Hostname: page-component-cd9895bd7-q99xh Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-12-27T13:01:50.128Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Network Governance and Multi-level Delegation: European Networks of Regulatory Agencies1

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2008

DAVID COEN  and
MARK THATCHER
DAVID COEN
Affiliation:
School of Public Policy The Rubin Building 29/30 Tavistock Square London WC1H 9QU e-mail: d.coen@ucl.ac.uk
MARK THATCHER
Affiliation:
London School of Economics Houghton Street London WC2A 2AE e-mail: M.Thatcher@lse.ac.uk
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

European networks of regulators in industries such as telecommunications, securities, energy and transport have been cited as important examples of the growth of network governance in Europe. Using a principal-agent perspective as a starting point, the article examines why a double delegation to networks of regulators has taken place. It looks at how and why the European Commission, national governments and independent regulatory agencies have driven the creation of networks, their institutional character and their implications for regulatory governance in Europe. It argues that problems of co-ordination were the main factor advanced to justify establishing networks of regulators. The new networks have been given a wide range of tasks and broad membership, but enjoy few formal powers or resources. They are highly dependent on the European Commission and face rivals for the task of co-ordinating European regulators. Thus in institutional terms the spread of network governance has in fact been limited.

Type
Research Article
Information
Journal of Public Policy , Volume 28 , Issue 1 , April 2008 , pp. 49 - 71
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2008

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

1. The project ‘After Delegation: The Evolution of European Regulatory Networks’ was funded by the EU 6th Framework Project as part of the EUI NewGov consortium. The authors would like to thank all the European Commission officials, national regulators and European network regulators who participated in the research. A number of people have commented on this paper at conferences at ECPR, EUSA, Connex meetings at ARENA, Birkbeck and Madison, NewGov conferences in Florence, ERSC Centre for Competition Norwich and the Centre for Network Industries Lausanne, but we would especially like to thank Jonathan Zeitlin, Keith Armstrong and Andrew Tarrant for detailed comments and Adrienne Héritier and Dirk Lehmkuhl for editing the special issue. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, we would like to give special mention to Julian Knott and Annelie Dodds for their research assistance on this project.