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What Phenomenal Contrast for Bodily Ownership?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  24 March 2020

FRÉDÉRIQUE DE VIGNEMONT
FRÉDÉRIQUE DE VIGNEMONT*
Affiliation:
INSTITUT JEAN NICODfrederique.de.vignemont@ens.fr
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Abstract

In a 1962 article, ‘On Sensations of Position’, G. E. M. Anscombe claimed that we do not feel our legs crossed; we simply know that they are that way. What about the sense of bodily ownership? Do we directly know that this body is our own, or do we know it because we feel this body that way? One may claim, for instance, that we are we aware that this is our own body thanks to our bodily experiences that ascribe the property of myness to the body that they represent. Here I approach this issue from the perspective of the debate on the admissible content of perception, appealing to the method of phenomenal contrast. After rejecting the myness hypothesis, I criticize alternative accounts of the contrast in somatosensory, cognitive, and agentive terms. I conclude that the phenomenology of ownership consists in the affective awareness of the unique significance of the body for survival.

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Articles
Information
Journal of the American Philosophical Association , Volume 6 , Issue 1 , Spring 2020 , pp. 117 - 137
Copyright
Copyright © American Philosophical Association 2020

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