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The Chinese Minority and Sino-Indonesian Diplomatic Normalization

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  24 August 2009

Leo Suryadinata
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Extract

This paper attempts to analyse Sino-Indonesian relations and the problems as perceived by Indonesian ruling and counter-elites, as well as the place of the Chinese minority in the issue of such a normalization. Pro- and anti-normalization groups are identified and two Presidential Decrees — one granting citizenship certificates and the other granting “mass naturalization” to ethnic Chinese — are analysed in the context of normalization. Possible outcomes will also be discussed.

Type
Articles
Information
Journal of Southeast Asian Studies , Volume 12 , Issue 1 , March 1981 , pp. 197 - 206
Copyright
Copyright © The National University of Singapore 1981

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References

1 For an analysis of Sino-Indonesian relations during 1949–75, see Suryadinata, Leo, Pribumi Indonesians, the Chinese Minority and China: A Study of Perceptions and Policies (Kuala Lumpur, 1978), pp. 165–89Google Scholar. For a brief account on the subject after 1975, see Suryadinata, Leo, “Indonesia in 1976: A Year of Challenge”, Southeast Asian Affairs 1977 (Singapore, 1977), p. 119Google Scholar; also Suryadinata, Leo, “Indonesia: A Year of Continuing Challenge”, Southeast Asian Affairs 1979 (Singapore, 1979), pp. 115–17CrossRefGoogle Scholar; idem, “Indonesia in 1979: Controlled Discontent”, Southeast Asian Affairs 1980 (Singapore, 1980), pp. 140–42.

2 Sinar Harapan, 24 11 1979Google Scholar.

3 Straits Times, 11 11 1978Google Scholar.

4 According to Reuters, Fretilin's “Defence Mmister” (Rogerio Lobato) told a Lisbon daily that “Hanoi was making up for the loss of aid from China which has halted all forms of help to Fretilin forces” (Straits Times, 14 01 1980Google Scholar; New Nation, 14 01 1980)Google Scholar.

5 “Stateless” is often used to refer to those Chinese who do not want to be considered either as PRC citizens or Taiwan nationals. For a discussion on the term, see Suryadinata, , Pribumi Indonesians, ppGoogle Scholar.

6 Kompas, 20 01 1979Google Scholar.

7 Wanandi, Jusuf, “Pekerjaan Rumah bagi ASEAN”, Tempo, 13 10 1979Google Scholar.

8 See, e.g., Tempo's interview with Mochtar, , “Perlu Selera untuk Melangkah”, Tempo, 29 03 1980, p. 11Google Scholar. The re-registration started in mid-June 1975 in Bandung. It was later followed in other cities.

9 Far Eastern Economic Review (hereafter FEER), 21 09 1979, p. 39Google Scholar.

10 Ibid.

11 Tjeng, Lie Tek, “Indonesia in China's Foreign Policy, 1949–1977: A Perspective from Jakarta” (Paper submitted to Leverhulme Conference on China: Development and Challenge), p. 12 (Mimeo)Google Scholar.

12 FEER, 21 09 1979, p. 39Google Scholar.

13 There was a report towards the end of 1979 that the DPR was divided on the normalization question. While the civilian faction of the ruling party GOLKAR and a large segment of the Democratic faction (PDI) favoured normalization, the military and the Islamic faction opposed such a move. See Straits Times, 26 11 1979Google Scholar.

14 Straits Times, 22 01 1979Google Scholar.

15 For the military and cukong's connections with Taiwan see Crouch, Harold, “Generals and Business in Indonesia”, Pacific Affairs 48, no. 4 (Winter 1975/1976), esp. pp. 528ffCrossRefGoogle Scholar.

16 Kompas, Team, “Pro dan Kontra Mengenai Normalisasi Hubungan Dengan RRC”, Kompas, 2 06 1977Google Scholar.

17 Tempo, 27 10 1979, p. 10Google Scholar.

18 Sinar Harapan, 14 03 1980Google Scholar.

19 Rodney Tasker in his article entitled “Stopping Any Shade of Red” stated that “Three years ago the paper [Merdeka] is understood to have received a US$3.5 million loan from the Soviets” (FEER, 24 08 1979, p. 24)Google Scholar. Nurman Diah denied this. He wrote that “Merdeka had no need of any loan, either from the West or from the Soviets.” But Diah noted in the same letter that “The latest expansion of Merdeka was in 1971, when it modernized its plant with some modern presses. A foreign bank gave the loan, now repaid to the last cent.” There was no mention of the bank's name. “Letters to the Editor: Asia and the Power of the Soviets”, FEER, 19 10 1979, p. 8Google Scholar.

20 It is interesting to note that Merdeka's views have often been quoted by Moscow's and Hanoi's publications as representing Indonesia. See Borisov, V., “Beijing's Expansionist Plans in Southeast Asia”, International Affairs (Moscow), no. 6 (1979), pp. 22–23Google Scholar; Nguyen, Hoang, “When the Hoa Become Peking's Political Cards Against Vietnam”, The Hoa in Vietnam, Dossier II (Hanoi, 1978), p. 16Google Scholar. It is also noticeable that in the last few years, the Merdeka group published numerous articles attacking the PRC and the West. Most recent examples are Merdeka's editorial, “Strategi Neo-Kolonial”, 18 01 1980, and a book entitled Ancaman Dari Utara (Jakarta, 1980)Google Scholar.

21 Kamm, Henry, “Indonesia's Chinese: ‘Real Rulers’ or a Harried Minority?” The New York Times, 31 05 1979Google Scholar.

22 Ibid. In July, Prisma's editors denied that they had made such outrageous statements to Henry Kamm. They said that those quotes in Kamm's article “are completely false”. However, they stated that “we did say something about the Chinese problem in Indonesia, including the acknowledgement of the presence of racial sentiments, to which by the end of the interview, Mr. Kamm accused us of being racial. But what is racialism? Are all indigenous endeavours to strengthen the lame foot of the indigenous Indonesian people in political and economic terms a kind of racialism?” See letter by Editors of Prisma sent to New York Times, dated July 1979 (mimeo).

23 Tempo, 15 03 1980, p. 13Google Scholar.

24 DrSH, Ch. Himawan, “Mencari Bukti Kewarganegaraan RI: Siapa Yang Harus ke Camat?” Kompas, 16 04 1980Google Scholar.

25 This ministerial joint decision is called “Surat Keputusan Bersama Menteri Kehakiman dan Menteri dalam Negeri No. 42/1980 tanggal 10 Maret 1980”. According to this regulation, in order to obtain a citizenship certificate, a person should fulfil the following requirements: (1) be born and brought up in Indonesia; (2) lives as a member of the Indonesian society; (3) be able to speak Bahasa Indonesia or an Indonesian dialect; (4) when Presidential Instruction No. 2 is issued, the person should reside in one of the following areas: Sumatra Utara, Riau, Kalimantan Barat, DKI Jakarta, Kabupaten Bangka, Belitung, Tangerang, Bekasi, Bogor, Karawang, and Kotamadya Pangkalpinang; (5) has never rejected Indonesian citizenship during the period 27 Dec. 1949 to 27 Dec. 1950; (6) has never left Indonesia on “no-return condition”; (7) has no signs of being an alien. On the final point, it is of course difficult to determine. To solve this problem, Dr. Ch. Himawan SH argued that a “team gabungan” (united team) from the central government will be sent to help the camat (sub-district head). See Dr. Ch. Himawan SH, op. cit., Kompas, 16 04 1980Google Scholar. A person who voted in the Indonesian general elections will also qualify for a citizenship certificate. For the content of the regulation in Bahasa Indonesia, see Himawan, op. cit., also Topik, no. 96 (19 04 1980), p. 5Google Scholar.

26 FEER, 14 03 1980, p. 32Google Scholar.

27 Ibid.

28 Criticisms of this decree can be found in Tempo, 10 05 1980, p. 44Google Scholar.

29 See Appendix.

30 For a detailed account on the Indonesian nationality policy towards ethnic Chinese from 1946 to 1975, see Suryadinata, , Pribumi Indonesians, pp. 113–27Google Scholar.

31 Kompas, Editorial, 29 02 1980Google Scholar. Many are less optimistic about the implementation of these decrees. Bureaucratic inefficiency and rampant “irregularities” are two major factors which may retard the process. In addition, the large number of “ethnic Chinese” applications might also prove difficult to process efficiently. Many argue that it will not be possible for Presidential Instruction No. 2 to be completed by 17 Aug. 1980, and Presidential Decision No. 13 will require an even longer period of completion. According to recent information, the target date for the completion of Presidential Decision No. 13 is the 1982 election.

32 Ibid.

* Proficiency in Bahasa Indonesia and a fair knowledge of Indonesian history are not waived. They are included in Section 3, Article 3 of this decree.