Hostname: page-component-cd9895bd7-7cvxr Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-12-27T12:53:12.852Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

The Evolution of Australia's Defence Policy in relation to Malaysia-Singapore, 1964–1971

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  24 August 2009

Derek McDougall
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Extract

Australia's defence commitment in Malaysia-Singapore is of long standing. In the 1920's and 1930's non-Labour governments in particular had seen the Singapore base as the linchpin of Australian security. Despite Singapore's failure to play this role during World War II, the Malaysian area continued to play an important role in Australian defence thinking in the post-1945 period. Australia began participating in the ANZAM arrangement in 1949, and subsequently committed forces in the campaign against the Malayan Communists. As early as May 1950 the Menzies Government decided to send a squadron of Dakota aircraft to Malaya. In April 1955 this commitment was considerably enlarged to include an infantry battalion, a fighter wing of two squadrons and a bomber wing of one squadron, as well as a permanent naval force of either two destroyers or two frigates. This commitment has provided the basis of the Australian military presence in the area ever since Australia “associated” herself with the Anglo-Malayan Defence Agreement in 1959, and the extension of this agreement to Malaysia in 1963. Australia adopted a cautious policy during the period of confrontation and, for fear of antagonising Indonesia unduly, did not finally make combat forces available for service in East Malaysia until February 1965. This article is concerned primarily with developments which have affected the Australian defence presence in Malaysia-Singapore since the Wilson Government took office in the United Kingdom in October 1964. It examines the Australian reaction to the march of events in Britaín which culminated in the decision to withdraw British forces from Malaysia-Singapore by the end of 1971, and the attempt by Australia to redefine her role in the light of the new situation.

Type
Articles
Information
Journal of Southeast Asian Studies , Volume 3 , Issue 1 , March 1972 , pp. 97 - 110
Copyright
Copyright © The National University of Singapore 1972

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

1 The best general account of Australian policy towards Malaya during the 1940's and 1950's is Boyce, P., ‘Twenty-One Years of Australian Diplomacy in Malaya’, Journal of Southeast Asian History, vol. 4 no. 2 (09 1963), pp. 65–100CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Defence policy is examined at pp. 78–87.

2 Royal Institute of International Affairs, Collective Defence in Southeast Asia (London and New York, 1956), p. 20Google Scholar.

3 Current Notes on International Affairs, vol. 21 no. 5 (05 1950), p. 354Google Scholar.

4 Ibid., vol. 26 no. 4 (April 1955), p. 279.

5 Department of External Affairs, Malaysia (Select Documents on International Affairs No. 1 of 1963), p. 206.

6 Current Notes on International Affairs, vol. 36 no. 2 (02 1965), p. 98Google Scholar.

7 ‘External Affairs’ will be used in this article since that was the title during most of the period under consideration.

8 House of Commons Debates, vol. 710, ‘Written Answers’, col. 56 (6 April 1965); vol. 717, ‘Written Answers’, cols. 427–428 (5 August 1965).

9 Age, 11 August 1965.

10 Current Notes on International Affairs, vol. 36 no. 8 (08 1965), p. 505Google Scholar.

11 Age, 31 January 1966.

12 Canberra Times, 19 January 1966.

13 Ibid., 27 January 1966.

14 Times, 2 February 1966.

15 Ibid..

16 Current Notes on International Affairs, vol. 37 no. 2 (02 1966), p. 79Google Scholar.

17 Ibid..

18 House of Commons Debates, vol. 727, ‘Written Answers’, col. 23 (27 April 1966).

19 Australian, 4 June 1966. On 24 August 1966 Holt announced that the Australian Government had decided to undertake an investigation into the possibility of establishing naval support facilities for the Royal Australian Navy at Cockburn Sound. The investigation would ‘take fully into account the possible needs of allied navies for use of the proposed facilities, including in particular the possible needs of the Royal Navy’. (Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, H of R No. 52, pp. 342–343).

20 See in particular Cmnd. 2901, Statement on the Defence Estimates 1966. Part I The Defence Review (London: H.M.S.O., 1966), p. 8, para. 24Google Scholar.

21 Canberra Times, 24 February 1966.

22 Times, 26 May 1966.

23 Ibid. The motion was in fact defeated when it was put to a vote on 15 June 1966: 54 in favour, 255 against, with about 50 abstentions (Ibid., 16 June 1966).

24 Ibid., 28 May 1966.

25 Age, 1 June 1966.

26 Ibid., 3 June 1966. For a statement by Wilson on the matter, see House of Commons Debates, vol. 729, cols. 1239–1242 (14 June 1966).

27 Age, 3 June 1966.

28 Sydney Morning Herald, 29 June 1966.

29 Times, 12 July 1966.

30 Canberra Times, 16 July 1966.

31 Mayhew, Christopher, Britain's Role Tomorrow (London: Hutchinson, 1967), p. 7Google Scholar.

32 House of Commons Debates, vol. 732, col. 632.

33 Age, 22 April 1967.

34 Ibid.

35 See Observer, 23 April 1967; Age, 21 April 1967; ibid., 22 April 1967.

36 Ibid., 21 April 1967.

37 Ibid., 3 June 1967.

38 Ibid., 14 June 1967.

39 Ibid., 15 June 1967.

40 C.f. Healey's statement to a meeting of the Parliamentary Labour Party on 19 July 967 (Times, 20 July 1967). The journalist Maximilian Walsh argued that Healey's statement in the House of Commons on 18 July 1967 that the precise timing of complete Britísh withdrawal from the Far East would ‘depend on progress made in achieving a new basis for stability in South-East Asia’ represented ‘a measure of success for Holt’ (Australian Financial Review, 19 July 1967).

41 Age, 16 June 1967.

42 Press conference in Sydney on 22 June 1967 (ibid., 23 June 1967).

43 Cmnd. 3357, Supplementary Statement on Defence Policy 1967 (London: H.M.S.O., 1967), p. 5, paras. 6 and 8Google Scholar.

44 Age, 20 July 1967.

45 Ibid.

46 Ibid.

47 Ibid.

48 Ibid.

49 Current Notes on International Affairs, vol. 38 no. 8 (08 1967), p. 309Google Scholar.

50 Defence Report 1967 (Canberra, 1967), p. 11Google Scholar.

51 Cmnd. 3515, Public Expenditure in 1968–69 and 1969–70 (London: H.M.S.O., 1968), p. 5, para. 12Google Scholar.

52 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, H of R No. 10, pp. 2685–6 (2 11 1967)Google Scholar.

53 Current Notes on International Affairs, vol. 39 no. 1 (01 1968), p. 29Google Scholar.

54 Ibid., p. 30.

55 Ibid.

56 Age, 18 January 1968.

57 Ibid., 11 May 1968. For Fairhall's defence statement see Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, H of R No. 5, pp. 1073–84, especially p. 1075. Among the backbenchers' speeches, see in particular those by Jess (ibid., pp. 1102–6); Howson (ibid., H of R No. 6 (7 May 1968), pp. 1141–5); Turner (ibid., pp. 1161–5); St. John (ibid., pp. 1168–72).

58 President Johnson indicated in a speech during Gorton's visit to the United States in May 1968 that he hoped Australia would play a leading role in ‘the new Asia’. (Age, 29 May 1968). Defence Secretary McNamara in his ‘defence posture’ report to the Senate Armed Services Committee (as released on 1 February 1968) stated that the United States would ‘encourage a prominent Australian-New Zealand role and continuing Australian eflForts to consult the countries of the region about arrangements that will compensate for the British withdrawal’. (Statement of Secretary of Defence Robert S. McNamara Before the Senate Armed Services Committee on the Fiscal Year 1969–73 Defence Program and 1969 Defence Budget, p. 16). Another specific statement of the official American position was contained in the testimony of William Bundy (Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs) before the Subcommittee on Foreign Operations and Related Agencies of the House of Representatives Committee on Appropriations on 14 May 1968: ‘… we do not intend … to undertake any new commitments in regard to Malaysia or Singapore to replace any activities undertaken by the British … we have made it very clear that Australia and New Zealand must play the external role there and that we do not propose to do so. ‘(Foreign Assistance and Related Agencies Appropriations for 1969: Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations House of Representatives, 90th Congress, 2nd Session, Part 2 Economic Assistance, pp. 1163–64).

59 Age, 11 June 1968.

60 Ibid., 12 June 1968.

61 Current Notes on International Affairs, vol. 39 no. 6 (06 1968), pp. 249, 250Google Scholar.

62 Ibid., p. 250.

63 Ibid., vol. 38 no. 8 (August 1967), p. 310.

64 Age, 14 February 1968.

65 Ibid., 20 April 1968; 22 April 1968.

66 Current Notes on International Affairs, vol. 40 no. 2 (02 1969), pp. 41–44Google Scholar.

67 Ibid., vol. 40 no. 6 (June 1969), pp. 300–303.

68 Ibid., pp. 305–11.

69 Age, 19 June 1969; Straits Times, 19 June 1969.

70 Current Notes on International Affairs, vol. 40 no. 2 (02 1969), pp. 42–43Google Scholar.

71 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, H of R No. 4, p. 754 (7 04 1970)Google Scholar.

72 Current Notes on International Affairs, vol. 40 no. 6 (06 1969), p. 309Google Scholar; Age, 21 June 1969.

73 Ibid., 13 September 1969.

74 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, H of R No. 11, pp. 320–321 (14 08 1969)Google Scholar.

75 Australian, 10 February 1970.

76 Current Notes on International Affairs, vol. 41 no. 3 (03 1970), p. 97Google Scholar. McMahon may have felt that such a statement would strengthen the Conservatives in their resolve to maintain a defence force in Malaysia-Singapore.

77 Ibid., pp. 137–151.

78 See Australian, 7 July 1970; Age, 11 September 1970; Australian, 2 March 1971.

79 Ibid., 16 April 1971.

80 Ibid.

81 Age, 4 May 1971. The new arrangement, agreed upon at the London five-power conference as the replacement for the Anglo-Malaysian Defence Agreement, stated that in the event of ‘any form of armed attack externally organised or supported or the threat of such attack against Malaysia or Singapore, (the governments of the five powers) would immediately consult together for the purpose of deciding what measures should be taken jointly or separately.’ (ibid., 22 April 1971).

82 Ibid., 22 April 1971; 4 May 1971.

83 The subsequent settlement of the rental dispute between Singapore and Australia supports this interpretation to some extent. Australia offered training facilities for Singaporean forces in Australia. Married quarters used by Australian forces in Singapore would be paid for at 75% of market rental, and recreational and educational facilities at an annual rate of 4% of their capital value. Rental would not be paid on military facilities used by Australian forces, (ibid., 2 November 1971).

84 For an appraisal of contemporary Australian relations with Malaysia and Singapore, see Boyce, Peter, “Australia, Singapore and Malaysia”, Australia's Neighbours, Fourth Series, No. 76 (07-08 1971), pp. l–4Google Scholar.