Between the Chinggisid principle, loyalty, and self-aggrandisement: Jochid elites in the ‘Time of Troubles’ (1359 to circa 1380)

Abstract

In the mid-fourteenth century, the Jochid ulus went through a phase of extreme political turbulence. Following the death of the last Batuid khan Berdibek (r. 1357–1359), during the next two decades, circa 1360–1380, a high number of power contenders rose at both the central and the local levels of the ulus. This article aims to map and exemplify those attempts as part of the broader theoretical discussion concerning the scope and depth of the khanate's crisis. It does so by combining an overall, bird's-eye perspective on the political history of the ulus by zooming in on the regional history, as well as through the analysis of both written primary and numismatic sources. None of the multiple patterns of reaction to the dying-out of the Batuid lineage clearly contradicted the idea of the khanate's unity and the overarching ‘Chinggisid principle’. At this point in time, the ulus still followed the centrifugal logic of the Chinggisid rule. At the same time, the crisis of the Jochid ulus of the mid-fourteenth century indeed prepared the very ground for the power division between the still-existing branches of the Jochid family and the break-up of the Jochid power domain of the fifteenth century that followed the last unification attempt of the ulus under Toqtamïsh (r. 1380–1406).

Introductory notes

The Jochid ulus was ruled by the descendants of Jochi Khan's eldest son, Batu, throughout the majority of the thirteenth and first half of the fourteenth centuries. Although the exterior boundaries of the ulus had become more stable by the mid-thirteenth century, the power dynamics within the ulus were still influenced by divisions among the many sub-lineages of the ruling family. From a simplified perspective, the supreme ruler of the Jochid (also known as Batuid) khanate resided in the main capital that was located in the Lower Volga basin. At the same time, the regions to the east of the Volga River and present-day Eastern Siberia acknowledged the de facto authority of the descendants of Batu's eldest son, Orda.¹ With few exceptions, however, and despite constant and often bloody conflicts between various Chinggisids and their commanders, Batuid authority had generally been accepted by all members of the Jochid family. This state of affairs started to change towards the mid-fourteenth century, in the decades that followed the death of Janibeg (r. 1342–1357), the last omnipotent Jochid khan. The major qualitative (and abrupt) change occurred in around 1359, following the sudden death of Özbeg Khan's (r. 1313–1341) grandson, Berdibeg (r. 1357–1359), the last Batuid ruler on the Jochid throne.

Berdibeg's death can be seen as the opening act of a lengthy series of events that together constitute the crisis in the Jochid ulus. For the sake of further discussion, it is important to provide a schematic overview of major developments of the following decades of Jochid history. Berdibeg's death in 1359 was immediately followed by an intensive period of conflict between various groups of Chinggisids and members of the military elite. While the protagonists’ proclaimed goal continued to be the central Jochid throne in Sarāy, the Jochid capital on the Lower Volga (also known as Sarāy al-Jadīda, the ‘New Sarāy’),² an increasing number of local rulers of various backgrounds emerged, mostly aiming to secure regional control outside of the metropolitan capital. Both centrifugal and centripetal political tendencies strengthened over time, reaching their peak in the late 1360s and early 1370s.³ Towards the early 1380s, the last Jochid khan-unifier, Toqtamïsh (r. circa 1380–1395), succeeded in reuniting most of the Jochid territories, and this shaky unity survived for slightly more than a decade. Following Temür's (r. 1370–1405) military operations against the Jochids in the 1380s and 1390s (and especially the crushing defeat on 14 or 15 April 1395 at the Terek River), Toqtamïsh's power and authority slowly weakened.⁴ During battle on the Vorskla River on 12 April 1399, a decisive skirmish broke out between, on the one side, Toqtamïsh and his Lithuanian supporter Grand Duke Vytautas the Great (Vytautas Didysis [Witold], r. 1392–1430) and, on the other, the Chinggisid Temür-Kutlugh and Edigü (d. 1419), a powerful Jochid commander of Manghit origin, after which Toqtamïsh no longer played a major role in Jochid internal politics.⁵ While strong centripetal tendencies appeared in the Jochid ulus following Toqtamïsh's downfall, the ulus ultimately dissolved into a number of lesser political entities.⁶

This article maps and analyses ways in which Jochid elites, in both the centre and the peripheries, acted during the so-called Time of Troubles (Turc.: bulqaq, Rus.: zamjatnja).⁷ The years 1359–1389 should be regarded as the initial period of Jochid restructuring that led to the eventual decentralisation of the ulus. The article traces how, during this period, parts of the multifocal imperial system reacted to the crisis of its central elements, in terms of both ideology and human capital. According to the (mainly later) primary sources, Batuid rule came to an end due to large-scale massacres that were committed by Janibeg and Berdibeg.⁸ This is, however, only partially true. A general rule for the transmission of power across the whole Chinggisid realm during most of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries was the requirement that aspiring rulers should belong to the Chinggisid family. After the crisis, this ‘Chinggisid principle’ continued to thrive in the Jochid territories, Mongolia, and in the eastern Chaghadaid realm until the verge of modernity and, in some cases, the end of the nineteenth century.⁹ The paramount importance for a Jochid Chinggisid (in the absence of the Batuids) to rule the ulus is visible during the crisis, and some sort of general unwritten agreement on this matter seems to have existed among the major players.

One of the characteristics of this period was the introduction of ‘puppet’ khans, or political marionettes, who, while claiming Chinggisid origin, exerted little, if any, control over their realm, but were manipulated by powerful kingmakers. While emir Mamai (d. 1380?) is well known, it is plausible that almost all pretenders to the central throne up to Toqtamïsh were at least partially dependent on some strong individual or group, even though in most cases these kingmakers remain obscure. Simultaneously, the Time of Troubles witnessed a rise of strong figures at the regional level. They did not covet the Sarāy throne but exploited the lack of central control to build their own (regional) power. The issue of their own coins (mainly of copper but including some silver) is a paradigmatic change in the way power became managed by regional lords. Yet, such regional organisation should not be regarded as an irreversible step towards the decentralisation of the ulus: as soon as Toqtamïsh, the last unifying khan, appeared, these rulers submitted to him without much hesitation. This initial decentralisation should nonetheless be interpreted as the first sign of a slow break-up of the Jochid political framework of the ulus.

Exact identification of all contenders for the central khan's position in Sarāy and the delineation of their often confusing and contradictory ruling periods is not within the scope of this article.¹⁰ Rather, of primary interest is the identification and contextualisation of the patterns of reactions of the various Jochid power holders (both Chinggisids and otherwise) amid the break-up of the Batuid lineage in Sarāy, in the centre of the ulus and its peripheries. A clear differentiation of the various patterns is possible mostly only on paper, primarily due to the confusing and partial information on the various actors. This is especially true regarding the backgrounds of the main figures and the chronology of the historical developments. Moreover, developments in the peripheries caused or influenced by the weakening of the Jochid ulus often had a direct influence on developments in the central capital and vice versa. Thus, for example, those regional elites who reacted to the turmoil around the capital region by strengthening their rule in their own peripheral domain could also have devised greater plans and attempted to intervene in the contest for the central throne. Likewise, a loser in the battle for the central throne could have been banished into the periphery. Hence, for clarifying the relationship between the core and periphery of the ulus, it is important to isolate the different reactions of political stakeholders—a vital tool for clarifying the political developments in this turbulent period.

Jochid political changes in the second half of the fourteenth century cannot be viewed in isolation from the broader developments that were taking place concurrently on the continental scale. Scholars have already identified significant climatic, demographic, economic, and political changes that encompassed local developments in the Jochid power centres that were both influenced by them and (in some cases) exercised influence on them. Of these, climatic change and the climate-impacted decline in Jochid economic activity in the urban centres and beyond certainly played a role.¹¹ Rapid dispersion of the Black Death along major cross-Eurasian trade routes can be singled out as another significant factor influencing the stability and longevity of the Jochid ulus.¹² More specific processes also destabilised the integrity of the ulus. Thus, the aridification of the western zone of the Eurasian Steppe Belt (Dasht-i Qipchaq) and the transgression of the Caspian Sea levels, which led to the partial destruction of the economy of the ulus, coincided with the cumulative effect of a long-term rise in population in the urban and Steppe centres of the ulus over previous decades.¹³ Combined with the epidemics, this sparked crises in urban food supply.¹⁴ These developments coincided with the overall demise of the major Trans-Asian trade routes in the mid-fourteenth century. While various reasons for this cannot be discussed here (in addition to those mentioned above, the crisis in Yuan China, the collapse of the Ilkhanate and post-collapse's upheavals, political developments in the Chaghadaid ulus and its following split, the political crisis in the Delhi Sultanate, and the third and fourth wars between Genua and Venice in 1350–1355 and 1377–1381 could be named as examples), suffice it to state that the political destabilisation in the centre of the ulus went hand in hand with the long-term destabilisation of the social and economic conditions both in the cities and beyond.¹⁵

When discussing the Jochid crisis, three major sources-related issues should be kept in mind. First, analysis of the written sources does not allow us to identify a direct causality between broader political developments and specific events in Jochid history. This is primarily due to the paucity of contemporary indigenous sources for the history of the Jochid ulus in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, except for a number of yarliqs (authority orders or edicts), preserved mainly outside the ʿulamāʾ core areas of the ulus.¹⁶ Most of the sources were written outside the khanate and not only represent the perspective of outsiders (Rus’ letopistsy, Arabic and Timurid ʿulamāʾ, European merchants and clergy or Chinese literati), but focus mainly on developments in the core areas of the ulus: the Lower Volga and, specifically, Sarāy al-Jadīda.

This phenomenon had been apparent since the nineteenth century and it was at around the same time that scholars began searching for additional sources on Jochid history. Due to the lack of indigenous written sources up to the early fifteenth century, and since archaeological research had been conducted very unevenly across the territory of the ulus, numismatic evidence has been deemed the most promising. Methodologically, however, coins are a problematic witness. Indeed, analysis of both the physical characteristics (metal type, weight) and the content of coins (specific legends, various visual elements) can add titbits of data on political and economic history to support, compliment, or contradict the evidence of the literary sources (e.g. providing names of otherwise unknown people or locations).¹⁷ Coins can assist in mapping alternative power centres as well as specifying the geographical extension of authority enjoyed by rulers. Analysis of the textual and visual legends can broaden our understanding of how local rulers positioned themselves and highlight the ideological threads that were drawn upon to legitimise their rule. The countermarking of coins—that is, the placing of a mark or sign on coins that were issued by a ruler's predecessors—can help us to better reassess the heritability of power and its contestation by local players within a given time frame.¹⁸ On the other hand, coins can be misleading. As they convey a specific ideological message, they rarely let us understand the broader political, economic, and social developments behind their issue.¹⁹

Thirdly, the limitations of the secondary sources must be acknowledged. The majority of scholarship on Jochid history in the last 150 years has been conducted in Russian-speaking and (currently and formerly) Russian-dominated areas (the Russian empire, Soviet Union, and the current post-Soviet states). Research conducted outside of these areas has been influenced by Russian-language scholarship.²⁰ This in turn relied heavily on the Rus’ chronicles (letopisi) that were compiled by the monks and scribes at the courts of the Rus’ knjazes.²¹ Further on, the Russian interest in Jochid history often derived from an attempt to evaluate its impact on future Russian history.²²

Crisis developments around the central capitals have attracted great interest among the historians since the nineteenth century. This has occurred not only due to the predominant focus of the written sources. Starting from the nineteenth century, scholars have also significantly expanded the archaeological and the numismatic research on this period. Nevertheless, and despite scholars’ awareness of the decentralisation processes across the ulus in this period and the need to look beyond the developments outside the Lower Volga (i.e., the areas around Sarāy), developments in the ‘periphery’ of the ulus still mainly attracted attention only in those cases in which these were relevant to developments in the centre.²³ While the Russian-speaking scholarly community has developed valuable insights and regionally oriented approaches in the history of the crisis period, often based on new numismatic (and, to a lesser degree, archaeological) evidence, awareness of this research outside of the former USSR has shrunk significantly in the last decades. It is thus of primary importance to delve beyond the history of the central areas, exemplifying the variety of political reactions to Batuid decline across the ulus.

Patterns of power consolidation (I): developments in the centre

The first and most obvious mode of political and ideological reaction in the post-Batuid puzzle is that multiple figures, from various Chinggisid (or, as discussed below, pseudo-Chinggisid) backgrounds, aimed at occupying the vacant—or supposedly illegally held—Khan's throne in Sarāy. The origins and background of these contenders is more intricate than one might think, as one can at least assume (and in some cases find confirmation in the sources) that many of the contenders were not only unable to promote their candidacy without the support of a broad network of powerful allies, often in the military, but also functioned as puppets, acknowledged or otherwise, of those supporters. In many cases, however, these contenders’ power bases were most probably located outside the capital metropolitan area and the newcomers were often viewed as strangers (or outsiders) by the Sarāy's established Batuid elites. We can call this development ‘regions-to-centre’.

In the cases of Qulpa (Qulna, r. 1359–1360?) and Nawrūz (r. 1360), we do not possess any exact information on the power groups behind their enthronement. In Qulpa's case, the Christian names of his children, Michael and Ivan, indicate a possible connection with the Orthodox Church. Although Grigor'ev suggests that his rise to power occurred against the background of his support by the Rus’ knjazes, this cannot be confirmed.²⁴ Despite a lack of clarity on the background of the first two Sarāy khans after Berdibeg's death, it is plausible that both belonged to the Jochid Right Wing (and, in this regard, support, formal and informal, from Taidulla, Özbeg Khan's omnipotent widow, would have been crucial to enthronement in Sarāy).²⁵ The only confirmable information on the first years after Berdibeg's death is that groups associated with the non-Batuid Jochid branches soon attempted to enthrone their own man from outside the Right Wing. This time, it was a certain Khizr (r. 1360–1361?), titled by the Rus’ chroniclers ‘tsar’ s Vostoka’ (‘the tsar from the East’), who became the third self-proclaimed khan of Turmoil-era Sarāy.²⁶ As with Qulpa and Nawrūz, scholars make varying assessments of his origin and political affiliation. Some associate him with the Shaybanids, non-Batuid descendants of Jochi's fifth son Shiban, whose ulus has been located along the Yaik River in the south-east of the ulus.²⁷ Others connect him with the Left-Wing descendants of Jochi Khan's oldest son Orda.²⁸ Unlike Qulpa and Nawrūz, Khizr's apparent murder of the Taidulla, whose death occurred during his enthronement or shortly afterwards in around the mid-1360s, supports the sources’ portrayal of him as at least partially ‘alien’ to the metropolitan area as well as to the high echelons of Jochid central power.²⁹

The chaotic history of Sarāy rulers during the two decades of the Time of Troubles can be generally characterised as a transition phase from complete Batuid dominance of the highest positions in the ulus to its 1380 reunification in the hands of the Togha Temürid Toqtamïsh Khan. The first two Sarāy rulers, Qulpa and Nawrūz, belonged (at least via their relationship with Taidulla) to the senior Jochid power circles of the Right Wing. Khizr Khan and his son, Temür Khwāja, who was apparently enthroned in Sarāy immediately after his father's death, belonged, highly probably, to the Shaybanid branch.³⁰ Interestingly, none of these used Batuid legitimacy to strengthen their claims to the throne.³¹ Very little is known of yet another Sarāy khan, Ordu Melik, whose coins were minted in Sarāy and were dated to the same year, 762/1361–1362,³² but it seems that he, like his immediate predecessors, made no attempt to legitimise his rule by recalling the Batuid past.³³ It was only the following (arguably the sixth) Sarāy khan, the so-called (pseudo)-Keldibek (r. 1361–1362?), who revived Batuid memories. To understand his emergence, one should recall that a person named Keldibek was indeed a member of the Batuid family, often identified with one of Berdibeg's cousins, a son of his uncle, Irinbek.³⁴ A number of sources report, however, that the real Keldibek was murdered by Berdibeg during the massacres that were conducted shortly after the latter's enthronement in 1357.³⁵ While this seems to have been known in the ulus, it did not prevent the new pretender to the Khan's throne in Sarāy, most probably an unknown impostor, from proclaiming himself as Janibeg's son.³⁶ It remains unclear how broad the military and popular support enjoyed by the new khan actually was, though it seems plausible that, at least in the beginning, he was backed by military elites not only in Sarāy, but also outside the capital.³⁷ In or after late 1362, however, (pseudo)-Keldibek was either expelled from the capital or killed by other contenders to the throne.³⁸

(Pseudo)-Keldibek is therefore unique in his use of the Batuid legacy to legitimise his rule. It is difficult to say whether the apparently fictional nature of the Batuid origin that he claimed was clear to Sarāy elite circles. Nevertheless, it is revealing that it did not prevent them from supporting the impostor during the first months of his rule.³⁹ It was only after the new khan massacred the old Jochid nobility that his support vanished and other khans—with origins similarly difficult to trace—occupied the capital.⁴⁰ Among Turmoil-era khans, Keldibek remains the only one to openly claim Batuid legitimacy. Although primogeniture had become a key principle for succession and transmission of power across all of the Chinggisid families almost since the very formation of Mongol Eurasia (compared with the Batuid family with lineages such as the Hülegüids and the Qubilaids), one must keep in mind that transition of power in the Chinggisid political universe was not limited to this pattern. Indeed, it was a more general rule, according to which all male members of the Golden Family were allowed to claim their right to rule and to share power, that underpinned most of the power conflicts in the various Chinggisid uluses amid attempts by power holders to transmit the throne, as a rule, from father to son or inside an extended patrimonial lineage.⁴¹ From this perspective, it is not unexpected that many of the Turmoil-era khans did not make claims to Batuid legitimacy. It appears that, when Chinggisid primogeniture could no longer consistently produce suitable male candidates for the throne, the Jochids shifted to a more inclusive model. This allowed all claimants to compete for the ruling position while still adhering to the ‘Chinggisid principle’.

Until now, we have concentrated on developments in the central capital, Sarāy al-Jadīda. The city's location remained a matter of scholarly concern since the early nineteenth century. One of the major hypotheses identifies Sarāy al-Jadīda with the area of present-day Tsarëv, about 60 kilometres from Volgograd (the Soviet-era Stalingrad), located on the right bank of the Akhtuba River, the Lower Volga's major left tributary.⁴² While various critical voices have challenged this hypothesis in recent years, Sarāy al-Jadīda appears to have been the main seat of the Jochid khans and the major metropolitan centre since the early (or around the first quarter of the) fourteenth century.⁴³ From Berdibeg's death in 1359 until Toqtamïsh's successful unification of the ulus in the early 1380s, Sarāy al-Jadīda was also the main epicentre of political turmoil in the ulus. At the same time, since quite early in the 1360s, one can discern another pattern of political development that could be termed ‘regionalisation of the centre’. This denotes a peculiar situation during which, after Berdibeg's death, Sarāy (al-Jadīda) lost its exclusive status as the main seat of the overall khan—a process that seems to have started shortly after the beginning of the Turmoil. Arguably, the multiplicity of contenders for the throne as well as the related decentralisation of power to areas outside the imperial capital strengthened regional centres, leading to the rise of contending locations.

A good example of this is the emergence of Gulistān—a location in the Lower Volga basin that functioned as an alternative capital for those vying for the khan's throne in the early 1360s.⁴⁴ Gulistān appeared as one of the major minting centres of the metropolitan areas during the last decade of Batuid rule in the 1350s.⁴⁵ Before the Turmoil era, it seems never to have served as a seat of the Jochid khans⁴⁶ and it appears that this location only rose in importance during the early Turmoil period.⁴⁷ Shortly after Ordu Melik's enthronement, another powerful contender for the central throne—a certain Mürid—proclaimed himself as the overall khan in Gulistān.⁴⁸ Sarāy al-Jadīda was occupied in this period first by Ordu Melik and further by (pseudo-)Keldibek, who proclaimed himself as the khan in Sarāy in October 1361.⁴⁹ Mürid kept Gulistān under his control during circa three years and possibly succeeded in briefly occupying Sarāy al-Jadīda.⁵⁰

It was during this period that the Jochid Right Wing split between various contenders, most of whom resided outside the metropolitan capital.⁵¹ Thus, it seems that Mürid succeeded in unifying most of the Right Wing to the east of the Volga, on its left shore, especially in its lower basin.⁵² The areas of the Right Wing to the west of the Volga were reunited during the early 1360s under the rule of Mamai, a powerful Jochid commander of Qiyat origin, on whom see below. Originally positioning himself in his western domains in Crimea, Mamai made his first attempt to occupy the metropolitan capital in late 1362, during which he apparently succeeded in entering Sarāy with his first puppet khan ʿAbd Allāh.⁵³ Mamai did not remain there for long, and returned to his primary domains to the north of the Black Sea in early 1363. He used his puppets’ Chinggisid legacy to expand his rule over most of the Right Wing, namely across the Steppe areas that stretched from the Crimea and the northern Black Sea shores to the Volga's right bank—an area known in the Rus’ chronicles as ‘Mamai's Horde’ (‘Mamaeva orda’).⁵⁴ While this political division between Mamai and Mürid did not last long and ended with Mürid's death in autumn 1364, it became quite obvious even to outside observers.⁵⁵ Thus, the Rus’ chronicles include multiple records that use the expression ‘Muratova orda’ (i.e. ‘Mürid's Horde’), and variations on this, as a counterpart to the main Jochid khan's seat in Sarāy al-Jadīda during the early 1360s.⁵⁶ Mürid passed away in 764/1362–1363⁵⁷ and, within two years, Gulistān had become the seat of another contender—a certain Pulad (Bulad) Khwadja, who minted coins in Gulistān in 766/1364–1365.⁵⁸ During his short rule, the new mint name Gulistān al-Jadīda (‘New Gulistān’) appears.⁵⁹ While there is no indication that another settlement was erected, this new mint name may have been used by the khan to counterpose his seat to the ‘old’ metropolitan capital, Sarāy al-Jadīda. In the following years, Gulistān continued to serve as a springboard for contenders for the throne, such as a certain ʿAzīz Shaykh, who first minted coins in Gulistān in 766/1364–1365 and then in Sarāy al-Jadīda a year later.⁶⁰

It is unclear how widespread a phenomenon this ‘regionalisation of the centre’ became. We are aware that many of the Turmoil-era khans minted coins in their names in various locations across the ulus before they started doing so in the central capital. It is, however, very difficult to clarify whether these ‘early’ pre-capital mints were aimed at strengthening these figures’ authority from the very beginning as candidates for the central throne (thus proposing them as central khans of the whole ulus from the beginning) or were intended to secure their status in a specific peripheral area (thus indicating decentralising tendencies). Both options are plausible. While many individuals or groups of interest hoped to be able to rule from the central capital (or a viable alternative site, such as Gulistān), minting coins in the name of figures other than the current khan in Sarāy indicated the increasing centrifugal tendencies across the ulus.

From the early 1360s to 1380, approximately 15 to 20 khans sought to establish their authority in the central city, Sarāy al-Jadīda. However, to have authority over Sarāy, one needed to be part of the Golden bloodline, or at least pretend to be, whether legitimately or not. But what occurred if someone lacked this privilege or was hesitant to assert it? The following section examines various reaction patterns that were implemented across the ulus during the Turmoil decades, suggesting increasing decentralising processes outside the capital that undermined the very political raison d’être behind the centralised Jochid rule and the unification of the enormous territories of the ulus on both shores of the Volga under the Sarāy khan.

Developments in the regions (I): proclaiming a khan

A discussion of regional developments should start with perhaps the most obvious, but at the same time most problematic, reaction that a person of power in the Jochid periphery could choose when reacting to Batuid decline and subsequent chaos in Sarāy—a self-proclamation by a Chinggisid as a khan within a certain region, and not over the whole ulus. On the one hand, this move could have been the most obvious choice, as, unlike the Batuids, there was no lack of other Jochid candidates throughout the ulus during the early 1360s. The descendants of Jochi Khan's fourteen⁶¹ sons were dispersed across the territories and certain areas are known to have remained under the exclusive control of specific Jochid lineages. Aside from the Batuids, the houses of Orda, Shiban, and Togha Temür, Jochi's first, fifth, and thirteenth (according to the Jami al-Tawārīkh) sons, respectively, were of primary importance for Jochid history.⁶² Geographically, Orda's ulus (the so-called Kok-Orda, or ‘Blue Horde’)⁶³ occupied most of the territory of today's Western and Southern Kazakhstan, the ruler's main seat lying at Signaq, a location close to the present city of Schangaqorghan, in south-western Kazakhstan, on the Syr-Darya's right shore.⁶⁴ However, the whole eastern part of the Jochid ulus (i.e. the Left Wing) seems to have been under the de facto control of Orda's family, which in turn was nominally ruled by the Batuid khan in Sarāy.⁶⁵ Recent research on political and genealogical developments in the Blue Horde has succeeded in tracing the—at least nominal—presence of Blue Horde khans until, quite peculiarly, 1360 or 1361, shortly after the beginning of the Turmoil era in the Right Wing of the ulus. Shortly after the Batuid secession, similar developments occurred in the eastern parts of the ulus. Chimtai, Orda's sixth-generation descendant, ruled from 754/1344–1345 to 762/1360–1361. It seems that there was no other male heir from the khan's family to succeed him.⁶⁶ As shown by Vásáry, it is clear that, after more than a century of the Ordaid dominance in the Jochid Left Wing, in the early 1360s, the Togha Temürids brought most of the Kok-Orda under their rule, raising their own khan in Signaq to succeed Chimtai.⁶⁷

The early 1360s therefore witnessed an abrupt break-up of the previously centralised power transmission inside the two most senior Jochid lineages in both parts of the ulus. The historical developments in the eastern parts of the Jochid ulus still remain unclear. On the one hand, recent numismatic finds show that it took about five to six years for the Kok-Orda's new Togha Temürid rulers to start minting their own coins. Their first identifiable coins were issued by a certain Mubarak Khwāja, who (according to Vásáry's reconstruction) belonged to the eighth generation from Jochi Khan and seventh generation from his thirteenth son Togha Temür and ruled (as far as the coins let us judge) from 768/1366–1367 to 769/1367–1368.⁶⁸ Independent minting of coins by Eastern Jochids could be seen as a sign of the Kok-Orda khans’ effective declaration of independence from the central authorities amid the kaleidoscopic change of nominal rulers in Sarāy. It is notable, however, that it took at least five years for the change to occur.⁶⁹ Considering that Mubarak Khwāja was the fourth Togha Temürid to control the Kok-Orda, it is clear that the Togha Temürid takeover did not lead to the Kok-Orda's dismissing the Sarāy general rule, at least nominally. Furthermore, his case remained an exception. Urus Khan, the next Togha Temürid to rule in Signaq, oriented his power aspirations once more towards the central capital and his rule culminated in occupation of Sarāy in 1375.⁷⁰

Another concurrent development in the history of the Jochid ulus is the rise in importance of the Shaybanids, who were descendants of Jochi Khan's fifth⁷¹ son, Shiban. Generally, pre-fifteenth-century Shaybanid history remains quite confusing. In addition to a general lack of contemporary sources, the Shaybanid case is further complicated by the permanent conflicts of interest concerning earlier historical information in post-fourteenth-century sources that were compiled both by pro- and anti-Shaybanid historians.⁷² The contradictions in the later sources include a broad range of issues, the most significant of which are the original location of the Shayban ulus and the internal hierarchy among the Jochid sons.⁷³ While the latter issue remains a matter of discussion, on the former, I am inclined to agree with Egorov, according to whom the bulk of Shaybanid possessions were located in the north-eastern-most parts of the Jochid Left Wing, in the steppes in the north of present-day Kazakhstan and in Western Siberia. This would place the easternmost border of the ulus along the Irtysh River, with major urban centres (such as Tümen) located along the Tura River.⁷⁴ As said, the Turmoil, certain Shaybanids had already tried to place their own candidates on the Sarāy throne. The identity of the succeeding khans in Sarāy is still up for debate but some claim that Shaybanids (who might not necessarily have been identical to Khizr Khan's supporters in the early 1360s) tried to take control of Sarāy in the 1370s as well, before Toqtamïsh, the last Jochid unifier, ultimately succeeded.⁷⁵

These considerations notwithstanding, following Janibeg's death, the main interests of the Shaybanids seem to have been concentrated on developments in Eastern Siberia and the Lower Volga; there is no indication that they aimed at separation from the ulus until the 1370s. It is enlightening, therefore, that a Shaybanid khan was actually enthroned in Saraychiq in the early 1370s. Located on the right shore of the Ural River in the western Atyrau Region of present-day Kazakhstan, this settlement is known to have been a major Jochid trade hub. It is not clear which status the ulus actually had before the 1360s.⁷⁶ Information is scant but it does not seem, despite its economic importance, that Saraychiq had any political function until the early 1370s.⁷⁷ Most of the coins that are known to be from Saraychiq actually reflect the Sarāy power relations.⁷⁸ Unlike Azaq and Gulistān, Saraychiq was never a minting centre before the 1360s and most coins that were found there (the earliest examples were issued in the name of Möngke Temür, r. 1266–1282)⁷⁹ were minted outside the city, in Sarāy, Ukek, and Azaq, and it was only from Mürid's rule in the early 1360s onward that minting began in Saraychiq.⁸⁰ It seems to have sporadically occurred there after Mürid as well, but it is only under a certain Muḥammad Öljeitü Temür Khan (r. 769/1367–1368 to 770/1368–1369?) that a silver coin was struck in Saraychiq.⁸¹

It is quite striking that both Mürid and Öljeitü Temür Khan also minted coins outside Saraychiq and their power still seems to have been connected to Jochid metropolitan areas along the Lower Volga. A rapid political change occurred later in 775/1373–1374, as two⁸² Shaybanids, Ilbak or Ilban (r. 775/1373–1374) and Alp Khwadja (r. 775/1373–1374), minted coins in their names in Saraychiq as a clearly autonomous (though short-lived) move vis-à-vis Sarāy.⁸³ Despite claims that Ilbak or Ilban succeeded in controlling Sarāy for a short period during the same year, the numismatic finds do not support this.⁸⁴ It is thus only in the following year, 776/1374–1375, that a certain Kaganbek (r. 776(?) to 778(?)/1375–1377), whom some identify as Ilbak's son, occupied Sarāy and proclaimed himself as the overall khan.⁸⁵ Yet another Shaybanid, a certain ʿArab Shāh (r. 1377–1379), who was apparently Ilbak's nephew, succeeded Kaganbek.⁸⁶ Shortly after that, however, some Shaybanid groups seem to have changed their minds.⁸⁷ Despite the lack of clarity over whether Kaganbek was of Shaybanid origin, we know that, after continuous conflict between the Shaybanids and Togha Temürids for Sarāy during the late 1360s and 1370s, the Shaybanids supported the Togha Temürid unification of all Jochid domains under Toqtamïsh, postponing their own desire for independence until the break-up of the ulus in the early fifteenth century.⁸⁸

Developments in the regions (II): the case of Mamai

The most obvious response from multiple male Chinggisids across the Jochid ulus to the demise of the centralised Batuid control in Sarāy may have been the self-proclamation of a legitimate Chinggisid as regional khan. But this was not the case. The previous discussion highlighted a number of ambitious Chinggisids who seem to have been involved in the political and military struggles of the Turmoil period. Surely, none of these could ever have reached the degree of power and influence that they possessed without military support. However, even if they were protégés of such patron–client support networks, such figures as Qulpa, Khizr, and Kaganbek do not seem to have been fully controlled by their patrons. The sources inform us, however, of other Chinggisids (or pseudo-Chinggisids) who did not play independent roles in the Turmoil period but functioned as puppets of other powerful figures without any (confirmable) Chinggisid background. This phenomenon is the first of several key patterns of reaction observed across the Jochid domains among the subjects who were lacking Chinggisid legitimacy.

The best known example of such a (puppet-)kingmaker is the famous tümen commander Mamai, of Qiyat origin.⁸⁹ While the sources do not provide much information on his past or family, he remains of primary significance in Turmoil-era Jochid history.⁹⁰ Partly due to the fact that scholarly discussions of Mamai's background and early career at the Jochid court are mainly based on later sources (such as Ibn Khaldūn's Kitāb al-ʿibar), they are not completely conclusive. Nevertheless, some scholars assume that Mamai, supposedly born in the 1320s or 1330s,⁹¹ had belonged to Berdibeg's inner circle, thus entering the high echelons of power before the beginning of the Turmoil.⁹² This hypothesis remains problematic, as, aside Ibn Khaldūn's claim that Mamai numbered among the ‘senior Mongol commanders’ (kabīr min al-umarāʾ al-mughul) and was ‘responsible for all affairs of state’ (kāna mutaḥakkiman fī dawlatihī),⁹³ we lack further indications of Mamai's occupying a high position at Berdibeg's court, and Mamai's name is not found in any official documents known to us from Berdibeg's reign.⁹⁴ Further on, if one trusts the same source, then Mamai even married Berdibeg's sister.⁹⁵ Such a marriage would have granted Mamai the valuable position of güregen (imperial son-in-law), connecting him with the Chinggisid blood lineage.⁹⁶ The date of such a marriage remains unknown and one can only speculate that, had it indeed taken place, it might have occurred at around the time of Berdibeg's death—a period on which our sources are even less forthcoming.⁹⁷ However we read this, Mamai is not mentioned in any of the chronicles prior to Berdibeg's death.

Mamai's rise to power has been discussed many times since the nineteenth century. It is plausible that Mamai's family exerted a strong influence in the Crimea from Janibeg's reign and he, or other members of his family, retained control over this area until his death at the earliest.⁹⁸ Uncertainties concerning the temporal aspects of Mamai's control over Crimea notwithstanding, Mamai's primary stronghold was located in the far west of the Jochid ulus, not only on or around the peninsula, but more generally in the area between Dniester and Azak.⁹⁹ Despite this, Mamai's power interests were closely (but not exclusively) connected with developments around Sarāy and the Lower Volga centre. As mentioned above, in 1362, shortly after Berdibeg's death and in parallel with the change of khans in Sarāy, a certain Chinggisid known as ʿAbd Allāh was raised to the throne by Mamai, apparently in Crimea.¹⁰⁰ This enthronement in the west seems to have pointed to much broader plans, as coins were struck at the Sarāy mint in the name of ʿAbd Allāh in 764/1362–1363. It seems that Mamai succeeded in installing ʿAbd Allāhin the central capital (apparently between Keldibek and Mürid) for a short time.¹⁰¹ Mamai's control of the metropolitan areas did not last long, as Mürid seems to have forced him to leave the Volga's left shore. Starting from the mid-1360s, a peculiar situation developed in the Jochid domain, during which most of the territories from the Volga's right shore westward were controlled, directly or indirectly, by Mamai (the Mamaeva Orda of the Rus’ chronicles). At the same time, areas along the Volga and eastward remained either under the control of the overall khan in Sarāy or under the direct domination of regional power holders such as the Shaybanids or Togha Temürids.¹⁰² With the exception of one more Sarāy issue in 768/1366–1367, discussed below, ʿAbd Allāh continued to mint coins in Azaq as well as other locations until 770/1368–1369, before disappearing entirely from the historical sources in around 1369.¹⁰³ Shortly after ʿAbd Allāh's apparent death, Mamai found another individual of plausible Chinggisid origin to serve as his puppet.¹⁰⁴ The new khan, Ghiyāth al-Dunyā wa al-Dīn Muḥammad, was installed somewhere in Mamai's domain, possibly the Crimea, in 771/1369–1370 and retained the throne until 1379 or early 1380 at the latest, when Mamai apparently killed his own protégé.¹⁰⁵ Finally, yet another puppet khan was installed by Mamai. His identity is also very opaque, with the coins identifying him as ‘Tūlāk’¹⁰⁶ and the Rus’ chronicles as ‘Teljak’ (Novgorod IV chronicle) or ‘Tetjak’ (Sofijskaja chronicle).¹⁰⁷

As Mamai's headquarters were located in the westernmost parts of the Jochid ulus, his primary tactical interests were related to developments on the northern and western borders of his domains. Aside from an important rebellion against Mamai's authority in Crimea in 1367, the rise in power of the Muscovite knjaz’ Dmitrij and the continuous expansion of the latter's authority across the Rus’ territories were of equal importance to the kingmaker. Further, Mamai had, since the mid-1360s, been keenly interested in preventing the expansion of the Great Duchy of Lithuania. Mamai's involvement in these affairs did not prevent him from aspiring, at the same time, to return to the Lower Volga. The period between 1367 and 1372 remains very unclear in this regard but it seems that Mamai continued his involvement in the developments around the metropolitan capital. We know that coins naming Mamai's protégés were minted at least twice in Sarāy during this time. Firstly, the coins bearing ʿAbd Allāh's name and the Sarāy mint appear in 768/1366–1367.¹⁰⁸ Secondly, based on a combination of the rather vague primary sources and numismatic evidence, scholars suggested a peculiar 773/1371–1372 attempt on Mamai's part to install a woman—a certain Tulunbek Khanum, identified, as noted above, with his own Chinggisid wife—as a ruler in Sarāy.¹⁰⁹ Indeed, we are aware of copper coins that were minted in Sarāy that bore the name of a certain ‘Tūlūn Bek Khanūm’.¹¹⁰ Paradoxically, however, these coins were only minted in Sarāy; in all other areas that were assumed to be under the Mamai's control, coins were minted concurrently in the name of Muḥammad, his second puppet khan.¹¹¹ Despite the fact that all known coins issued in the name of the khanum were made of copper, it is plausible that such an attempt indeed took place. It is also possible that this occurred due to Muḥammad's youth, and that Tulunbek Khanum's apparent (but unconfirmed) Chinggisid authority carried more weight for Mamai's designs on Sarāy. Either way, if indeed enthroned, Tulunbek Khanum does not seem to have kept her position for long and, as the textual sources do not recall this enthronement, one cannot judge the reaction of the political elite to this development.¹¹²

Starting from the early 1370s, the metropolitan area of the Jochid ulus had become the epicentre of Togha Temürid unificatory expansion from the East. During the first half of the 1370s, Urus Khan (r. 1386?—1378), the Togha Temürid ruler then based in Signaq, aimed to expand his rule beyond the Left-Wing domains, hoping to occupy Sarāy. Scholars do not agree on the exact timeline of Urus Khan's invasion attempts.¹¹³ The sources remain vague, and the Rus’ chronicles do not provide additional information.¹¹⁴ It seems that Urus Khan indeed succeeded in occupying Sarāy temporarily in the mid-1370s and remained there for a short time.¹¹⁵ If one trusts Ibn Khaldūn's record of political turmoil on the Lower Volga during the early 1370s, then Mamai had already been forced out of the area by Cherkes Bek, a regional ruler who was based in Hajji Tarkhan, before Urus Khan's appearance in Sarāy.¹¹⁶ While Urus Khan left Sarāy in around 1375, it seems that Mamai never returned to the old capital, primarily being involved in developments along the northern borders. His enterprise came to an end, however, only a couple of years later. On 8 September 1380, Mamai's troops were crushed by a Muscovite army under the leadership of Dmitrij (henceforth known as ‘Donskoi’) at the famous Battle at the Kulikovo Field on the right shore of the Don River.¹¹⁷ Even if we accept the otherwise unsupported suggestion by the Russian historians that Mamai's protégé, Teljak, was killed during the battle, neither the defeat nor even the khan's death would have been crucial to Mamai's survival.¹¹⁸ Much more serious was the threat to Mamai's authority and life from Toqtamïsh, another Togha Temürid, who, with Amir Temür's help, had unified most of the Jochid ulus, bringing Sarāy and the metropolitan area under his control during the late 1370s.¹¹⁹ Following Mamai's defeat at Kulikovo, Toqtamïsh moved against the kingmaker, aiming to unify the ulus under his rule. Another battle, this time with Toqtamïsh, occurred in mid-autumn 1380 in the vicinity of the Kalka River, resulting, according to the Rus’ sources, in most of Mamai's army's changing sides.¹²⁰ Mamai fled to Crimea and attempted to hide in Genoese Caffa. Subsequent developments remain ambiguous. The usual reading of the sources suggests that Mamai was killed by the Genoese.¹²¹ Other sources claim, however, that he was not allowed to enter the city.¹²² According to Ötemish Hajji, Mamai was killed by Toqtamïsh's supporters sometime later (this remark supports the second version).¹²³ With Mamai's death, Toqtamïsh's unification enterprise was complete. It took two more decades for the centrifugal tendencies among the Jochid elite, strengthened by Amir Temür's rise in the south and growing Muscovite dominance in the northwest, to bring the ulus to its definite break-up in the early fifteenth century.

Developments in the regions (III): claiming autonomy

Appointing a Chinggisid puppet was one way to realise one's ambitions to power during the Turmoil period despite lacking Chinggisid legitimacy. For those who aimed to exercise power over the central throne but did not belong to the Chinggisid family, this was the only path to choose. At the same time, sources include multiple indications that the more one concentrates on regional developments, the more impressive the diversity of methods that one finds that the local power holders applied in order to assert and legitimise their authority. The rest of the article is dedicated to a discussion of these strategies.

Before moving to the methods applied by those individuals who were without direct Chinggisid legitimacy, we should mention a certain ‘borderline case’ that brings us back to the powerful beglerbegi Mamai of the Qiyat, who exemplifies how diverse power holders’ actions can be under what are allegedly similar political circumstances. We have already noted that Mamai rose to power under Berdibeg, succeeding in establishing an impressive domain of his own in the territories of the Jochid Right Wing of the ulus. There are some vague indications, however, that, shortly after Berdibeg's death, Mamai had made a short-lived attempt to proclaim himself, rather than a puppet or even, perhaps, his own Chinggisid wife, as Jochid khan.

As mentioned above, coins with ʿAbd Allāh's name were minted in Mamai's domains, especially in Azaq, starting from 764/1362–1363. However, scholars have been puzzling since the early nineteenth century over a strange silver coin that bears the name of an issuer that could not be clearly identified with any of the known Turmoil-era ruling figures. Dated 763/1361–1362, such coins appeared in Azaq for a short period and alongside other coins that were issued in the name of (pseudo-)Keldibek.¹²⁴ Following Frédéric Soret's suggestion in the 1820s, some have attempted to read the name on the mysterious coins as al-sulṭān al-‘ādil Mamai Khān ¹²⁵—a reading that was supported by recent Russian researchers.¹²⁶ As of now, only a limited number of such coins are known and a conclusive analysis remains elusive.¹²⁷ At the same time, if one accepts the validity of the reading of the name (and identifies the words that are struck on the coins, i.e. al-sulṭān al-‘ādil + name’ with Mamai of the Qiyat), then the need for historical contextualisation and the meaning of such coins becomes obvious. Could it be possible that Mamai had attempted to proclaim himself as khan in his stronghold shortly after Berdibeg's death but shortly before he raised the Chinggisid ʿAbd Allāh to the throne? Various opinions exist on this issue. Pavel Petrov, a leading Russian numismatist, suggests that the cast was a personal initiative by some minting masters without direct authorisation from above.¹²⁸ While this remains debatable, I tend to assume that the coins do indeed shed light on Mamai's plans.¹²⁹ Our historical perception of the powerful beglerbegi is influenced by his broadly known usage of puppet khans over almost 20 years. Indeed, no non-Chinggisid, even a güregen, was able to proclaim himself as khan (and even the omnipotent Amir Temür never dared do so).¹³⁰ At the same time, it is quite plausible that, shortly after Berdibeg's death and amid the inability of the Sarāy khans to establish durable authority during the early 1360s as well as the lack of the Batuid contenders for the Jochid throne, Mamai made an attempt, if short-lived and unsuccessful, to proclaim himself as khan in clear opposition to (pseudo-)Keldibek in Sarāy in 763/1361–1362. Having failed, possibly due to a lack of support for his ambitions from the military elite, Mamai changed his strategy, enthroning ʿAbd Allāh. Both the fact that such an attempt took place and its failure are revealing, proving that, in the Chinggisid political continuum, the khan's throne remained closed to non-Chinggisids even during a crisis of legitimising centralised power. Those with aspirations and military support had to apply other strategies.¹³¹

Silver coins that were minted in the Lower Volga during the late 1360s in the name of a certain Bulad Temür, son of *Nugan, attest to one of these alternative scenarios.¹³² What is impressive in these coins is that they often include not only the name of the amir, but also that of the Batuid Janibeg Khan, long dead at that time. These specific coins use the name of the khan with an additional al-maḥrūm, ‘the deceased’, followed, at the same time, by a celebration of a living ruler, khalada mulkahu, ‘may his reign be long’.¹³³ We can identify this Bulad Temür as a person known in the Rus’ chronicles as ‘Bulat-Temir’ or ‘Bulak-Temer’, who, according to the letopisi, brought the Volga Bulgarian lands under his control in around 1361–1362.¹³⁴ The sources do not include much information on Bulad Temür's reign in these lands, but it seems likely that his control in the Volga Bulgarian areas and generally along the Central Volga basin remained relatively firm until the mid-1360s. The key conflicts in which Bulad Temür was involved were those with his north-western neighbours from the Rus’, not only with the north-western Rus’ knjazes, who had to withstand Bulad Temür's invasion in 1367,¹³⁵ but also with the so-called ushkujniki, Rus’ freebooters, who travelled and raided along the Volga down to Hadji-Tarkhan, present-day Astrakhan, multiple times during the late fourteenth century.¹³⁶ It remains difficult to describe the scope of Bulad Temür's rule in Volga Bulgaria during the first half of the 1360s. No coins seem to have been minted in his name in Bulgar, one of the old Jochid minting locations, or elsewhere until 786/1366–1367,¹³⁷ when events clearly forced Bulad Temür to issue his own coins, both silver and copper, on which his authority was strengthened and potentially legitimised by recalling the deceased Janibeg Khan's name.¹³⁸

While most such coins were produced in 768/1366–1367, identifying the mint's location remains a problem. Some lack a mint location¹³⁹ and, on the others, we find Gulistān, the above-mentioned location near Sarāy al-Jadīda and thus some way south of Bulad Temür's mid-1360s’ territory,¹⁴⁰ possibly indicating that Bulad Temür's political ambitions were shifting, or expanding, towards the central capitals. The Nikonovskaja chronicle provides the most reasonable explanation for Bulad Temür's move southward towards the Lower Volga areas, reporting that he had been crushed by Rus’ forces from Suzdal’ and Nizhnij Novgorod in 1367 and forced to flee to the Sarāy metropolitan areas.¹⁴¹ It seems plausible that, during the course of this flight, Bulad Temür might have taken the opportunity to proclaim himself overall khan, drawing on the deceased Batuid authority, as witnessed on the silver coins that were minted at Gulistān that year.¹⁴² This move was, however, momentous. According to the chronicle, shortly after moving to ‘Orda’, Bulad Temür was killed by ʿAzīz Shaykh, who was then in control of the central capital.¹⁴³

It is difficult to clarify the scope of Bulad Temür's control of the Central Volga. Often, amid the lack of the written sources, coinage can assist in demarcating the power holders’ zones of control but, in this case, the coins appear late, in 768/1366–1367. Though providing little assistance, they can help us to proceed one step further in the study of this mysterious figure. As noted, the silver issues bearing the names of Bulad Temür and Janibeg Khan probably appeared in Gulistān only.¹⁴⁴ At the same time, copper coins with a somewhat similar legend (preceding the name of Janibeg Khan with the attribute ʿazīz) were minted in the same year in Mokhshi, in the Mordovian region.¹⁴⁵ Though indirectly, this issue shows that Bulad Temür's authority did not vanish immediately from the Central Volga region. It also indicates that Bulad Temür's control expanded not only in the Volga Bulgarian areas (i.e. the areas around Bulghar and Bilar), but also westward to the Mordovian areas, in the buffer zone between the Jochid and Rus’ domains. It is likely that they were brought under Bulad Temür's control during his invasion of north-western Rus’. According to the chronicles, when he took over the Volga Bulgarian lands in the early 1360s, another knjaz’ Ordynskij, a certain Tagay, came from Bezdezh and occupied Naruvchat—that is, Mokhshi (in today's Penza Oblast’).¹⁴⁶ The excavations in Mokhshi have indeed revealed copper coins that were minted in the name of ‘Taghay Bek’.¹⁴⁷ Thus, these domains were controlled by Taghay until 1366¹⁴⁸ and, in 1367, they came under Bulad Temür's control.¹⁴⁹

Taghay Bek's case exemplifies yet another strategy that was available to ambitious regional power holders who were lacking a Chinggisid background. By cleverly positioning himself vis-à-vis other power holders as well as general Chinggisid ideological principles, he made it clear that he had no ambitions for the overall khan's throne. Firstly, he is known to have issued only copper coins. Copper mints, unlike silver and gold mints, remained in the hands of the local authorities throughout the Mongol domains, explicitly serving regional interests and strengthening their legitimacy. In Taghay Bek's case, their issue was limited to the Mordovian territories. Secondly, Taghay's coins do not exploit the Chinggisid legacy; Taghay never referred to himself as ‘khan’ and never employed identifiably Chinggisid symbols on his coinage. Usage of the word bek, an equivalent of the Old Slavonic knjaz’, clearly demarcated his regional ambitions. Thirdly, unlike the coins that were minted in the name of contenders for the khan's throne, Taghay's coins did not include the word ḍarb (mint), but used muhr (seal), thus eliminating any connotation with the central coin production.¹⁵⁰ Thus, Taghay's usage of the mint was limited to his own domain without countering either nearby regional power holders or contenders for the khan's throne.

This mode of action was not unique to Taghay; we find similarities in the case of copper coins that bear the name of the regional power holder (Hajji) Cherkes Bek, who appears to have controlled Hajji Tarkhan, one of the important Jochid trade centres (not least due to its proliferating slave traffic),¹⁵¹ probably beginning in the 1360s. More precise dating of his rise to power remains problematic, although scholars agree that the city was certainly under his control during the late 1360s.¹⁵² Cherkes Bek remains a foggy figure in Jochid history, although Ibn Khaldūn identified Cherkes in his Kitāb al-ʿibar as one of the Jochid (and, in this context, likely Batuid) so-called ‘road amirs’ (umara’ al-masīra).¹⁵³ In general, it does not seem that any coins were minted in Hajji Tarkhan before the early 1370s.¹⁵⁴ Whether Cherkes Bek took control of Hajji Tarkhan in the first half or middle of the 1360s, no coinage bearing his name appeared during the first decade of the Turmoil period, and it is likely that neither person who was in control of Hajji Tarkhan took a stance vis-à-vis the central powers until the early 1370s.¹⁵⁵ Minting began in 776/1374–1375 with the copper coins in the name of ‘amir al-ʿadil Cherkes Bek’.¹⁵⁶ According to Ibn Khaldūn, Cherkes had even controlled Sarāy for a short time but was expelled from the capital by the Shaybanid Aibek (or Ilbek) and retreated to his domain during the early 1370s.¹⁵⁷ There are no coins that were minted in Cherkes Bek's name in Sarāy or in Gulistān but, if Ibn Khaldūn is correct, then it seems that the issue began after Cherkes Bek's return to his stronghold, having failed to control Sarāy. Thus, the minting of copper (regional) coinage served to secure his claim to power in the important Jochid trade hub.¹⁵⁸

Developments in the regions (IV): playing in a ‘grey zone’

Various ‘survival’ strategies that were in use by both Chinggisid and non-Chinggisid contenders for power across the Jochid ulus during the Turmoil period have been discussed already. Notably, all the personalities who were mentioned either belonged to imperial elites of Chinggisid origin or, as far as one can judge, were military figures of nomadic origin. Before moving on to the concluding discussion, however, two further, and in many regards different, case studies deserve mention. The first concerns the monetary policy of the Grand Muscovite Knjaz’ Dmitrij during the Jochid Turmoil period and the second involves the rulers of Khwārazm, which was brought under the control of a Qonggirad family shortly after Berdibeg's death.

We will start with the Muscovite case. As is known, the Rus’ knjazhestva in general and Muscovy in particular were part of the Jochid domain in a general sense, paying taxes and obliged to seek the khans’ permission to appoint rulers but not positioned directly under Chinggisid rule. While the historical role of the Chinggisid control in the Rus’ areas remains controversial and politicised, I agree with Charles Halperin's understanding of Chinggisid dominance in Rus’ history as being not entirely negative and in some regards even foundational.¹⁵⁹ From this perspective, the rise of Muscovy that culminated in the unification of most Rus’ territories under Muscovite dominance during the second half of the fifteenth century had already begun during the early fourteenth century.¹⁶⁰ It started with the marriage of Özbeg Khan's sister Konchaka to Juri Danilovich, then Great Knjaz’ of Moscow, in 1317.¹⁶¹ This marriage not only raised Juri to the respected güregen status, but also, combined with the transition of the Church Metropolitan seat from Vladimir to Moscow in 1325 and the underlying Jochid decision to make the Muscovite knjazes responsible for tax collection in the Rus’, laid the cornerstone for Moscow as the political, financial, and ideological core of the future Russian tzarstvo.¹⁶²

It is from this angle that we approach the Muscovite minting of their own coins, known generally as den'ga moskovskaja, under the Great Knjaz’ Dmitrij Ivanovich. It should be recalled that, from the early twelfth century until the mid-fourteenth century, the Rus’ areas generally neither used nor minted coins. The Russian term for this period is ‘bezmonetnyj’ (‘one without coins’).¹⁶³ Finds in the various hordes attest to a very limited influx of Jochid coins that were minted outside the Rus’ areas towards the mid-fourteenth century and brought, probably, by trade.¹⁶⁴ However, the second half of the fourteenth century witnessed a renewal of independent minting in the Rus’ areas, in the Muscovite knjazhestvo, in the Suzdal, Nizhnij Novgorod, and Rjazan’, and, after 1400, in Tver’.¹⁶⁵ The coins of specific interest to us were minted during the rule of the Great Knjaz’ Dmitrij Ivanovich. While it seems that minting in the Rus’ lands had begun in the mid-fourteenth century with production of silver coins that bore imitations of Jochid Arabic inscriptions on both sides, those issues can be seen more as an intermediary step in the development of the Rus’ interregional trade than as any conscious political move towards independence from the Horde.¹⁶⁶ Starting in the early 1370s at the latest, however, Dmitrij Ivanovich began to mint coins that bore his own name,¹⁶⁷ with one side showing a person with a sword within an Old East Slavonic inscription along the outer range of the coin. The inscription remained either anonymous, with the words ‘pechat' knjazja velikogo’ (‘Seal of the Great Knjaz’)¹⁶⁸ or mentioned Dmitrij explicitly: pechat’ knjazja velikogo Dmitrija (‘Seal¹⁶⁹ of the Great Knjaz’ Dmitrij’). Of particular importance for us is, however, the reverse of those coins (Gajdukov's Type I), which include an Arabic (or pseudo-Arabic) inscription. While Tolstoj claimed, based on Markov's information, that the inscription is legible,¹⁷⁰ my personal view is that the inscription is not readable, but is a roughly made imitation of cursive Arabic script (Gajdukov and Grishin count seven variations of those reverses). Most of the letters are incorrectly connected one to another, which prevents reconstruction of the text.¹⁷¹ However, looking back, we can find analogues among the silver dirhems (dang) of none other than Muḥammad Özbeg Khan—I assume that the front of these coins clearly served as model for the Rus’ copyists behind the coins’ production. The prototype for these inscriptions belongs to a specific set of Özbeg's issues that were minted in his name in 727/1326–1327 and 728/1327–1328 in Sarāy and in 731/1330–1331 and 732/1331–1332 in Bulghar.¹⁷² The original inscription read al-sulṭān al-aʿẓam Muḥammad Ūzbek Khān (‘the Highest Sultan Muḥammad Özbeg Khan’).¹⁷³ It is quite obvious, however, that the Rus’ copyists, who used Özbeg's coin as a prototype for their own stamp, were not acquainted with the Arabic language. I would also suggest that the aim of the mint masters was not to copy the original Arabic inscription so that one who knew the language could read it, but rather to copy it for recognition as coinage that was associated directly with the Jochids. It seems that the target group of these new coins were not Jochid tax collectors or merchants, but the Rus’ themselves—more precisely, the Muscovite populace. It is evident that these coins were the first step in Knjaz’ Dmitrij's development of an independent Muscovite monetary system and it is no coincidence that this first attempt to mint Muscovite coinage occurred during the Turmoil period (in or after the mid-1370s if Gajdukov's chronology is correct).¹⁷⁴ It seems, therefore, that, at some point, in the absence of a strong Jochid khan in Sarāy, Dmitrij's first coins draw on the Batuid legacy to establish his own position vis-à-vis his Muscovite subjects, referring, at the same time, to the broader Chinggisid charisma.¹⁷⁵ Notably, this occurred without any reference to the contemporary events or to the ever-changing khans on the Lower Volga. Thus, while maintaining a de facto acceptance of Jochid domination, Muscovy made a symbolic start on its road to independence, building its status, at the same time, on the knjazes’ personal legacy within Özbeg's specific past.

Until now. the discussion has raised multiple cases that all positioned themselves directly or indirectly within Chinggisid power. Those who came from the Chinggisid family themselves, pseudo-Chinggisids and kingmakers with Chinggisid princes, real or otherwise, self-proclaimed khans and powerful amirs, even Muscovite knjazes who deployed the Batuid legacy—none openly broke the rules of the game in trying to adapt to a dynamic situation. Only one exception has yet been identified—that of the Qonggirad of Khwārazm—which provides an alternative scenario, based not on the foundational principles of the Chinggisid ideological space, but on the Islamic power discourse. As my analysis of this case elsewhere has shown, the Qonggirad rulers of Khwārazm did not fully neglect Chinggisid power claims, but supplanted them, turning to Islamic legitimacy in their hour of need. Moreover, when forced to do so, primarily following Temür's invasions into Khwārazm, they returned to the Chinggisid ideological framework.¹⁷⁶ Thus, in this case, too, the independence claim remained limited in space and time—an exception that confirms the validity of the Chinggisid principle in the Jochid ulus even during the Turmoil era.

Qonggirad rule in Khwārazm should be seen in the context of a broader dispersion of Qonggirad tribesmen, not least members of Qonggirad chieftain Dei Sechen's descendants across Mongol Eurasia during the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries.¹⁷⁷ In the second half of the thirteenth century, Khwārazm belonged to the yurt (dwelling areas) of a certain Salji’üdai (d. 1301 or 1302)—a descendant from Dei Sechen's brother Daritai.¹⁷⁸ After being controlled by powerful figures from Özbeg's inner circle, probably of non-Qonggirad origin, during the first decades of the fourteenth century, Khwārazm came under the control of a certain Nanguday, also one of Özbeg's senior commanders, from the late 1330s or early 1340s onward.¹⁷⁹ Importantly, Nanguday was Özbeg's father-in-law, as Kebek, the khan's second wife, was Nanguday's daughter.¹⁸⁰ Being important under the two last Batuids of Janibeg and Berdibeg, Nanguday retained power in Khwārazm during the first years of the Turmoil, ultimately being killed by (pseudo-)Keldibek in 1361 or 1362.¹⁸¹ In the following years, until 1389 at the latest, the Khwārazm region fell under the control of the so-called ‘Sufi-Qonggirad’ Dynasty, Nanguday's direct descendants, among whom Ḥusayn Ṣūfī (d. 1372), Nanguday's eldest son Yūsuf (r. 1373–1380), Ḥusayn's brother, as well as two other family members, Baynaq Ṣūfī and Süleyman Ṣūfī (both active in the city during the 1380s), played a major role.¹⁸² The Nangudaids also belonged to the prestigious güregen strata of the Chinggisid military elite, as one of Nanguday's sons (exact name remains controversial) married Özbeg's daughter, Shaqar Bek.¹⁸³ Starting from 1371–1372, shortly after Temür installed his Ögedeid puppet Soyūrghātmīsh on the Chaghadaid throne and expanded his conquests northward, Khwārazm found itself a target of five consecutive campaigns (in 1372, 1374, 1376, 1379, and 1388–1389).¹⁸⁴ The last one ended with Temür's occupation of the whole area and the destruction of Urgench—the Qonggirad capital and core settlement of northern Khwārazm.¹⁸⁵

As far as one can judge from the written and numismatic sources, the Qonggirad tried to gain some sort of independence from the Jochid central authorities in Sarāy during the Turmoil that followed Berdibeg's death. Starting from the early 1360s, anonymous and mainly golden coins were minted in Khwārazm that bore the legend mulk li-llāh (‘the rule is of God’).¹⁸⁶ This led Barthold and a number of subsequent scholars to claim that the Qonggirads had tried to establish theocratic Islamic rule in the areas under their control.¹⁸⁷ Despite the family founder's intimate links with Sufi shaykhs, one cannot agree with this assessment.¹⁸⁸ The title ‘Sufi’ in the name of the ruling family and the Islamic power formula on otherwise anonymous coins are probably best interpreted in a practical, less ideological sense—as a means to strengthen Qonggirad legitimacy over Khwārazm, a renowned Islamic centre.¹⁸⁹ The fact that the coins remained anonymous clearly shows that the Qonggirads did not intend to completely disconnect themselves from the Batuid power.¹⁹⁰ They seem to have used the anonymous mint as a temporary strategy in order to survive during the Turmoil phase, especially taking into account that the primary threat that they faced were not contenders for the throne in Sarāy, but the Chaghadaids and, from 1371, Temür's drawing on Chaghadaid legitimacy. Starting from the mid-1370s, and despite the fact that such coins were minted continuously in Khwārazm until the late 1380s, it appears that the Qonggirad rulers sought (or were open to adapting to) additional and even controversial sources of power.¹⁹¹ As such, coins that bore the names of Khan Soyurghatmish and ‘Temür Güregen’ appeared in Khwārazm in 1380 over a short period.¹⁹² Later, during the 1380s, coins that bore the name of Toqtamïsh were minted in Urgench in parallel with the anonymous coinage.¹⁹³ It seems, therefore, that the Qonggirads, who remained in control of the city until its destruction by Temür in 1389, aimed to retain autonomous rule in Khwārazm in the first 12 to 14 years of their rule. For this reason (and amid the chaotic circumstances on the Volga), they minted anonymous coins with the Islamic legend that provided them with the legitimacy to rule in Khwārazm without their being forced to proclaim themselves as rulers or to take sides vis-à-vis Jochid or Chaghadaid power holders. Towards the early 1380s, the Nangudaids seem to have turned to a much more complicated and multifocal policy, reacting to both Temür's continuous aggression to their south and Toqtamïsh's unification of the Jochid ulus to the north.

Discussion

This article has mapped and exemplified key strategies that were introduced by various actors across the Jochid ulus in reaction to the crisis of central power in Sarāy after Berdibeg's death in 1359. Such analysis is needed in order to establish a broader discussion on the durability and ‘stress resistance’ of the Jochid political system during the crisis of its central authority of the mid-fourteenth century. As shown, the ‘Chinggisid principle’—that is, the non-written rule according to which only a person of a Chinggisid origin could rule as khan—remained intact in the ulus even after the collapse of the Batuid rule. Importantly, none of the patterns of reaction that have been discussed, in either the central areas or the regions, was aimed at a complete break with the Jochid ulus as one united political and ideological space. While some strategies that were employed by powerful figures were aimed at contending for central power in the metropolitan area around Sarāy al-Jadīda on the central Lower Volga and others at strengthening aspirations to local power, the ulus should still be seen as one whole in this period. It is only after the final unificatory attempt by Toqtamïsh and the decline of the pre-1360s’ Batuid elites that decentralising tendencies brought the ulus to the eventual break-up into multiple khanates and hordes in the early fifteenth century.

Some key tendencies can be singled out of this broad discussion. Firstly, there were continuous attempts to proclaim a specific person, of real or, if necessary, fake Chinggisid origin, as an overall khan, either in Sarāy or, questioning the legitimacy of the current Sarāy rulers, in other areas. While these attempts moved the ulus generally from the Batuid to Shaybanid and later Togha Temürid domination, in any given period, especially during the 1360s, multiple contesters fought one against the other for the formerly Batuid throne. Interestingly, despite more than a century of Batuid rule, it seems that their legacy was weaker than one might have expected. Rather, the old Steppe rule, according to which all members of a ruling family had the right to serve as a khan, was revived quite soon after the post-1359 contest for the central throne began and representatives of other (but not all) Jochid lineages extended their ambitions to the khan's seat.¹⁹⁴ This was a significant change in comparison with Batuid centralised rule, but still within the framework of the ‘Chinggisid principle’. Installations of puppet khans followed this principle too, even though the Chinggisids probably only played a symbolic role in this regard. Importantly, the fight for the central throne continued throughout the whole Turmoil period and until Toqtamïsh entered Sarāy in 1380, even though its importance remained mainly emblematic, especially after the mid-1360s. Thus, while centrifugal tendencies increased from 1359, centripetal inertia remained the key tendency throughout the 1360s and 1370s.

This centripetal impulse is crucial in order to understand the developments in regions beyond the central Lower Volga. Despite manifold moves by various power holders in the Jochid periphery to establish or secure their own rule, in no case did these actors aim at wholehearted secession or independence from the Jochid political space. Indeed, we are aware of multiple cases of regional coinage that was minted in the name of specific figures. Firstly, however, these were not gold coins, as those remained the prerogative of the khans. Issues of silver coinage primarily represented attempts to extend power beyond the bounds of specific regions, as in the case of Bulad Temür when he moved from Volga Bulgaria to the central Lower Volga. An alternative survival strategy was to develop one's own copper mint. However, although, in many cases, we observe the disappearance of the signs of the Jochid central authority from the mints, copper issues as such did not run counter to the existence of such authority or to its acceptance.

Notwithstanding such developments, which could have been observed across the ulus from Crimea to Western Siberia, one must keep in mind that there were many more powerful military figures, of both Chinggisid and non-Chinggisid origin, who were dispersed across the Jochid domains, whose number greatly outnumbered the known ‘rebellious’ cases. Again, it seems that the strategy that was most commonly adopted by such personalities was silent acceptance of the current Sarāy khan or of the contenders who were aspiring to become the overall khan, rather than breaking away from the Jochid space or rebellion against central authorities. Notably, it is difficult to decide at which point, or under which circumstances, such silent acceptance could have come to an end and when a given regional actor could have moved to mint his own coins, even at the copper production level. Indeed, the number of contenders for the central throne and the variety of regional developments give an impression of the complete decentralisation of the ulus. I would argue, however, that this impression is misleading, as both chronicles and the numismatic evidence show only fragmented visions of political reality. As the number of the potential contenders to the throne and the number of strong men in the regions were certainly much higher and remain impossible to calculate, it seems that the Great Crisis, at least during its first two decades, confirmed, despite all challenges, a substantial stability in the overall political system, while the Batuid collapse did indeed lead to the rise of multiple contesting parties and voices. Last but not least, the main underlying factor—predictability and the clarity in the rules of the political game, the unwritten ‘Chinggisid principle’—stabilised political developments even when outside witnesses, such as the Rus’ chroniclers, perceived them as chaotic and contradictory.¹⁹⁵

Two additional cases discussed at the end of this article do not run counter to, but rather confirm these findings, although with variations. Early Muscovite coinage is quite communicative in this regard, especially as one notes that the Rus’ knjazes had been quick enough to pursue their own aspirations to power as the presence of central Jochid authority declined from the early 1360s onward. Sure enough, Dmitrij Ivanovich lacked confirmed Chinggisid blood in his direct ancestral line. He belonged, however, to the family of the Chinggisid güregens (from his great-great-uncle Jurij) and, similarly importantly, Moscow belonged to the closest Jochid allies and satellites, not least due to its importance for both the Horde and the neighbouring Rus’ domains as a powerful fiscal agent. Clearly, the minting of their own coinage, especially after a very long period without their own mint, shows aspirations for independence among the Muscovite knjazes. In this regard, they were the forerunners of broader developments that were visible across the Rus’ domains from Toqtamïsh's rule onwards. It is enlightening, however, that these aspirations developed quite organically inside the broader legitimating sphere of Jochid domination. No names of the pre-Toqtamïsh khans of the Turmoil period ever featured on the Rus’ coinage, but the reference to a ‘golden’ Özbeg past—one in which the special status of the Muscovite ruling family was rooted—remained obligatory for both internal and (possibly) limited external use. This exemplifies well the crucial importance of the Jochid legitimacy for Dmitrij in order to unify and rule the rising Muscovite polity (despite the crisis of the central Jochid authorities). However, quite in accordance with the Rus’ bookmen's ‘ideology of silence’ as stressed by Halperin, this foundational relevance of Jochid authority to Muscovite ascendancy is not referred to in the chronicles and is little discussed in the modern Russian historiography.¹⁹⁶ Nevertheless, it is important to better understand the subsequent developments in post-Turmoil centralisation of the Muscovite rule during the fifteenth century onwards.

Nor does the Qonggirad case in Khwārazm break from the same general analytical outline. On the contrary, it supports the findings of the article. To recall, the Qonggirad family of Khwārazm belonged to the late Batuid inner circle. The collapse of Batuid rule and, more importantly, the beginning of conflict around the central capital forced the ruling family in Khwārazm to face the question of its position vis-à-vis the developments in Sarāy. The later chronicle recalls Ḥater Sufi's involvement in the political struggle in Sarāy in the very early 1360s but, if true, it would remain an absolute exception, as the Qonggirads basically chose a policy of abstinence and seclusion, both politically and ideologically.¹⁹⁷ Politically, it seems, they preferred to close themselves within their domain, being more interested in (and irritated by) developments on their southern border, in the Chaghadaid ulus, than the developments on the Lower Volga. Ideologically, their minting of anonymous coinage bearing Islamic legends can be seen in two ways. On the one hand, this was clearly an open protest against both the break-up of centralised Batuid authority and the multiple-party war around the capital. On the other, the coins were a means of securing their rule in Urgench in particular and Khwārazm in general, just to the north of the Chaghadaid domains, without proclaiming themselves as a ruling family or choosing sides. The only peculiar (and exceptional) move was their golden mint—the prerogative that belonged exclusively to the Chinggisid khans. This move can be probably explained less by the self-positioning of the Qonggirads vis-à-vis developments in the Jochid domains (and certainly not by their wish to proclaim themselves khans) and more by their having been sandwiched between the two contesting uluses—that is, as an attempt to secure their rule in Khwārazm without openly disconnecting themselves from the Chinggisid political universe. As later developments show, the Qonggirads returned to the Jochid acceptance as soon as it became necessary and as they had found one figure whom could safely accept as a khan. The Qonggirad case, therefore, does not attest to a breakdown of the ‘Chinggisid principle’, but rather exemplifies the diversity of political reactions that were available to powerful actors of the Turmoil period.

This analysis reveals that, while the Turmoil period both strengthened and established centrifugal tendencies all across the ulus (and, in the long run, initiated its eventual break-up), the ‘Chinggisid principle’ remained the major affiliation marker for regional elites. This was, arguably, the major reason why, when Toqtamïsh started his unifying process in the early 1380s, he was able to proceed rather quickly. Generally, one can note a strong durability and survivability of the Jochid political and ideological framework. One wonders what would have happened had Temür not started his invasions into the Jochid ulus, significantly weakening Toqtamïsh's rule and authority towards the end of the fourteenth century, but this topic remains beyond the scope of this discussion. As a last remark, one should stress that, while the various political reactions among the multiple contenders for power may seem to have varied widely, in fact they did not. The only major change that materialised during the Turmoil decades was the rise of the Shaybanid and Togha Temürid families. Their accumulation of power and expansion of their influence beyond their own appanages had a lasting impact on Central Eurasian history over subsequent centuries (including the rise of the Uzbeks, the broader post-fourteenth-century change in ethnic composition across the Steppe, and the beginning of the decoupling of the Muscovy throne from the Horde). The crisis decades (1360s to 1370s), however, should be seen as the first transitional phase in the Jochid history during which the ulus still maintained its integrity, secured by the lasting strength of the unifying Chinggisid imperial vision.