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First-order logic based on inclusion and abstraction

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  12 March 2014

John Bacon*
Affiliation:
The University of Sydney, New South Wales, Australia2006

Extract

Quine has shown that set theory may be based on inclusion and abstraction [1937], [1953]. He quantifies over (or abstracts upon) sets of all kinds, of course, including sets of sets. Here I confine Quine's approach to quantification over (abstraction upon) individuals alone, or at any rate their unit classes. Forsaking quantification over sets undercuts Quine's definition of negation, however. Smullyan sketches a first-order restriction of Quine's approach with no bound class variables for which inclusion and abstraction alone are adequate logical primitives [1957, n. 10]. However, the definition of negation requires more than one element in the universe of discourse. This requirement is met for Smullyan because he is doing arithmetic. Here, on the other hand, I presuppose only that the universe is nonempty. Accordingly, I assume a third primitive notion, the empty class. I will show that this threefold basis suffices both for classical first-order logic and for a version of “free” many-sorted logic. The monadic fragment, which I call Boolean logic with abstraction, is intermediate in strength between Boolean class logic and Lesniewski's Ontology. It affords a novel perspective on descriptions, particularly in their generic use.

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © Association for Symbolic Logic 1982

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References

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