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On the effectiveness of elected male and female leaders and team coordination

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  17 January 2025

Ernesto Reuben Open the ORCID record for Ernesto Reuben [Opens in a new window]  and
Krisztina Timko
Ernesto Reuben*
Affiliation:
New York University Abu Dhabi, Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates
Krisztina Timko*
Affiliation:
University of Helsinki, Helsinki, Finland
*
e-mail: ereuben@nyu.edu
krisztina.timko@gmail.com
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Abstract

We study the effect on coordination in a minimum-effort game of a leader’s gender depending on whether the leader is democratically elected or is randomly selected. Leaders use non-binding messages to try to convince followers to coordinate on the Pareto-efficient equilibrium. We find that teams with elected leaders coordinate on higher effort levels. Initially, the benefits of being elected are captured solely by male leaders. However, this gender difference disappears with repeated interaction because unsuccessful male leaders are reelected more often than unsuccessful female leaders.

Keywords

Gender differencesLeadershipDemocracy effectLeader effectivenessCoordination

JEL classification

M14: Corporate Culture • Diversity • Social Responsibility M54: Labor Management C92: Laboratory, Group Behavior J16: Economics of Gender • Non-labor Discrimination
Type
Original Paper
Information
Journal of the Economic Science Association , Volume 4 , Issue 2 , December 2018 , pp. 123 - 135
Copyright
Copyright © 2018 Economic Science Association

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Footnotes

Electronic supplementary material The online version of this article (https://doi.org/10.1007/s40881-018-0056-3) contains supplementary material, which is available to authorized users.

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