Published online by Cambridge University Press: 15 November 2019
When a symbol is a marker of a primary bearer of value and, secondarily, a bearer of value itself, then it has symbolic value. Philosophers have long been suspicious of symbolic values, often regarding them as illusory or irrelevant. I suggest that arguments against symbolic values either overgeneralize or else require premises that can only be supported if the normative significance of some symbolic considerations is presupposed. Humans need symbols to represent identity facts to themselves and others. Symbolic values thereby contribute to individuals’ control over their own agency.
Ancestors to this paper were presented at the Center for Human Values Graduate Fellowship Workshop at Princeton University and at the Northwestern Society for the Theory of Ethics and Politics. For helpful comments and discussion on earlier drafts, I am grateful to Eric Beerbohm, Charles Beitz, Kyla Ebels-Duggan, Jessica Flanigan, Elizabeth Harman, Javier Hidalgo, Peter Jaworski, Stephen Macedo, Quinn Mecham, Kristi Olson, Kelly Patterson, Philip Pettit, and Samuel Scheffler. Thanks also to two referees for their time and very helpful criticisms and suggestions.