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Caesar and the Mutiny of 47 B.C.

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2012

Stefan G. Chrissanthos
Stefan G. Chrissanthos*
Affiliation:
California State University, Fullerton
*
schrissanthos@fullerton.edu
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Extract

In 47 B.C., despite victory at the Battle of Pharsalus and the subsequent death of Cn. Pompeius Magnus, the Civil War continued for C. Julius Caesar. He faced hostile Roman armies in Spain and North Africa. Rumours circulated that the African army was preparing to invade Italy. Order was kept in Rome only through the force employed by Caesar's lieutenant M. Antonius. Contemporaries certainly did not believe Caesar's victory was a foregone conclusion. In the midst of these crises, Caesar faced a mutiny amongst his veteran Gallic legions billeted in Campania. These troops refused his orders to move from Italy to Africa to fight the Pompeian army that had gathered there. Instead they marched to Rome to demand back pay, discharge, and promised bonuses of money and land. Caesar's power, and his very survival, were hanging in the balance.

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Articles
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The Journal of Roman Studies , Volume 91 , November 2001 , pp. 63 - 75
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Copyright © Stefan G. Chrissanthos2001. Exclusive Licence to Publish: The Society for the Promotion of Roman Studies

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References

1 [Caes.], B.Af. I. In Africa, the Pompeians eventually mustered ten Roman legions, four native legions under the command of King Juba of Numidia, 120 elephants, and numerous cavalry.

2 Cic., Att. 11.10.12,15,18.

3 Cic, Att. 11.7, 12, 13. The letters of M. Tullius Cicero during this period make it clear that he and other Romans did not know who would win the war. This uncertainty is found in modern accounts as well, for example see M. Gelzer, Caesar: Politician and Statesman (1968), 241, 252–3. Gelzer observed that ‘the war was by no means over’.

4 Cic, Att. 11.21–2; [Caes.], B.Al. 65; B.Af. 19, 28, 54; Livy, Per. 113; Suet., Div.Jul. 70; Front., Stra. 1.9.4; Luc, Phar. 5.237–373; Plu., Caes. 51; Ant. 10; Ap., B.C. 2.92–4; Dio 42.52–5. There are few modern studies of mutiny in general and none on the historical aspects of this mutiny in particular. For a brief survey of mutinies during the Republic see Messer, W., ‘Mutiny in the Roman army. The Republic’, CP 15 (1920), 158–71Google Scholar.

5 Suet., Div.Jul. 70; Plu., Caes. 51; Ap., B.C. 2.93; Dio 42.53; Tac., Ann. 1.42; Luc, Phar. 5.357–60. Lucan also included the use of this term but obviously was not writing an historical account of the event. In fact, he combined two separate incidents, a mutiny against Caesar in 49 and the mutiny of 47. For an historiographical analysis of Lucan's treatment of these episodes see Fantham, E., ‘Caesar and the mutiny: Lucan's reshaping of the historical tradition in De Bella Civili 5.237–373’, CP 80 (1985), 119–31Google Scholar. For the historical value of Lucan in general see Lintott, A. W., ‘Lucan and the history of the Civil War’, CQ 21 (1970), 488–505CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

6 Ap., B.C. 2.94. Caesar magnanimously refused the offer.

7 For example, see Messer, op. cit. (n. 4), 158; Adcock, F. E., ‘The Civil War’, in Cook, S. A., Adcock, F. E. and Charlesworth, M. P. (eds), Cambridge Ancient History, Volume 9 (1932), 680;Google Scholar J. P. V. D. Balsdon, Julius Caesar, a Political Biography (1967), 144–5; G. R. Watson, The Roman Soldier (1969), 122; E. Huzar, Mark Antony (1978), 67–9; E. Bradford, Julius Caesar (1984), 241–3; Fantham, op. cit. (n. 5), 119–20; A. Kahn, The Education of Julius Caesar (1986), 387–9.

8 Rawson, E., ‘Caesar: civil war and dictatorship’, in Crook, J. A., Lintott, A. W., and Rawson, E. (eds), Cambridge Ancient History, Volume 9 (1994), 435,Google Scholar n. 58.

9 Gelzer, op. cit. (n. 3), 263.

10 M. Grant, Julius Caesar (1969), 211.

11 Scullard, H. H., From the Gracchi to Nero, a History of Rome from 133 B.C. to A.D. 68 (1982), 140Google Scholar.

12 T. Rice Holmes, The Roman Republic and the Founder of the Empire, Volume III (1923), 232. In a similar vein, Huzar, op. cit. (n. 7), 69: ‘Caesar's mastery (of the army) was complete.’

13 For a detailed analysis of Caesar's works and their impact see F. E. Adcock, Caesar as a Man of Letters (1956). For a brief summary on Caesar's motives for composition see R. Mellor, Roman Historians (1999), 170–6.

14 Suet., Div.Jul. 56.

15 Caes., B.C. 1.39–41.

16 Dio 38.35–47. See Hagendahl, H., ‘The mutiny at Vesontio’, Classica et Mediaevalia 6 (1944), 1–40,Google Scholar for an in-depth discussion on the historiographical problems of this mutiny.

17 Caes., B.C. 2.22, 3.1. In between was the failed campaign of C. Scribonius Curio in North Africa (Caes., B.C. 2.23–44).

18 Caes., B.C. 1.16–23. For example the mutiny against L. Domitius Ahenobarbus at Corfinium in 49.

19 [Caes.], B.Al. 65. The author of the Alexandrian War made only one brief reference to the military troubles in Italy.

20 Adcock, op. cit. (n. 13), 104–5.

21 [Caes.], B.Af. 28, 54.

22 [Caes.], B.His. 12, 23, 30. The author of the Spanish War provides no direct references to the mutiny of 47. However, he also includes information about the later service of some Gallic legions.

23 For modern discussions of Cicero during this period see D. R. Shackleton Bailey, Cicero (1971), 172–8; E. Rawson, Cicero, a Portrait (1975), 202–8; T. N. Mitchell, Cicero, the Senior Statesman (1991), 262–7.

24 Cic., Att. 11.20–2.

25 Cic., Att. 11.14, 13, 10.

26 Cic., Att 11.7, 12–16.

27 Cic., Att 11.9, 17a, 18.

28 Cic., Att. 11.6, 14–16, 17a, 21.

29 Cic., Att 11.5–6, 15.

30 Cic., Att. 11.6, 9, 15, 17.

31 Cic, Att 11.13–15.

32 Cic, Att 11.16.

33 Cic, Brut. 75,262.

34 Cic, Att 7.13a, 16.

35 Dio 42.52–5; Ap., B.C. 2.92–4.

36 Some examples: the use of C. Sallustius Crispus as a messenger and his brush with death (Ap., B.C. 2.92; Dio 42.52); the soldiers' grievances and demands (Ap., B.C. 2.92; Dio 42.53–4); the fact that the discharge demand was merely a ploy by the soldiers (Ap., B.C. 2.93; Dio 42.53); the use of the term quirites and the reaction of the soldiers to Caesar's use of it (Ap., B.C. 2.93–4; Dio 42.53); direct speech for Caesar divided into three parts by Dio and Appian which, in both accounts, make essentially the same points (Ap., B.C. 2.93–4; Dio 42.53–4); Caesar's plans for the settlement of the soldiers (Ap., B.C. 2.94; Dio 42.54). One contradiction in the two stories: in Appian the mutinous men converged unarmed on the Campus Martius, but in Dio the soldiers were armed with their swords (Ap., B.C. 2.93; Dio 42.52).

37 Plu., Caes. 51; Suet, Div.Jul. 70; Front., Stra. 1.9.4; Livy, Per. 113. Livy's Periochae contain one line about the mutiny. Presumably it was treated in some detail in the original history.

38 A few examples: the death of two senators on the soldiers' march to Rome (Dio 42.52; Plu., Caes. 51); Caesar ignoring advice of timid friends to face the soldiers alone (Ap., B.C. 2.92; Suet., Div.Jul. 70; Front. 1.9.4); the use of the term quirites and the soldiers' reaction to the term (Suet., Div.Jul. 70; Plu., Caes. 51; Front. 1.9.4).

39 For a recent historiographical study of Pollio see Morgan, L., ‘The autopsy of C. Asinius Pollio’, JRS 90 (2000), 51–69Google Scholar.

40 Plu., Caes. 32.

41 Ap., B.C. 2.40, 45–6; Plu., Cato Min. 53.

42 Suet., Div.Jul. 30; Plu., Pomp. 72; Ap., B.C. 2.82.

43 Plu., Ant. 9; Morgan, op. cit. (n. 39), 57. According to Plutarch, Pollio was a tribune of the plebs in 47, along with P. Cornelius Dolabella and L. Trebellius.

44 Cic, Att. 12.2; Plu., Caes. 52.

45 P. A. Brunt, Italian Manpower (1971), 690.

46 Suet., Div.Jul. 56; Morgan, op. cit. (n. 39), 58–9.

47 Ap., B.C. 2.82; Plu., Caes. 46. For example, Pollio disputes Caesar's estimates of the Pompeian dead at Pharsalus.

48 Morgan, op. cit. (n. 39), 5 1, 54–5, 57.

49 Ap., B.C. 2.45–6, 82. Appian specifically mentions Pollio as a source. For modern discussions of Pollio's impact on Appian see E. Gabba, Appiano e la storia delle guerre civili (1956); Badian, E., ‘Appian and Asinius Pollio’, CR 8 (1958), 159–62;Google Scholar A. M. Gowing, The Triumviral Narratives of Appian and Cassius Dio (1992).

50 Gowing, op. cit. (n. 49), 39–50. Pollio's work was possibly transmitted to Dio through Livy.

51 Plu., Pomp. 72, Caes. 32, 46. For Plutarch see Pelling, C. B. R., ‘Plutarch's method of work in the Roman Lives’, JRS 69 (1979), 74–96Google Scholar. Pelling argues that Pollio was a major source for Plutarch's lives of Pompeius, Caesar, and Antonius. For Livy see P. G. Walsh, Livy: his Historical Aims and Methods (1961), 136. Walsh states that Pollio was an ‘obvious’ choice as a source for the period between 60 and 42.

52 Suet., Div.Jul. 30, 55–6.

53 Caes., B.G. 1.7, 10; Ap., B.C. 2.13. For an examination of Caesar's legions from 58–44 see Brunt, op. cit. (n. 45), 466–8, 473–80.

54 Caes., B.G. 2.23; 8.8.

55 Caes., B.G. 1.40.

56 Caes., B.G. 2.23,8.8.

57 Caes., B.G. 2.23.

58 Caes., B.G. 1.10.

59 Caes., B.C. 1.39–41; Dio 38.35–47; Livy, Per. 104. For modern discussions see Holmes, op. cit. (n. 12), 30–4; Hagendahl, op. cit. (n. 16), 1–40; Gelzer, op. cit. (n. 3), 107–11; C. Meier, Caesar (1995), 243–5. Elmore, J., ‘Caesar on the causes of mutiny’, CJ 20 (1924), 430–2,Google Scholar discusses the speech Caesar made to his men at Vesontio and Caesar's views on what constituted the legitimate causes of mutiny.

60 Caes., B.G. 2.2, 5.24–37, 7.51. Actually two legions were raised, but Legion XIV was destroyed in 54.

61 Caes., B.G. 5.24; Suet., Div.Jul. 24.

62 Caes., B.G. 6.1.

63 Caes., B.G. 6.32. This replaced the Legion XIV destroyed in 54.

64 Caes., B.G. 6.32, 8.4.

65 Caes., B.G. 6.1, 8.54.

66 Caes., B.G. 7.1,8.24.

67 Caes., B.G. 8.54; Suet., Div.Jul. 29; Brunt, op. cit. (n. 45), 67–8, 474–5.

68 For the opening manoeuvres of the Civil War see Bailey, D. R. Shackleton, ‘Expectatio Corfiniensis’, JRS 46 (1956), 57–64;Google ScholarBurns, A., ‘Pompey's strategy and Domitius' last stand at Corfinium’, Historia 15 (1966), 74–95;Google ScholarHillman, T., ‘Strategic reality and the movements of Caesar, January, 49 B.C.’, Historia 37 (1988), 248–52Google Scholar. Burns in particular focuses on the effects of Caesar's narrative on the historical tradition. Caesar of course attempted to justify his actions in crossing the Rubicon, while at the same time attempting to ruin the reputations of his enemies. This is especially true of his treatment of the Pompeian general Domitius and the mutiny of his men at Corfinium (Caes., B.C. 1.16–23). However, in this case, Cicero's letters provide an independent account of events (Cic, Att. 4.8, 7.13, 23–4, 26, 8.1, 3, 6–7, 11–12). Burns notes (87) that in Caesar's version of the opening stages of the war ‘we find all the techniques that Caesar uses consistently to impose his coloration on the events while seemingly preserving his objectivity’.

69 Caes., B.G. 8.54, B.C. 1.7.

70 Caes., B.C. 1.15.

71 Caes., B.C. 1.18.

72 Caes., B.C. 1.25.

73 Caes., B.C. 1.32; Cic, Att. 9.15. Of the three new legions with Caesar on his march to Brundisium, two were sent to Sicily and one to Sardinia.

74 Caes., B.C. 1.45.

75 Caes., B.C. 1.46.

76 Caes., B.G. 8.54; B.C. 1.37.

77 Caes., B.C. 1.36, 57.

78 Caes., B.C. 1.39.

79 Caes., B.C. 1.87, 2.22, 3.2, 6; Holmes, op. cit. (n. 12), 74; Scullard, op. cit. (n. n ), 136–7.

80 Caes., B.C. 2.21–2.

81 Ap., B.C. 2.47–8; Dio 41.26–36; Suet., Div.Jul. 69; Luc, Phar. 5.237–373; Front., Stra. 4.5.2; Plu., Caes. 37. Appian, Dio, and Suetonius all discuss the mutiny, and its location at Placentia. Appian and Suetonius specifically mention Legion IX. Frontinus discusses Caesar's success in quelling the mutiny, but provides little detail. Plutarch omits mention of the mutiny, but chronicles the discontent in Caesar's army as it marched from Spain to Brundisium. As noted above, the mutiny is not included in Caesar's account of the Civil War.

82 Suet., Div.Jul. 69; Ap., B.C. 2.47. Suetonius mentions only Legion IX. Appian states that the men of Legion IX ‘instigated’ the mutiny, possibly implying that others were involved.

83 Caes., B.C. 1.52; Suet., Div.Jul. 68. This would be true in Greece.

84 Ap., B.C. 2.47; Dio 41.26.

85 Caes., B.C. 1.45.

86 Caes., B.C. 2.22; Plu., Caes. 37.

87 Ap., B.C. 2.47.

88 Dio 41.26.

89 Ap., B.C. 2.47; Caes., B.C. 2.21–2; Holmes, op. cit. (n. 12), 77, 94.

90 Ap., B.C. 2.47; Caes., B.C. 2.22. Though he does not mention the mutiny in his own narrative, Caesar does state that he and the three veteran legions left Massilia at the same time. It is almost inconceivable that he would not have used these soldiers for support at Placentia.

91 Dio 41.26.

92 Ap., B.C. 2.47; Suet., Div.Jul. 69; Dio 41.27–35.

93 Ap., B.C. 2.47; Suet., Div.Jul. 69; Dio 41.35; Front. 4.5.2.

94 Ap., B.C. 2.47.

95 Dio 41.26.

96 Caes., B.C. 2.22, 3.2.

97 Caes., B.C. 3.2; Brunt, op. cit. (n. 45), 475.

98 Caes., B.C. 3.2, 87, 100–1; [Caes.], B.Al. 44–7; B.Af. 10; Cic, Att. 11.5, 9. After recovering, some of these soldiers were placed under the command of P. Vatinius to guard Brundisium, while P. Sulpicius Rufus took the rest to garrison Vibo. They remained there, protecting these ports against possible invasion until Caesar's return in 47. Later, these seven cohorts served in Africa.

99 Caes., B.C. 3.22.

100 Caes., B.C. 3.6.

101 Caes., B.C. 3.29.

102 Caes., B.C. 3.29, 34, 56–7, 106; Plu., Caes. 43. This legion was not present at Pharsalus, but later accompanied Caesar to Egypt.

103 Legions XI and XII: Caes., B.C. 3.34; Legions VIII, IX, and X: Caes., B.C. 3.89; Legion VI: [Caes.], B.Al. 33. These legions are specifically attested.

104 Caes., B.C. 3.106; [Caes.], B.Al. 33, 77.

105 [Caes.], B.Af. 54; Ap., B.C. 2.92; Cic, Phil. 2.59.

106 Dio 42.52.

107 [Caes.], B.Al. 65; B.Af. 54.

108 [Caes.], B.Af. 28, 54; Holmes, op. cit. (n. 12), 258; Grant, op. cit. (n. 10), 210.

109 Plu., Ant. 9–10; Cic, Phil. 2.59–62. For a detailed account of Antonius' activities in Rome and Italy in 48/47 see Huzar, op. cit. (n. 7), 63–9.

110 Cic, Att. 11.7. This letter dated 17 December 48 shows Antonius in Rome exercising power.

111 [Caes.], B.Al. 42–3; Brunt, op. cit. (n. 45), 475–7.

112 Cae., B.G. 1.39–41, 8.38; B.C. 1.64, 71–2, 78–9.

113 Ap., B.C. 2.92; Suet., Div.Jul. 70; Dio 42.53.

114 Caes., B.C. 3.2.

115 Caes., B.C. 3.2, 87.

116 Caes., B.C. 1.89; Ap., B.C. 2.82; Plu., Caes. 46. For a discussion of the size of the rival armies at Pharsalus see Brunt, op. cit. (n. 45), III, 689–96; Holmes, op. cit. (n. 12), 472–6. Brunt, using information ultimately derived from Pollio, suggests that in Caesar's account the numbers at Pharsalus, as elsewhere, were deliberately or inadvertently altered in his favour.

117 Caes., B.C. 1.45–6, 3.62–71. The losses at Ilerda in Spain helped precipitate the mutiny of 49. The legion sustained more casualties at Dyrrachium in 48.

118 Caes., B.C. 3.89.

119 Caes., B.C. 3.106; [Caes.], B.Al. 33, 69, 77.

120 Caes., B.C. 3.34, 56, 106; [Caes.], B.Al. 33; Dio 41.51.

121 Caes., B.C. 1.52, 3.96.

122 Caes., B.C. 3.80; Suet., Div.Jul. 68.

123 [Caes.], B.Af. 47.

124 Ap., B.C. 2.92; Dio 42.52.

125 Suet., Div.Jul. 33.

126 Corfinium, Iguvium, Ariminum, Arretium, Pisaurum, Fanum, Ancona, and Firmum, for example, were all spared.

127 Caes., B.C. 1.8, 11–12, 16, 21, 23, 28, 86–7, 2.22, 3.80–1. In Greece only Gomphi was stormed.

128 Caes., B.C. 2.22.

129 Caes., B.C. 1.23, 86–7. For example, Pompeian officers captured at Corfinium and Pompeian soldiers captured in Spain were all freed and allowed to keep their property.

130 Ap., B.C. 2.92; Dio 42.52; Cic, Att. 11.22.

131 Caes., B.C. 1.39.

132 Suet., Div.Jul. 68.

133 Caes., B.C. 1.39.

134 Dio 42.49–50; Suet., Div.Jul. 54. As will be demonstrated later Antonius definitely did not have the financial resources to keep the men happy. Caesar's first act upon returning to Rome in 47 was to raise money from every source possible to provide for his soldiers. This implies that he too did not have the necessary funds on hand to satisfy his men. During 47, there may have been nobody providing them with regular pay.

135 Caes., B.C. 3.6; Ap., B.C. 2.47.

136 Ap., B.C. 2.92.

137 Ap., B.C. 2.92.

138 Suet., Div.Jul. 25, 26, 28, 54, 65, 67. They received double pay and other economic benefits. For discussions of Caesar and the Republican soldiers' pay see Watson, G. R., ‘The pay of the Roman army’, Historia 7 (1958), 115–20;Google ScholarBoren, H., ‘Studies relating to the stipendium militum’, Historia 32 (1993), 446–9;Google ScholarAlston, R., ‘Roman military pay from Caesar to Diocletian’, JRS 84 (1994), 113–23Google Scholar.

139 Caes., B.G. 1.40. As argued by Elmore, op. cit. (n. 59), 430–2.

140 Ap., B.C. 2.47; Caes., B.C. 1.71–2, 3.90; [Caes.], B.Af. 82–3, 85. For a discussion of the class divisions between soldier and commander, and in particular Caesar's policy of clemency which brought him into conflict with his men, see MacMullen, R., ‘The legion as society’, Historia 33 (1984), 451–3Google Scholar.

141 Caes., B.C. 1.64,72.

142 [Caes.], B.Af. 85. This happened again in Africa in 46. Caesar's soldiers ignored his orders to spare the Pompeian survivors after the Battle of Thapsus and instead massacred them to a man.

143 Caes., B.C. 3.91. Before Pharsalus, a centurion in Caesar's army, possibly reflecting the general belief of the men, proclaimed that ‘only this one battle remains’.

144 Cic., Att. 11.17a.

145 Dio 42.30.

146 Cic., Att. 11.7, 10, 12; Plu., Cat. Min. 55–7.

147 Cic, Att. 11.15, 18. Cicero heard these rumours by May of 47.

148 [Caes.], B.Al. 48–64; Cic, Att. 11.10.

149 Cic., Att. 11.10; Gelzer, op. cit. (n. 3), 254.

150 Some modern historians mistakenly believe that the mutiny was a relatively minor event involving only Legion X, or Legions X and XII. See Messer, op. cit. (n. 4), 158; Fantham, op. cit. (n. 5), 120; Kahn, op. cit. (n. 7), 387.

151 [Caes.], B.Al. 77–8. Only Legion VI, which was on its way back from the East, did not participate.

152 [Caes.], B.Af. 19. The trouble inspired confidence in T. Labienus and Caesar's other enemies in Africa.

153 Cic, Att. 11.20.

154 Ap., B.C. 2.92.

155 Legion V: [Caes.], B.Af. 28, 54; Cic, Att. 11.22; Legion X: Suet., Div.Jul. 70; Ap., B.C. 2.94; [Caes.], B.Af. 54; Legion XII: Cic, Att. n.21.

156 Ap., B.C. 2.92; Dio 42.53–4; Suet., Div.Jul. 70; Livy, Per. 113; Front., Stra. 1.9.4.

157 Ap., B.C. 2.93; Dio 42.53.

158 [Caes.], B.Af. 54; Plu., Ant. 10; Dio 42.52.

159 Dio 42.30; Cic, Att. 11.16. In a letter dated to June 47 Cicero states that he believes the mutiny will end before Caesar returns to Italy. It is possible that this corresponds to Antonius' impending trip to Campania.

160 Huzar, op. cit. (n. 7), 69, notes that Antonius did not possess the necessary ‘prestige, power, or wealth to resolve the issues’.

161 Cic, Att. 11.16. Cicero underestimated the situation, believing that the problems in Campania would be ended before Caesar's return. Though the failure of Antonius may have come as a surprise, he probably still expected Caesar to quell the trouble with ease when he arrived.

162 Cic, Att. 11.16; Dio 42.30; [Caes.], B.Al. 65. Cicero, Dio, and the author of the Alexandrian War all imply that the disturbances in Campania were contemporaneous with Dolabella's disturbances in Rome.

163 Dio 42.30.

164 Dio 42.30–2; Plu., Ant. 9; Livy, Per. 113.

165 Cic, Att. 11.20–1. Cicero's information concerning Caesar's planned movements was reliable; it derived from Caesar's subordinate M. Gallius who had just arrived from the East and met Cicero at Brundisium around 15 August.

166 Cic, Att. 11.20; [Caes.], B.Al. 65. The author of the Alexandrian War states that Caesar learned about the troubles in Campania when he arrived in Syria. Cicero's letter of 15 August 47 reveals that a freedman of C. Trebonius left Caesar in Antioch and, after a twenty-eight day trip, arrived in Italy. This means Caesar learned of the problems at the latest by 18 July.

167 Cic., Att. 11.20.

168 Cic., Att. 11.20.

169 Cic, Att. 11.21–2; Caes., B.C. 3.89. Sulla commanded Legion X in the Battle of Pharsalus.

170 Cic, Att. 11.21–2; [Caes.], B.Af. 28.

171 Cic, Att. 11.20–1.

172 [Caes.], B.Af. 28.

173 Cic., Att. 11.21–2.

174 Cic., Att. 11.22.

175 Cic., Att. 11.21.

176 Dio 42.49–50.

177 Dio 42.50; Suet., Div.Jul. 54.

178 Plu., Ant. 10.

179 Ap., B.C. 2.92; Dio 42.52.

180 Dio 42.52; Plu., Caes. 51. The men were C. Cosconius (pr. ?54) and an unknown Galba. The use of violence marked a new stage in the development of the mutiny.

181 Ap., B.C. 2.92

182 Plu., Caes. 51; Ap., B.C. 2.93; Suet., Div.Jul. 70; Dio 42.53.

183 Suet., Caes. 70; Ap., B.C. 2.94; Front., Stra. 1.9.4.

184 Luc, Phar. 5.237–373. Lucan uses the episode for just such a purpose. See Fantham, op. cit. (n. 5), 123–31.

185 Curt. 9.2.1–3.19, 10.2.8–4.2; Fantham, op. cit. (n. 5), 126–31; Carney, E., ‘The Macedonians and mutiny’, CP 91 1 (1996), 19–44Google Scholar.

186 Livy 28.24–32; Polyb. 11.25–30; Zon. 9.9–10; Ap., Iber. 34–7.

187 Tac., Ann. 1.31–44; Williams, M. F., ‘Four mutinies: Tacitus Annals 1.16–30; 1.31–49 and Ammianus Marcellinus Res Gestae 20.4.9–20.5.7; 24.3.1–8.’, Phoenix 51 (1997), 44–74CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

188 Suet., Div.Jul. 67, 69–70.

189 Front., Stra. 1.9.4.

190 Dio 42.52.

191 [Caes.], B.Al. 77–8.

192 See above, p. 71.

193 Dio 42.54; Livy, Per. 113; Plu., Caes. 51. After lengthy campaigns in the East, Legion VI was to rest in Italy during the African War. It was the only Gallic legion to fight in Spain but not Africa: [Caes.], B.His. 12.

194 Brunt, op. cit. (n. 45), 320.

195 Cic, Att. 11.21. The participation of Legion XII in the mutiny is specifically attested.

196 Caes., B.C. 3.2, 87, 100–1; [Caes.], B.Al. 44–7, B.Af. 10; Cic, Att. 11.5,9.

197 Plu., Caes. 51.

198 Plu., Caes. 51; Dio 42.54. For a detailed discussion of veteran settlement see L. Keppie, Colonization and Veteran Settlement in Italy (1983), 49–52.

199 Cic., Fam. 9.17; Keppie, op. cit. (n. 198), 87–8. In a letter to L. Papirius Paetus, Cicero discussed land surveys conducted by Caesar's agents in the summer or fall of 46. Certainly Caesar was not present in Etruria as the work continued, nor would the process have ended when he left for Spain.

200 Keppie, op. cit. (n. 198), 50–8.

201 Dio 42.53; Ap., B.C. 2.93.

202 [Caes.], B.Af. 60.

203 [Caes.], B.Af. 1, 60; Brunt, op. cit. (n. 45), 435. It is doubtful whether Caesar would have wished to use so many inexperienced men in Africa without more veteran support.

204 [Caes.], B.Af. 86.

205 [Caes.], B.His. 12, 23, 30.

206 Plu., Caes. 51; Dio 42.55; Suet., Div.Jul. 70.

207 Dio 42.55.

208 Suet., Div Jul. 70.

209 [Caes.], B.Af. 54. In the end, Caesar would spend more than two months in Italy providing for his men. This allowed the Pompeian army to continue to increase in strength, and forced Caesar to make a more difficult crossing to Africa. It also ensured that the African campaign would continue into 46.

210 Livy 28.24–32; Polyb. 11.25–30; Zon. 9.9–10; Ap., Iber. 34–7. The mutiny against Scipio at Sucro in 206 is a famous example. Like Caesar's men, Scipio's soldiers demanded overdue pay, supplies, promised bonuses, and discharge. Unlike Caesar, Scipio was able to quickly quell the rebellion and execute the ringleaders. For a modern discussion of the Sucro mutiny see S. G. Chrissanthos, ‘Scipio and the mutiny at Sucro, 206 B.C.’, Historia 46 (1997), 172–84.

211 I would like to take this opportunity to thank Dr D. Brendan Nagle of the University of Southern California for his invaluable assistance on this paper. I would also like to thank Martin Goodman and the Editorial Committee of JRS for their aid and constructive criticism.