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Well-Being Policy: What Standard of Well-Being?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  29 December 2015

DANIEL M. HAYBRON  and
VALERIE TIBERIUS
DANIEL M. HAYBRON
Affiliation:
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITYhaybron@gmail.com
VALERIE TIBERIUS
Affiliation:
UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTAtiberius@umn.edu
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Abstract:

This paper examines the norms that should guide policies aimed at promoting happiness or, more broadly, well-being. In particular, we take up the question of which conception of well-being should govern well-being policy (WBP), assuming some such policies to be legitimate. In answer, we lay out a case for ‘pragmatic subjectivism’: given widely accepted principles of respect for persons, well-being policy may not assume any view of well-being, subjectivist or objectivist. Rather, it should promote what its intended beneficiaries see as good for them: pleasure for hedonists, excellence for Aristotelians, etc. Specifically, well-being policy should promote citizens’ ‘personal welfare values’: those values—and not mere preferences—that individuals see as bearing on their well-being. Finally, we briefly consider how pragmatic subjectivism works in practice. While our discussion takes for granted the legitimacy of well-being policy, we suggest that pragmatic subjectivism strengthens the case for such policy.

Keywords

political philosophyethicsnormative ethicsphilosophy of sciencephilosophy of economicsphilosophy of social sciencewell-beinghappiness
Type
Articles
Information
Journal of the American Philosophical Association , Volume 1 , Issue 4 , Winter 2015 , pp. 712 - 733
Copyright
Copyright © American Philosophical Association 2015 

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