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A generalization of the antilogism

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  12 March 2014

Ray H. Dotterer
Ray H. Dotterer*
Affiliation:
The Pennsylvania State College
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Extract

The Ladd-Franklin “antilogism” provides a very convenient procedure for testing syllogistic arguments, especially when they are expressed algebraically. It is well known, however, that the antilogism test indicates the invalidity of certain moods which the traditional logic regards as valid. These are the moods in which a particular conclusion is inferred from two universal premises. It is the aim of this paper to show that the antilogism can be generalized in such a way as to cover these moods, and also to be applicable to certain forms of “immediate inference” and “sorites,” as these designations have been traditionally employed.

We shall find that when generalized in this fashion there are two principal kinds of antilogisms: (1) those which include an inequation of the form ab≠0, and (2) those which include an inequation of the form a≠0.

Definition. An antilogism is a group of propositions so constructed that the contradictory of any one of them is implied by the logical product of the others.

Type
Research Article
Information
The Journal of Symbolic Logic , Volume 6 , Issue 3 , September 1941 , pp. 90 - 95
Copyright
Copyright © Association for Symbolic Logic 1941

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References

1 For summaries of the doctrine of the antilogism, see Eaton, R. M., General logic, pp. 132 ff.Google Scholar; also Baldwin's Dictionary of philosophy and psychology, articles on Syllogism and Symbolic logic, both of which were written in part by Mrs. Ladd-Franklin.

2 Cf. Lewis, C. I. and Langford, C. H., Symbolic logic, pp. 64 fGoogle Scholar.

3 Throughout this paper the word “proposition” is used in such a way as to restrict it to equations and inequations of the forms ab = 0, ab≠0, a≠0. This restriction is made explicit in Rule 2 below.