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Why Can An Idea Be Like Nothing But Another Idea? A Conceptual Interpretation of Berkeley's Likeness Principle

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  16 August 2021

PETER WEST
PETER WEST*
Affiliation:
TRINITY COLLEGE DUBLINwestp@tcd.ie
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Abstract

Berkeley's likeness principle is the claim that ‘an idea can be like nothing but an idea’. The likeness principle is intended to undermine representationalism: the view (that Berkeley attributes to thinkers like Descartes and Locke) that all human knowledge is mediated by ideas in the mind that represent material objects. Yet, Berkeley appears to leave the likeness principle unargued for. This has led to several attempts to explain why Berkeley accepts it. In contrast to metaphysical and epistemological interpretations available in the literature, in this essay I defend a conceptual interpretation. I argue that Berkeley accepts the likeness principle on the basis of (1) his commitment to the transparency of ideas and (2) his account of resemblance, which he sets out in his works on vision. Thus, I provide an explanation for Berkeley's reasons for accepting the likeness principle that, appropriately, focuses on his views concerning ideas and likeness.

Keywords

Berkeleyresemblancerepresentationideaslikeness principlerelations
Type
Article
Information
Journal of the American Philosophical Association , Volume 7 , Issue 4 , Winter 2021 , pp. 530 - 548
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Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2021. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of the American Philosophical Association

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Footnotes

Thanks to Kenny Pearce, Manuel Fasko, Katia Saporiti, Peter Kail, and several anonymous reviewers for providing constructive feedback on versions this essay.

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