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Windows of opportunity: legislative fragmentation conditions the effect of partisanship on product market deregulation

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  23 January 2015

Michael G. Smith  and
Johannes Urpelainen
Michael G. Smith
Affiliation:
Global Strategy Group, USA E-mail: mgs2131@columbia.edu
Johannes Urpelainen
Affiliation:
Department of Political Science, Columbia University, USA E-mail: ju2178@columbia.edu
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Abstract

Previous research on deregulation in industrialised countries emphasises differences between left-wing and right-wing parties, but data on product market regulation (PMR) indicate that these differences have been modest. If partisan preferences on the merits of deregulation differ sharply, why such modest differences? We argue that partisan differences only become pronounced when the government is strong and rules a relatively unified legislature. Thus, legislative fragmentation should reduce the left-right difference in PMR. We test this theory against PMR data in 29 industrialised countries, 1978–2007. We find that right-wing governments only have a strong negative effect on regulation if the legislature and the government are not fragmented.

Keywords

deregulationpartisanshippolitical economyproduct market regulation
Type
Research Article
Information
Journal of Public Policy , Volume 36 , Supplement 1 , March 2016 , pp. 51 - 86
Copyright
© Cambridge University Press, 2015 

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