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Are objectivism and subjectivism compatible concepts?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  20 April 2012

P. G. Moore
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Extract

1.l. The aim of this paper is to examine a number of issues that arise in decision-making. In particular it seeks to explore the relevance to decision-making of the commonly made polarization as between the so-called objective and subjective approaches to probability. The paper is in three parts. The first concerns utility, and the second various aspects of probability. The third and final part looks at the interplay between these two concepts. Whilst a number of the comments and illustrations refer specifically to the insurance industry, the concepts discussed are broadly set in the wider context of business and commerce as a whole. It is hoped that the paper will thereby provide a basis for discussion on a topic that has acquired increasing importance in recent years.

Type
Research Article
Information
Journal of the Institute of Actuaries , Volume 107 , Issue 1 , January 1980 , pp. 11 - 47
Copyright
Copyright © Institute and Faculty of Actuaries 1980

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