. (2013) Legislative Organization and the Second Face of Power: Evidence from U.S. State Legislatures. The Journal of Politics 75(1): 210224.Google Scholar
Battista, J., Peress, M. and Richman, J. (2014) Policy Representation in the State Legislatures. University of Rochester Working Paper, Rochester, New York, USA.Google Scholar
Battista, J. C. and Richman, J. (2011) Party Pressure in the U.S. State Legislatures. Legislative Studies Quarterly 36: 397422.Google Scholar
Berry, F. S. and Berry, W. D. (1990) State Lottery Adoptions as Policy Innovations: An Event History Analysis. The American Political Science Review 84(2): 395415.Google Scholar
Binder, S. (1999) The Dynamics of Legislative Gridlock, 1947--1996. American Political Science Review 93: 519533.Google Scholar
Black, D. (1958) The Theory of Committees and Elections. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Bowen, D. and Greene, Z. (2016) Legislative Professionalism Component Scores, V1.1, http://dx.doi.org/10.7910/DVN/27595 (accessed 17 August 2017).Google Scholar
Bowen, D. C. and Greene, Z. (2014) Should we Measure Professionalism With an Index? A Note on Theory and Practice in State Legislative Professionalism Research. State Politics & Policy Quarterly 14(3): 277296.Google Scholar
Brady, D. W. and Volden, C. (1998) Revolving Gridlock: Politics and Policy from Carter to Clinton, 2nd ed. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.Google Scholar
Cameron, C. M. (2000) Veto Bargaining: Presidents and the Politics of Negative Power. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Canes-Wrone, B. (2006) Who Leads Whom?: Presidents, Policy, and the Public. Chicago, IL and London: The University of Chicago Press.Google Scholar
Caughey, D. and Warshaw, C. (2015a) Dynamic Representation in the American States, 1960--2012. Technical Report, MIT Working Paper, Cambridge, Massachusetts, USA.Google Scholar
Caughey, D. and Warshaw, C. (2015b) The Dynamics of State Policy Liberalism, 1936--2014. American Journal of Political Science 60: 899913.Google Scholar
Chiou, F.-Y. and Rothenberg, L. S. (2003) When Pivotal Politics Meets Partisan Politics. American Journal of Political Science 47(3): 503522.Google Scholar
Chiou, F.-Y. and Rothenberg, L. S. (2009) A Unified Theory of U.S. Lawmaking: Preferences, Institutions, and Party Discipline. Journal of Politics 71(4): 12571272.Google Scholar
Clinton, J. D. (2007) Lawmaking and Roll Calls. Journal of Politics 69(2): 457469.Google Scholar
Clinton, J. D. (2012) Congress, Lawmaking, and the Fair Labor Standards Act, 1971--2000. American Journal of Political Science 56: 355372.Google Scholar
Clinton, J. D. (2017) Coding the Ideological Direction and Content of Policies. Annual Review of Political Science 20: 433450.Google Scholar
Clinton, J. D., Jackman, S. and Rivers, D. (2004) The Statistical Analysis of Roll Call Voting: A Unified Approach. American Political Science Review 98: 355370.Google Scholar
Coleman, J. J. (1999) Unified Government, Divided Government, and Party Responsiveness. American Political Science Review 93: 821835.Google Scholar
Cox, G. W. and McCubbins, M. D. (2005) Setting the Agenda: Responsible Party Government in the US House of Representatives. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Diermeier, D. and Krehbiel, K. (2003) Institutionalism as a Methodology. Journal of Theoretical Politics 15(2): 123144.Google Scholar
Erikson, R. S., Wright, G. C. and McIver, J. P. (1993) Statehouse Democracy: Public Opinion and the American States. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Finnigan, K., Adelman, N., Anderson, L., Cotton, L., Donnelly, M. B. and Price, T. (2004) Evaluation of the Public Charter Schools Program: Final Report. Technical Report, U.S. Department of Education, http://www2.ed.gov/rschstat/eval/choice/pcsp-final/finalreport.pdf (accessed 29 December 2013).Google Scholar
Florsheim, L. (2014) Here’s Proof That the Anti-Abortion Movement is Winning. The New Republic. 30 July, http://www.newrepublic.com/article/118897/pro-life-movement-winning-abortion-battle-arizona-mississippi (accessed 5 August 2015).Google Scholar
Gamm, G. and Kousser, T. (2010) Broad Bills or Particularistic Policy? Historical Patterns in American State Legislatures. American Political Science Review 104(1): 151170.Google Scholar
Hamm, K. and Squire, P. (2005) 101 Chambers, State Legislatures, and the Future of Legislative Studies. Columbus, OH: Ohio University Press.Google Scholar
Howell, W. G. (2003) Power Without Persuasion: The Politics of Direct Presidential Action. Princeton, NJ and Oxford: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
Jenkins, J. and Gailmard, S. (2010) Negative Agenda Control in the Senate and House: Fingerprints of Majority Party Power. Journal of Politics 69: 698700.Google Scholar
Jenkins, S. (2008) Party Influence on Roll Call Voting: A View from the States. State Politics and Policy Quarterly 8: 239262.Google Scholar
Kernell, S. (2007) Going Public, 4th ed. Washington, DC: CQ Press.Google Scholar
Kousser, T. and Phillips, J. H. (2009) The Power of American Governors: Winning on Budgets and Losing on Policy. New York: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Krehbiel, K. (1998) Pivotal Politics: A Theory of U.S. Lawmaking. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago.Google Scholar
Krehbiel, K. and Rivers, D. (1988) The Analysis of Committee Power: An Application to Senate Voting on the Minimum Wage. American Journal of Political Science 32: 11511174.Google Scholar
Lapinski, J. (2008) Policy Substance and Performance in American Lawmaking, 1877--1994. American Journal of Political Science 52: 235251.Google Scholar
Lax, J. and Phillips, J. (2012) The Democratic Deficit in the States. American Journal of Political Science 56(1): 148166.Google Scholar
Lee, F. (2016) Insecure Majorities: Congress and the Perpetual Campaign. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.Google Scholar
Lewis, D. E. (2008) The Politics of Presidential Appointments: Political Control and Bureaucratic Performance. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
Mayhew, D. R. (2005) Divided We Govern: Party Control, Lawmaking, and Investigations, 1946--2002, 2nd ed. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.Google Scholar
Mintrom, M. and Vergari, S. (1998) Policy Networks and Innovation Diffusion: The Case of State Education Reforms. The Journal of Politics 60(1): 126148.Google Scholar
Moe, T. M. (2006) Political Control and the Power of the Agent. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 22(1): 129.Google Scholar
Moe, T. M. and Howell, W. G. (1999) The Presidential Power of Unilateral Action. Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization 15(1): 132179.Google Scholar
Peress, M. (2013) Estimating Proposal and Status Quo Locations Using Voting and Censorship Data. The Journal of Politics 75(3): 613631.Google Scholar
Poole, K. T. and Rosenthal, H. (1997) Congress: A Political-Economic History of Roll Call Voting. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Rau, A. B. (2013) Timeline: Abortion Laws in Arizona. The Arizona Republic. 21 May 21, http://www.azcentral.com/news/politics/articles/20130226arizona-abortion-law-timeline.html (accessed 5 August 2015).Google Scholar
Reilly, M. (2009) States Limiting Legislative Debate. Technical Report No. 2009-R-0249, Connecticut General Assembly Research Report, http://www.cga.ct.gov/2009/rpt/2009-R-0249.htm (accessed 18 May 2015).Google Scholar
Reiss, P. C. and Wolak, F. A. (2007) Structural Econometric Modelling: Rationales and Examples from Industrial Organization in J. J. Heckman and E. E. Leamer (eds) Handbook of Econometrics, Volume 6A, North-Holland, Amsterdam, The Netherlands and Oxford, UK, 4280–4415.Google Scholar
Richman, J. (2011) Parties, Pivots, and Policy: The Status Quo Test. American Political Science Review 105(1): 151165.Google Scholar
Rogers, S. (2016) National Forces in State Legislative Elections. Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 667(1): 207225.Google Scholar
Rogers, S. (2017) Electoral Accountability of State Legislative Roll-Calls and Ideological Representation. American Political Science Review 111: 555571.Google Scholar
Rohde, D. W. (1991) Parties and Leaders in the Postreform House. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.Google Scholar
Romer, T. and Rosenthal, H. (1978) Political Resource Allocation, Controlled Agendas, and the Status Quo. Public Choice 33(4): 2743.Google Scholar
Shipan, C. R. and Volden, C. (2006) Bottom-Up Federalism: The Diffusion of Anti-Smoking Policies from U.S. Cities to States. American Journal of Political Science 50(4): 825843.Google Scholar
Shober, A. F., Manna, P. and Witte, J. F. (2006) Flexibility Meets Accountability: State Charter School Laws and their Influence on the Formation of Charter Schools in the United States. Policy Studies Journal 34(4): 563587.Google Scholar
Shor, B. and McCarty, N. (2011) The Ideological Mapping of American Legislatures. American Political Science Review 105(3): 530551.Google Scholar
Shor, B. and McCarty, N. (2014) July 2014 Update: Aggregate Data for Ideological Mapping of American Legislatures. Harvard Dataverse, V1, http://dx.doi.org/10.7910/DVN/26799 (accessed 11 May 2014).Google Scholar
Smith, S. S. (2007) Party Influence in Congress. New York: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Squire, P. (2007) Measuring State Legislative Professionalism: The Squire Index Revisited. State Politics & Policy Quarterly 7(2): 211227.Google Scholar
Squire, P. (2012) The Evolution of American Legislatures: Colonies, Territories, and States, 1619--2009. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.Google Scholar
State of New Hampshire Charter School Program Review (2007) Technical Report, New Hampshire Department of Education, https://www.education.nh.gov/instruction/school_improve/charter/documents/program_review.pdf (accessed 8 June 2015).Google Scholar
Treier, S. (2010) Where Does the President Stand? Measuring Presidential Ideology. Political Analysis 18(1): 124136.Google Scholar
Volden, C. (2006) States as Policy Laboratories: Emulating Success in the Children’s Health Insurance Program. American Journal of Political Science 50(2): 294312.Google Scholar
Wawro, G. J. and Schickler, E. (2004) Where’s the Pivot? Obstruction and Lawmaking in the Pre-Cloture Senate. American Journal of Political Science 48: 758774.Google Scholar
Wawro, G. J. and Schickler, E. (2006) Filibuster: Obstruction and Lawmaking in the U.S. Senate. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
Wiseman, A. E. and Wright, J. R. (2008) The Legislative Median and Partisan Policy. Journal of Theoretical Politics 20(1): 529.Google Scholar
Woon, J. and Cook, I. P. (2015) Competing Gridlock Models and Status Quo Policies. Political Analysis 23(3): 385399.Google Scholar
Wright, G. C., Erikson, R. S. and McIver, J. P. (1987) Public Opinion and Policy Liberalism in the American States. American Journal of Political Science 31(4): 9801001.Google Scholar
Supplementary material: PDF

Clinton and Richardson supplementary material 1

Clinton and Richardson supplementary material

Download Clinton and Richardson supplementary material 1(PDF)
PDF 226.9 KB