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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 09 June 2014
This article stems from an informal inquiry into how military history was employed in British and North American centres for higher military education to prepare officers for deployment to Afghanistan. The discussions were conducted with professional military educators who were actively teaching in institutions tasked with educating middle and senior ranking officers. When questioned about course reading materials and texts, there was little commonality of approach between the three North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) allies. There was, however, a common working assumption that the only applicable military history lessons were those drawn from the three Anglo-Afghan Wars fought in 1839–1842, 1878–1880 and 1919 respectively.
When asked about the linkages of Afghanistan to Pakistan and the wider South Asian region, there was a begrudging admission that the war in Afghanistan could not be fought in isolation and that any lasting peace had to be considered within a greater regional framework. Yet when it was posited that there may be benefit to a wider approach to the applicability of regional military history, those queried could see little to no benefit in considering any military history lessons but those derived from the three previously cited Anglo-Afghan Wars. This paper suggests that if military history has a useful role to play in contemporary conflict analysis and, more importantly, professional military education, then there is merit in considering a wider historic canvas and that the events of Hindustan's military past lend themselves to such an application.
1 Moyar, M., A Question of Command, Counterinsurgency from the Civil War to Iraq (New Haven and London, 2009), p. 222 Google Scholar. Interestingly, in the abstract of his dissertation, Petraeus warned, “Indeed, those who seek guidance from any past event should beware the pitfalls that await them, for history can mislead and obfuscate as well as guide and illuminate. As this dissertation will conclude, so has it been with Vietnam” (Mark Moyar was formerly holder of the Kim T. Adamson Chair of Insurgency and Terrorism at the United States Marine Corps University). See also: D. H. Petraeus, The American Military and the Lessons of Vietnam: A Study of Military Influence and the Use of Force in the Post-Vietnam Era, PhD thesis (Princeton University, 1987), p. ii, reproduction made available by UMI, Ann Arbor, Michigan.
2 ISAF is a NATO controlled military force that came into being as the result of legislative action taken by the United Nations Security Council. ISAF's official website can be found at: http://www.isaf.nato.int/
3 The First and Second Anglo-Afghan Wars are considered as 1839–1842 and 1878–1880 respectively.
4 Barfield, T., Afghanistan: A Cultural and Political History (Princeton, 2010).Google Scholar
5 Arab fighting men were often encountered on the battlefields of western India from the 16th to the 19th century, typically finding employment in coastal regions where they were readily deployed by vessels travelling from the Persian Gulf. Governor General Richard Wellesley was among those who cited their significant presence during the Battle for Bharuch in the Gujarat Campaign of 1803. Wellesley, R. C., Notes Relative To The Late Transactions In The Marhatta Empire, Fort William, 15 December 1803, with an Appendix of Official Documents, and also Six Plans of the Several Battles From Drawings Taken on the Spot (London, 1804), pp. 84–85 Google Scholar. In December 1817, Lieutenant-Colonel Valentine Blacker recorded that an enemy force of 3,000 Arab infantry were negotiated out of defending the Maratha controlled city of Nagpur. Blacker, V., Memoir of the Operations of the British Army in India during the Mahratta War of l8l7-l9 (London, l821), p. 132 Google Scholar.
6 Among the larger wars in South Asia during this period, one may list the Third (1789–1792) and Fourth (1799) Anglo-Mysore Wars, the Second (1803–1805) and Third (1817–1819) Anglo-Maratha Wars, and the War in Nepal (1814–1816).
7 National Army Museum, Chelsea, “The Journals of Captain George Isaac Call”, NAM, Acc. no. 6807–150.
8 Kolff, D. H. A., Naukar, Rajput and Sepoy: The Ethnohistory of the Military Labour Market in Hindustan, 1450–1850 (Cambridge, 1990)Google Scholar.
9 Ibid. , pp. 194–195.
10 Kilcullen, D., The Accidental Guerrilla, Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One (London, 2009)Google Scholar. The potential of part-time warriors to become full-time fighters, or “specialists in violence” was noted by Antonio Giustozzi as occurring during Afghanistan's Insurgent Warlord Period (1978–1992). Giustozzi, A., Empires of Mud, Wars and Warlords in Afghanistan (London, 2009), p. 47 Google Scholar.
11 1789–1792 and 1799 respectively.
12 1803–1805.
13 A number of the Maratha ‘Southern Jaghirdars’ broke with their kinsmen and served the British during the Third Anglo-Mysore War but then refused to fight for them in the Fourth Anglo-Mysore War. For observations on the Marathas’ willingness to exploit British logistical shortcomings to their own monetary advantage, see Dirom, Major Alexander, Deputy Adjutant General of His Majesty's Forces in India, A Narrative of the Campaign in India which Terminated The War With Tippoo Sultan in 1792 (London, 1793), p. 9 Google Scholar.
14 For a more thorough discussion of the process in 1803, see Cooper, R. G. S., The Anglo-Maratha Campaigns and the Contest for India: The Struggle for Control of the South Asian Military Economy (Cambridge, 2003)Google Scholar.
15 British Library: Asia, Pacific & Africa Collections (hereafter listed as BL: AP&AC), 0/6/6 Personal Records.
16 Pester, Lieutenant John, War and Sport in India 1802–1806, An Officer's Diary, (ed.) Devenish, J.A. (London, 1912), pp. 200–202 Google Scholar. Even by conservative reckoning, the figure of ten battalions represents no fewer than 5,000 men.
17 By way of comparison, the East India Company's debt in 1793 (following the Third Anglo-Mysore War) was £7,362,190. In April 1806 the total debt was £27,722,391, of which £16,669,745 was incurred after 1798. Richard Wellesley had overseen both the 1799 Fourth Anglo-Mysore War and the campaigns of the 1803–1805 Second Anglo-Maratha War. “Affairs of the East India Company Report from the Select Committee with Appendix 1810 (255) Vol. V”. In those reports we find 1793 as a baseline comparison and then the recovery and regeneration potential as expressed in the figures for 1808/9. British Parliamentary Papers, London.
18 See Appendix I for an example of the types of entries found on pay ledgers.
19 Charles Cornwallis was a highly experienced general known to Americans as the British officer who signed the surrender at Yorktown during the Revolutionary War. Following that disaster Cornwallis regained his honour as the Governor-General of India and he delivered a British victory in the Third Anglo-Mysore War (1789–1792). His recall to India in 1805 represented a desperate bid on the part of the East India Company to end yet another war and restore fiscally responsible behaviour.
20 Marquis Cornwallis to Lt Col. Malcolm, John, “On the river at Augaurdeep”, 14 Aug 1805, Correspondence of Charles, First Marquis Cornwallis, Vol. III, (ed.) Ross, C. (London, 1859), pp. 540–541 Google Scholar.
21 BL: AP&AC, MSS. Eur. F 176/28, The Barlow Papers, f.12, George H. Barlow to Lord Viscount Castlereagh, On the River Chunar, 21 Oct. 1805.
22 The pay ledger record in the Appendix includes a notation of the troopers’ ethnicity.
23 BL: AP&AC, MSS. Eur. F 176/28, The Barlow Papers, f.58, Gov. Gen. Barlow to Charles Grant, Chairman of the Court of Directors, Fort William, 6 May 1806.
24 Sir Penderel Moon was perhaps the most vocal historian to portray the inconclusive settlement of Richard Wellesley's Second Anglo-Maratha War as responsible for the continuing cycle of conflict with the Maratha states. He also singled out Cornwallis for particular criticism with respect to his failure to prosecute the war to its natural conclusion. Sir Moon, Penderel, The British Conquest and Dominion of India (London, 1990), p. 345 Google Scholar.
25 Neil B. Edmonstone, Sec. to Gov't at Fort William, to Mountstuart Elphinstone, Resident at Nagpur, 12 Oct 1806, including 12 enclosures and translations, as found in Selections from the Nagpur Residency Records, Vol. 1, 1799–1806, (ed.) H. N. Sinha (Nagpur, 1950), pp. 485–494.
26 BL: AP&AC, Board's Collections, F/4/394/10018/ff.1–9.
27 “Instructions for the guidance of the Governor General's Agent in Bundlecund in the event of Ameer Khan prosecuting his supposed designs against certain of the neighbouring petty Chieftains”, BL: AP&AC, Board's Collections, F/4/309/7075/ff.1–57.
28 BL: AP&AC, Board's Collections, F/4/309/7075/ff.50–52.
29 BL: AP&AC, Board's Collections, F/4/306/7016/ff.1–17.
30 This included 12-pounder cannon and 5.5-inch howitzers. BL: AP&AC, Board's Collections, F/4/394/10025/ff.1–77. “Depredations of the Pindarries”.
31 “Application from Ameer Khan soliciting employment or the grant of a Jaghire, otherwise to be allowed to pursue his plans of conquest”, BL: AP&AC, Board's Collections, F/4/335/7664, ff.1–48.
32 BL: AP&AC, Board's Collections, F/4/335/7664, ff.8–9.
33 BL: AP&AC, Board's Collections, F/4/335/7664, ff.30–31.
34 BL: AP&AC, Board's Collections, F/4/335/7664, f.41.
35 N.B. Edmonstone to A. Seton, 16 June 1810, BL: AP&AC, Board's Collections, F/4/335/7664, f.41.
36 Lest one think that the epithet ‘Soldier of Fortune’ is a derogatory western characterisation, Amir Khan used this term when referring to himself during negotiations : AP&AC, Board's Collections, F/4/335/7664, f.3, para 89, and in the title of his officially authorised biography, Memoirs of the Puthan Soldier of Fortune the Nuwab Ameer-ood-Doulah Mohummud Ameer Khan, Chief of Seronj, Tonk, Rampoora, Neemahera, and Other Places in Hindoostan, compiled in Persian by Busawun Lal, Naeb-Moonshee to the Nuwar (Calcutta, 1832).
37 A Collection of Treaties, Engagements and Sanads Relating to India and Neighbouring Countries, compiled by C.U. Aitchison, Under Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department, Vol. III, containing the treaties, &c., relating to the states in Rajputana, revised and continued up to 1930 by the authority of the foreign and political department (Calcutta,1932), pp. 244–245.
38 The Imperial Gazetteer of India, Vol. XXIII (Oxford, 1908), p. 409.
39 Memoirs of the Puthan Soldier of Fortune (Calcutta, 1832), p. 462.
40 BL: AP&AC, MSS. Eur. F 176/28, “The Barlow Papers”, ff.65–78, Gov. Gen. Barlow to Viscount Lord Castlereagh, Fort William, 9 June 1806.
41 BL: AP&AC, Board's Collections, F/4/421/10370, and “Aggressions of Scindiah's Troops on the Territories of States under the Protection of the British Government”, F/4/441/10629/ff.1–234.
42 “Proceedings in Consequence of an Irruption [sic] of Pindarries”, BL: AP&AC, Board's Collections, F/4/556/13490, ff.1–307.
43 Peers, D. M., Between Mars and Mamon, Colonial Armies and the Garrison State in India 1819–1835 (London and New York, 1995)Google Scholar.
44 Giustozzi, A., Koran, Kalashnikov and Laptop, the Neo-Taliban Insurgency in Afghanistan (London, 2007), pp. 40–41 Google Scholar.
45 C.J. Chivers, “Strategic Plans Spawned Bitter End for a Lonely Outpost”, New York Times, 25 July 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/26/world/asia/26keating.html?emc=eta
46 C.J. Chivers, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/26/world/asia/26keating.html?emc=eta.
47 Dirom, A., Deputy Adjutant General of His Majesty's Forces in India, A Narrative of the Campaign in India which Terminated The War With Tippoo Sultan in 1792 (London, 1793), pp. 1–2 Google Scholar, 7–9.
48 During the grain shortage of the 1803 campaigns, Indian merchants in Bombay brokered Arab ships carrying up to 10,000 bags of Bengal rice at a time. Maharashtra State Archives, “Misc. Records”, Records of the Grain Scarcity Commission, 317, p. 7, “The Report of Mr. Halliday, Bombay Market Clerk”. That former ISAF Commander General David H. Petraeus understood the logic of this type of contractual reallocation was evident in his 8 Sept 2010 issuance of COMISAF;'s Counterinsurgency (COIN) Contracting Guidance: http://www.isaf.nato.int/images/stories/File/100908-NUI-COMISAF%20COIN%20GUIDANCE.pdf
49 Cooper, R. G. S, “Beyond beasts and bullion: Economic considerations in Bombay's military logistics”, Modern Asian Studies, XXXIII, Pt. 1 (1999), pp. 159–184 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
50 Warlord, Inc., Extortion and Corruption Along the U.S. Supply Chain in Afghanistan, Report of the Majority Staff, Rep. John F. Tierney, Chair, Committee on Oversight and Government Reform. Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives, June 2010, p. 4.
51 International Security Assistance Force, North Atlantic Treaty Organization. http://www.isaf.nato.int/
52 Letter from John F. Tierney as Chairman to Members of the Subcommittee, 22 June 2010, located inside the cover of, Warlord, Inc., Extortion and Corruption Along the U.S. Supply Chain in Afghanistan, June 2010.
53 Helene Cooper and Mark Landler, “Targeted Killing Is New U.S. Focus in Afghanistan”, New York Times, 31 July 2010.
54 THREAT REPORT: OTHER RPT Qalat, 19 FEB 2008, TFZ INTSUM 568, GCTF, (SECRET//REL TO USA, ISAF, NATO) ANA BDE CDR is Threatened by TB: On 17FEB2008 at 2240L, the 205th ANA BDE Commander MG Jamaladin. Report taken from WikiLeaks as reproduced by the New York Times on 26 July 2010 on http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/world/26warlogs.html#report/7BEADD2E-2219–0B3F-9F200BCE337854EA.
55 M. O’Hanlon, “Prime numbers: Afghanistan”, Foreign Policy (March/April 2011), p. 72.
56 Antonio Giustozzi, in writing about regional and border militias during the Soviet-Afghan War, noted the Afghan government's means of sourcing additional cash for militia payments amounted in the post-1986 period to printing more money. Giustozzi, A., War, Politics and Society in Afghanistan 1978–1992 (London, 2000), pp. 209–210 Google Scholar, 286.
57 R. Nordland, “Lacking money and leadership, push for Taliban defectors stalls”, New York Times, 6 Sept. 2010. http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/07/world/asia/07taliban.html?emc=eta1.
58 Official website: http://www.worldbank.org.af/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/SOUTHASIAEXT/AFGHANISTANEXTN/0, contentMDK:23052411~menuPK:305990~pagePK:2865066~piPK:2865079~theSitePK:305985,00.html.
59 Report taken from WikiLeaks, as reproduced by the New York Times on 26 July 2010; on THREAT REPORT: ATTACK THREAT RPT Gehazi Abad, MULLAH JUMA KHANS ACTIVITY IN GHAZIABAD, 09 MAY 2009, TF DUKE INTSUM 285, NSIGCTF, (S//REL TO USA, GCTF, ISAF, NATO), http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/world/26warlogs.html#report/7899DDBD-2219–0B3F-9FC7AFC949C38675.
60 L.N. Condra, J.H. Felter, R.K. Iyengar and J.N. Shapiro, The Effect of Civilian Casualties in Afghanistan and Iraq, National Bureau of Economic Research. NBER Working Paper No: 16152 (July, 2010), p. 22.
61 Ibid. , p. 30.
62 Appendix B, U.S. Funds for Afghanistan Reconstruction, pp. 202–203; John F. Sopko, Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR), SIGAR Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, 30 April 2013. The post of SIGAR was established under the National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2008 (Public Legislation 110–181). In the table above, the agency sponsor for the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund (ASFF), as well as that for training and equipment, is the U.S. Department of Defense.
63 Aka Pathans
64 “Pay returns placed before the board, 29 Dec 1804”, Maharashtra State Archives, Bombay Military Dept., Military Board Diary, 1804, no.76.
65 Aka Gujarat