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Objectivity and Reflection in Heidegger's Theory of Intentionality

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2016

TUCKER MCKINNEY
TUCKER MCKINNEY*
Affiliation:
COLLEGE OF WILLIAM AND MARYtwmckinney@wm.edu
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Abstract:

Heidegger claims that Dasein's capacity for adopting intentional stances toward the world is grounded in the reflective structure of its being, which dictates that Dasein exists for the sake of a possibility of itself. Commentators have glossed this reflective structure in terms of the idea that our subjection to the normative demands of intentionality is grounded in a basic commitment to upholding an identity-concept, such as an occupation or a social role. I argue that this gloss has serious adverse implications for Heidegger's philosophical project and for the internal coherence of his theory of intention. I recommend an alternative gloss on the reflective structure of existence, according to which sustaining a robust claim to openness to the world specifies the universal, formal object of intentional stance-taking. The reflective structure of existence should be understood through the concept of self-maintenance rather than that of self-definition.

Keywords

history of philosophyGerman philosophytwentieth-century philosophycontinentalphenomenologyagencypractical reason
Type
Articles
Information
Journal of the American Philosophical Association , Volume 2 , Issue 1 , Spring 2016 , pp. 111 - 130
Copyright
Copyright © American Philosophical Association 2016 

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