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Mountbatten's Response to the Communal Riots in the Punjab, 20 March to 15 August 1947: An Overview

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  29 July 2016

MUHAMMAD IQBAL CHAWLA
MUHAMMAD IQBAL CHAWLA*
Affiliation:
University of the Punjab, Lahorechawla_iqbal@yahoo.com
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Abstract

Mountbatten once said, “I sincerely hope that His Majesty's Government will support me should this eventuality arise. But I feel that if we can blot out 10,000 fanatics in the first round we may stop four hundred million people from being involved in war”.1 Despite his strong commitment and prompt responses to the communal riots, Mountbatten's inability to prevent the massacres, especially brutal and widespread in the Punjab, and in the rest of the country in general, invited criticism of his role as the last leader of British India. It is important, therefore, to analyze the dynamics of the communal violence in the Punjab and Mountbatten's response to it. This paper attempts to understand Mountbatten's reading of Punjab's communal problem and his efforts to deal with it. It also analyzes the measures he took to curb and eradicate violence which resulted from that. Hence, this study fills an important gap in our existing historical literature and helps in revising prevailing views about Mountbatten's real role in dealing with the communal riots in the Punjab.

Type
Research Article
Information
Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society , Volume 26 , Issue 4 , October 2016 , pp. 683 - 706
Copyright
Copyright © The Royal Asiatic Society 2016 

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References

1 Viceroy's Conference Report Number Forty-Six, Viceroy's Personal Report No 6, MBI/D283/6.

2 More than two million people were killed, and almost fifteen million were forced to migrate from their homes. However, there is no exact estimate of the number of people killed in India at the time of partition but it ranges from 200,000 to three million. For details see: Ahmad, Ishtiaq, Punjab Partitioned, Bloodied And Cleansed (Karachi, 2012), p. xxxvii Google Scholar; Moon, P., Divide and Quit (London, 1960), p. 283 Google Scholar; Mosley, L., The Last Days of the British Raj (London, 1962), p. 279 Google Scholar.

3 It is a common understanding in the world that it is the state which plays an important role in eradicating the violence in the society but the British authorities remained incapable of stamping out the communal riots in the Punjab during the transfer of power. No wonder, the British government, including its last Viceroy in India, Mountbatten, were held responsible for it. For details see Bjorn Hansen, Anders, Partiton and Genocide Manifestation of Violence in Punjab: 1937–1947 (New Delhi, 2002), pp. 195–197 Google Scholar.

4 Talbot, Ian, (ed.), Deadly Embrace Religion, Politics, and Violence in India and Pakistan 1947–2002 (Karachi, 2007 Google Scholar); Talbot, Ian and Singh, Gurharpal, (eds.) The Partition of India (Cambridge, 2009 Google Scholar).

5 Pandey, Gyanendra, Remembering Partition, Violence, Nationalism and History in India (Cambridge, 2001), p. 45.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

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7 Horowitz has described the “attack on refugee trains as organized genocide”. Horowitz, Donald L., The Deadly Ethnic Riot (Berkley, 2001 Google Scholar).

8 Bjorn Hansen, Anders, Partiton and Genocide Manifestation of Violence in Punjab: 1937–1947 (New Delhi, 2002) pp. 195–197 Google Scholar.

9 Copland, Ian, ‘The Master and the Maharajas: The Sikh Princes and the East Punjab Massacres of 1947’, Modern Asian Studies, 36,3(2002), pp. 657–704.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

10 Virdi, Pippa, “Partition and the Absence of Communal Violence in Malerkotla”, in Talbot, Ian, (ed.), The Deadly Embrace, Religion, Politics and Violence in India and Pakistan 1947–2002 (Karachi, 2007), pp. 16–35 Google Scholar.

11 Copland, Ian, ‘The Integration of the Princely States: A Bloodless Revolution?’, South Asia, Vol. XVIII, 1995, pp. 131–115; ‘The Master and the Maharajas: The Sikh princes and the East Punjab Massacres of 1947’, Modern Asian Studies, 36,3(2002), pp. 657–704.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

12 Urvashi Butalia's well-received book throws light on the suffering of the women, especially the Sikh women, in the hands of men. The author, however, ignores the other side of the picture as the Muslim women also had to face a similar treatment from the non-Muslims. Butalia, Urvashi, The Other Side of Silence. Voices from the Partition of India (New Delhi,1998 Google Scholar).

13 For details see: Ziegler, Philip Mountbatten: The Official Biography, (London, 1985 Google Scholar); Hudson, H.V., The Great Divide: Britain, India and Pakistan (Karachi, 1985 Google Scholar).

14 Ahmed Sherwani, Latif, The Partition of India and Mountbatten (Karachi, 1986 Google Scholar).

15 Ahmed, Ishtiaq, The Punjab Blooded, Partitioned and Cleansed (Karachi, 2012), p. 537 Google Scholar.

16 Akbar S. Ahmad believes that the “raw deal” that Pakistan received stemmed in fact from the Edwina-Nehru-Mountbatten “triangle”. Ahmad, Akbar S., Jinnah, Pakistan and Islamic Identity, The Search for Saladin (London, 1997 Google Scholar).

17 Wolpert, Stanley, Shameful Flight: The Last Years of the British Empire in India. (Karachi, 2010 Google Scholar).

18 Mosley, Leonard, The Last Days of British Raj in India (London, 1961 Google Scholar).

19 Mountbatten is also alleged to have influenced the process of boundary demarcation in Punjab, thereby giving India land access to Kashmir. Muhammad Ali, Chaudhri, The Emergence of Pakistan, (Lahore, reprint 2009), pp. 213–218 Google Scholar.

20 Ziegler, Philip, Mountbatten: The Official Biography (London, 1985 Google Scholar).

21 Hodson, H.V., The Great Divide: Britain, India and Pakistan (Karachi, 1985 Google Scholar).

22 The western historians like Ziegler, Philip Mountbatten: The Official Biography, (London, 1985 Google Scholar), Hudson, H.V., The Great Divide: Britain, India and Pakistan, (Karachi, 1985 Google Scholar) Alan Campbell-Johnson and Ian Talbot, maintain that Mountbatten had limited resources to deal with the rising tide of communal violence. Mountbatten could only check terrorist activities of the organised groups with the help of the police and the army but there were signs of division visible in the Punjab police, and the army which were making his job more difficult.

23 Morris-Jones, W. H., ‘Thirty-Six Years Later: The Mixed Legacies of Mountbatten's Transfer of Power’, International Affairs 59 (4) (Autumn 1983), pp. 621–628 CrossRefGoogle Scholar; ‘Dividing the Jewel: Mountbatten and the Transfer of Power to India and Pakistan’, Pacific Affairs 58(4) (Winter 1985–6), pp. 653–662.

24 This article is based on a range of primary sources including the Jenkins papers of the final British Governor of the Punjab held in the British Library, the Rees Papers, which relate to the Punjab Boundary Force and the Khizar Tiwana Papers, and Alan Campbell-Johnson Papers. Both of the last two are held at the University of Southampton and provide insights from the final Prime Minister of the United Punjab and from Mountbatten's influential press attaché. My interpretation is chiefly derived however from a close reading of the Mountbatten Papers at the University of Southampton.

25 Record of Viceroy's Interview with Gandhi No 19, Meeting with Gandhi on 31 March 1947.MBI/D283/1

26 As Yasmin Khan has observed, “From 1946 different types of brutality were starting to occur in UP. These types of violence could clearly be crudely characterised as random stabbings and street fights, train attacks, and pogroms”. Khan, Yasmin, ‘Out of Control? Partition Violence and the State in Uttar Pradesh’, in Talbot, Ian, (ed.), Deadly Embrace Religion, Politics, and Violence in India and Pakistan 1947–2002 (Karachi, 2007), p. 40 Google Scholar.

27 Gopi Chand to Tiwana, 11 February 1947, Papers of Lieutenant Colonel Nawab Sir Malik Khizar Hayat Tiwana, University of Southampton, MS210/10.

28 Regarding situation in the Punjab, Hindustan Times wrote on 9 March 1947, “The political deadlock on the Punjab is no accident. It is inherited in the situation. The Hindu-Muslim problem in this country is not a religious conflict. Nor is it a question of minority and majority. It is essentially a struggle for power in the two provinces of the Punjab and the Bengal where the Muslims and non-Muslims are evenly balanced”.

29 Jenkins reported, “In the Punjab all parties are seriously preparing for civil war, and of these by far the most business-like and serious are the Sikhs, who already have a plan to seize the main irrigation centre in order to exercise physical control over the whole of the Punjab”. Jenkins to Viceroy, 2 April 1947, Jenkins Papers, MSS/EUR/D 897, British Library, London.

30 Nehru to Viceroy, 10 March 1947, Mountbatten Papers, MBI/D259, p. 35.

31 Raghuvendra Tanwar is not wrong in his assessment that the resolution of the partition of the Punjab by the Congress Working Committee on 8 March 1947 was prepared by Nehru who had been thinking since 20 February 1947 about partition as the one of the best solution of India but he overlooks the Rajagopalachari Formula and the Gandhi-Jinnah talks which also had demanded the partition of the Punjab in 1944. RaghuvendraTanwar, Reporting Partition of Punjab 1947, press public and other opinions (New Delhi, 2006), p. 127.

32 Nehru suggested establishing two ministries under the Governor, one for the Eastern part of the Province and one for the Western. But Mountbatten was rather doubtful of its being a practical one. “Did he propose that there should be fresh elections or that the existing Assembly should be split in two parts to the districts they came from? He did not seem to have thought an election was necessary, what he proposed was merely a temporary arrangement”. Letter from Members of Central Legislatures from Punjab to Nehru, 2 April 1947. Mountbatten Papers, MBI/D259, p. 78.

33 Hindustan Times, 5 April 1947.

34 The Sikhs suggested the terms of reference whereof should be demarcating the Provincial boundaries keeping in view: - Population, Landed Property, Land Rvenue, Historical places and traditions, of the various communities. Akali Dal further demands that faculties be provided for exchange of population and property and those special arrangements be made for the protection, honour, integrity and sanctity of the historically religious places. Akali Dal also appealed to all Panthic organisations and workers to unite and solidly stand behind this demand. Resolution No IX adopted by the Working Committee of the Shiromani Akal Dal, Amritsar in its meeting on 16 April 1947, Mountbatten Papers, MBI/D259, pp. 99.

35 Wavell to Secretary of State, No. 82-GT, 10 March 1947, Mountbatten Papers, MBI/D259, p. 40.

36 Statesman, 11 March 1947.

37 Hindustan Times, New Delhi, 16 March 1947.

38 The Muslim League launched a campaign of direct action against the coalition government, for the Government banned the Muslim League National Guards on 24 January to 1947. In fact paramilitary organisations such as the National Guards organisation along with the Hindu Rashtriya Swayam Sevak Sangh (RSS) were banned. Given that he could not resist popular resistance, Khizar lifted ban on processions and meetings. Moreover, he tendered his resignations on 2 March 1947.

39 Nanda maintains, “From the political point of view his resignation opened the sluice gates of anarchy”. See R Nanda, B., Punjab Uprooted: A story of the Punjab Riots and Rehabilitation Programmes (Bombay, 1948, reprint Delhi: NMML, 2003), p.15 Google Scholar.

40 Eastern Times, Lahore, 4 March 1947.

41 Jenkin to Wavell, 17 March 1947, Transfer of Power Vol. IX, pp. 965–969.

42 After the resignation of Khizar as Chief Minister, Even Jenkins did not allow the Muslim League to form Ministry as Master Tara Singh threatened to use force to sabotage the new government. Therefore, the Governor Rule was imposed by using the Section 93 of Government of India Act 1935.

43 On 1 April 1947 Jenkins informed Lord Ismay that the “Sikhs are brewing up trouble. Their object is the mastery of their kingdom, the Punjab. They may postpone action until we have gone, but Giani Kartar Singh is a hothead, and a spark might be touched off at any time. Partition could be imposed by force, it would be a dirty job requiring a lot of troops. When it had been done, the two governments would govern by sheer force, partition would spell economic ruin for the Punjab, the Sutlej Scheme, for example would be beyond their means”. See Notes of an Interview between Jenkins and Lord Ismay, 1 April 1947, 3 April, Mountbatten Papers, MBI/D259, pp. 75–76.

44 Nehru suggested that there might as a temporarily measure be two ministries under the Governor, one for the Eastern part of the Province and one for the Western. Viceroy and Nehru, 10 March 1947, Mountbatten Papers, MBI/D259, p. 35.

45 Rashtriya Swayam Sevak Sang first appeared in the Central Province and spread all over India. It became ‘the Hindu rashtra in miniature’. It had fascist forms its military-style features including uniforms and emphasis on drill. It was common to other Indian organisations of the period, including the Congress volunteers, the Khaksars and the Muslim League National Guards. Talbot, Ian, India and Pakistan: Inventing the Nation (London, 1999), pp. 102–103 Google Scholar.

46 In response to the Rawlpindi tragedy an exodus of Sikhs in large numbers took place to the eastern districts of the Punjab and to the Sikh princely states, where they narrated their woes, set up the nucleus of a revenge movement; as the Governor of Punjab failed to punish the perpetrators of the killings the situation got complicated further.

47 Brass, The Production of Hindu-Muslim Violence, pp. 5–39.

48 Ahmed, Ishtiaq, The Punjab Blooded, Partitioned and Cleansed (Karachi, 2012), p. 37 Google Scholar.

49 The newspapers while hailing the Hindu-Sikh solidarity writes, “It may be argued that situation on the Punjab with its three communities is materially different from that of Bengal where it is a simple problem of two communities, but the Hindus and the Sikhs of the Punjab are completely at one so far as the issue of separation is concerned.” Tribune, 16 June 1947, MBI/D84/1, p. 15.

50 Paul Brass explains that in post-independence India, the Hindu-Muslim riots which have turned into pogroms, massacres of the Muslims, of course only few Hindus are killed. Brass, The Production of Hindu-Muslim Violence, pp. 5–39.

51 Jenkins to Mountbatten 4 August 1947, Carter, Lionel, (ed.) Punjab Politics, 1 June 1947–14 August 1947 Tragedy Governments’ Fortnightly Reports and other Key Documents, (Delhi, 2007), pp. 193–211 Google Scholar.

52 In early 1947, it was estimated that the RSSS had more than 28,000 members. Quoted in Talbot, The Deadly Embrace, p. 13.

53 According to a rough estimate, the Muslim League National Guards had ten thousand members

54 Evan Jenkins reported that . . . . The more unpleasant interpretation is supported by Intelligence reports of the activites of Master Tara Singh and Kartar Singh. Both have advocated retaliation against the Muslims and both have been in touch with the rulers of Sikh States. Jenkins to Mountbatten, 9 April 1947, R/3/1/176: ff 100-107.; Yunus has observed,“The Sikhs begain to prepare for civil war. Master Tara Singh's war fund target of fifty lakhs Rupees was oversubscribed; he recevied substantial amounts from Calcutta Marwari and military form the Faridkot and Patiala State”. See Samad, Yunas, A Nation in Turmoil: Nationalism and Ethnicity in Pakistan 1937–1958 (Karachi, 1995), p. 111 Google Scholar.

55 Tribune, Lahore, 16 June, 1947.

56 Viceroy's Personal Report no. 10,Top secret and Personal, 27 June 1947, MBI/D284/1, pp. 1-14.

57 Ibid .

58 Mountbatten wrote, “In Gurgaon, where my wife went again on the 26th June there has been a longstanding feud between the Meos and Jats, and now that additional troops with the increased vehicles and wireless facilities have been sent in the hope that we shall be able to control the troubles. A similar Meo-Jat flare up in the United Provinces was dealt with very quickly, as the authorities were ready for it”. Ibid.

59 Daily Nawa-i-Wakt, Lahore, 4 April 1947.

60 Mountbatten opined that “I might add that the Hindus are nearly as bad, and that the determination, from the highest to the lowest in the land, to make out that the opposite religionists are devils incarnate as well as crooks, makes any sensible solution appear out of question”. Viceroy's Personal Report No. 5, 1 May 1947, L/PO/123 : ff 71–89; Nick Lloyd, “The last Governor: Sir Evan Jenkins in the Punjab 1946–1947” in Talbot, Ian (ed.), The Indiepence of India and Pakistan New Approaches and Reflections, (Karachi, 2013), p. 220 Google Scholar.

61 Deploring the disturbances in the country, Nehru reiterated that Governmental authority had almost collapsed. Tribune, 16 June 1947, MBI/D84/1, p. 15; however, Jenkins disagreed with Nehru allegations. Jenkins to Mountbatten, 16 June 1947, MBI/D84/1, p. 16.

62 Mountbatten was fully conscious of the seriousness of the situation in India and wanted everyone to show responsibility. In his first address on his Swearing-in Ceremony he said “Every one of us must do what he can to avoid any word or action which might lead to further bitterness or add to the toll of innocent victims”. Speech at the Swearing in Ceremony 24 March 1947, Mountbatten Papers MBI/M6.

63 Lord Ismay while explanation to the Prime Minister Clement Attlee about the winding up so quickly the British rule in India said, “I felt quite sure in my own mind that we had no option but to do what had done, and that as for rushing things too much, we would have probably been in a worse mess than we are now if we had delayed matters, with essential difference that we would be responsible for clearing up the mess without any means of doing so”. Ismay to Lord Mountbatten, 9 October 1947, Mountbatten papers MBI/D196/2.

64 Mountbatten of Burma, “Transfer of Power”, Royal Empire Society, Vol. XXXIX. No. 6 (London, November-December 1948), pp. 271–276.

65 Mountbatten's accepted this position after great pressure from His Majesty's Government and his term was fixed for only fifteen months. Prime Minister to Lord Mountbatten, 8 February 1947, MBI/D92/14.

66 Minutes of Viceroy's Staff Meeting, 31 March 1947, Mountbatten Papers MBI/M6.

67 Lord Ismay said, “We had no option but to do what had to be done, and that as for rushing things too much, we would have probably been in a worse mess than we are now if we had delayed matters, with essential difference that we would be responsible for clearing up the mess without any means of doing so.” Ismay to Lord Mountbatten, 9 October 1947, Mountbatten Papers MBI/D196/2.

68 For details see: Iqbal Chawla, Muhammad, “Quaid-i-Azam and Rajagopalachari Formula”, South Asian Studies, Vol. 17, No.1, January 2002, pp. 1–15 Google Scholar, Centre for South Asian Studies, University of the Punjab, Lahore Pakistan, 2002.

69 Iqbal Chawla, Muhammad, “Picture of Muslim Politics in India before Wavell's Viceroyalty”, Journal of the Research Society of Pakistan, University of the Punjab, Lahore, Vol. 45, No. 1, 2008, pp. 74–138 Google Scholar.

70 Dawn wrote that “the Congress propaganda is intended to disrupt and put obstacles and obstructions and difficulties in the way of an amicable solution. It is quite obvious that they have put up the Hindus Mahasabha in Bengal and the Sikhs in the Punjab, and the Congress Press is inciting the Sikhs and misleading them. The Sikhs do not stand to gain by the partition of the Punjab but they will be split into two halves. More that half of their population will have to remain in Pakistan, as proposed by the Muslim League even if partition of the Punjab takes place according to their conception, whereas in Pakistan, as proposed by the ML they will play, as one solid minority, a very big part. We have always been very willing to meet them in every reasonable way”. Dawn, 1 May 1947, MBI/D288/5.

71 Brass, Paul R., “The Partition of India and Retributive Genocide in the Punjab, 1946–47: Means, Methods, and Purposes”, Journal of Genocide Research, 5 (1), (2003), pp. 71–101 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

72 He was told that Jenkins had no hope of getting out of Section 93 and trouble was that a general election would solve nothing. The League would probably get a majority of up to 5 out of 175 seats, and would then proceed to form a government with bare Muslim majority, there might be real trouble. Viceroy's Personal Report No.2, dated 9 April 1947 MBI/D283/2.

73 Extract from a secret letter from Secretary of State to Mountbatten, 3 April 1947. Mountbatten Papers, MBI/D259, p. 78.

74 Notes of an Interview between Mountbatten and Nehru, 1 April 1947. Mountbatten Papers, MBI/D259, p. 77.

75 Viceroy to Secretary of State, 17 April 1947, Mountbatten Papers, MBI/D259, p. 80.

76 Viceroy's Conference Report No. 46, 29 April 1947, Viceroy's Personal report no 6, MBI/D283/6.

77 Viceroy's Conference Report Number Forty-Six, Viceroy's Personal Report No 6, 29 April 1947, MBI/D283/6.

78 Jenkins predicted that “they may postpone action until we have gone, but Giani Kartar Singh is a hothead, and a spark might be touched off at any time”. Notes of an Interview between Jenkins and Lord Ismay, 1 April 1947. Noted and signed Ismay on 3 April 1947, Mountbatten Papers, MBI/D259, pp. 75–76.

79 Viceroy's Personal Report no. 10, Top Secret and Personal, 27 June 1947, MBI/D284/1, pp. 1–14.

80 Mountbatten ot Jenkins, 17 May 1947, R/3/1/178: ff 55–56; Viceroy's Personal Report no 6, MBI/D283/6.

81 Viceroy's Personal Report No. 13, 18 July 1947, MBI/D284/4.

82 Viceroy's Conference Paper No. 68, Viceroy's Personal Report No. 8, 5 June 1947, MBI/D83/8.

83 Viceroy's Conference Paper No. 127, Viceroy's Personal Report No. 12, 12 July 1947, MBI/D84/3.

84 Deploring the disturbances in the country, Nehru reiterated that governmental authority had almost collapsed. The British were no longer interested in curbing the disturbances because they were leaving. Tribune, 16 June 1947, MBI/D84/1, p. 15.

85 Jenkins to Mountbatten, 16 June 1947, MBI/D84/1, p. 16.

86 G. D. Khosla and S. Gurcharan Singh Talib argue that the Rawalpindi violence was a war unleashed by the Muslim population to cow down Sikhs and Hindus; to carry on a total campaign of murder, arson, loot and abduction of women. It was the common perception of the Hindus and the Sikhs that that there had been cases of the police showing partiality to one or the other community in the restoration and maintenance of order after the riots. Therfore, Lady Mountbatten particularly enquired into this matter. Her finding was that no concrete evidence was produced to substantiate these vague complaints. She also confirmed that no action had been taken by the police that had not been justified in the prevailing circumstance. Further the police and military deserved praise for their action and behaviour under the very trying and dangerous conditions of the communal riots. Viceroy's Conference Report No. 46, 29 June 1947, Viceroy's Personal Report No 6, MBI/D283/6.

87 Hindustan Times, 5 April 1947.

88 During her four-day visit to the NWFP and the Punjab Lady Mountbatten visited nine hospitals, seven refugee centres varying in numbers accommodated from a small unit of forty to Wah Camp of 8,700 and four areas included Peshawar, Rawalpindi, Kahuta, Wah, Dera Ismail Khan, Tank, Amritsar and Lahore. At the refugee centres she spoke with some hundreds of the refugees and in hospitals met Hindu Sikhs and Muslim patients who had been victims of the riots and were still undergoing treatment. Viceroy's Personal Report No 6, 8 May 1947, MBI/D283/6.

89 Mountbatten observed that “In regard to the refugee centre (apart from Wah at which amenities are quite good as this was previously an Army hutted camp) the present accommodation is unsuitable for more that the purpose of temporary shelter. The buildings are all that are available but the inevitable conditions of overcrowding, the refugees' ignorance of hygiene accompanied by lack of facilities such as adequate drainage, water, soap and clean clothing, and their lack of occupation, entail risks that are apt to result in epidemics and disturbances among the refugees as well as further degeneration of morale. Superhuman efforts have obviously been made by the civil, military and police authorities to meet the emergency and their action during and after the riots and setting up the centres had done much to prevent further loss of life”. Ibid.; Viceroy's Personal Report No 6, 8 May 1947, Transfer of Power, Vol. X, p. 688.

90 A civil servant wrote to Mieville that “morale now in the Services has almost completely gone - it is not surprising, and may not even matter very much, but that is the fact, the old Steel frame has rusted badly at the joints, and all the bonds that held it together have been removed, so that at the first puff of trouble it will just fall apart. I think that is rather serious, even though we are handing over, because the Services can no longer save the country from descending into chaos if the political leaders do not reach some agreement, or at least evolve some ‘modus vivendi’ under which to carry on the ordinary essential administration of the country. Since the services, both military and civil, have been so undermined that they can no longer keep the ring, the urgency of some political settlement or arrangement is obvious, if there is not to be a civil war in this country. However, you will no doubt be getting all the latest dope from the India office, who I think may be getting some idea of the extent to which things have slid here, particularly in the last 6 months”. A Letter from I.C.S. (17 years service) to Sir Eric Mieville, 24 February 1947. (Extracts) Mountbatten Papers MBI/D125/2.

91 Jenkins informed the Viceroy that he was not interested in serving the Punjab after the partition of India. Transfer of Power, xii, p. 824

92 Similarly, Burrows was sure that it would be unsuitable and undignified for him to stay on as Governor of half the Province. Viceroy's Personal Report No. 9, Top Secret and Personal, 12 June 1947, MBI/D283/9.

93 Jenkins could not consult Mamdot, the Punjab leader of Muslim League, as he was from Lahore. Jenkins took rather a stiff line about this but Mountbatten asked him to alter his arrangements to securing the co-operation of both parties. Ibid.

94 Statement by the Partition Council, MBI/D84/5, Appendix 1.

95 One of main reasons for the growing communal disturbance was the spreading rumours about the so-called ill-designs of the communities. Therefore Government of the Punjab appealed the people of the Punjab to discourage rumour mongers and remain peaceful and do not panic. Government also appealed to form peace committees to control riots. Daily Inkilab, Lahore, 31 March 1947; Viceroy's Personal Report No. 10, Top Secret and Personal, 27 June 1947, MBI/D284/1, pp. 1–14.

96 Mountbatten observed that the city was badly affected by the riots and whole city presented a tragic scene of brutality.

97 In Gurgaon, additional troops with the increased vehicles and wireless facilities were sent in hope that “we shall be able to control the troubles”. Extract from the Punjab Police Abstract of the Intelligence for the week ending 5 April, Special Branch Lahore. National Documentation Centre Accession No. S 415.

98 Jenkins said “It seems to me that if a man is caught actually stabbing another or in possession of explosives or bombs or in the act of manufacturing the same it should be possible to try him summarily in the morning, to have sentence confirmed in the evening and to hang him next day. I believe that this would have a very good effect. At present what with communal feeling from which the courts are not immune and the pre-occupation of the police with their out-door work the chances of quick convictions and sentence are small”. Jenkins to Mountbatten, Telegraph No. 143-G, 25 June 1947, Jenkins Papers, R/3/1/176, ff 209-10, British Library, London; Khushwant Singh also verifies this cleavage between the communities. He says, “I had no illusion about the Muslim-Hindu/Sikh social divide. Even in the High Court Association and Library, Muslim lawyers occupied different corners of the lounge and the library from Hindus and Sikhs”. Singh, Khushwant, ‘Lahore, Partition and Independence’, in Saleem, Ahmad, (ed.), Lahore 1947 (New Delhi, 2nd ed., 2006), p. 119 Google Scholar.

99 It was at that time the understanding of the Government that decisive action by troops against “Cloak and dagger” activities was impossible, fear of the martial law would fail to produce the right results, and the army would stand exposed to the same communal attacks as the police force was experiencing. Therefore, Jenkins, while admitting that the situation was causing him grave anxiety, refused to impose martial law. Viceroy's Personal Report no. 10,Top secret and Personal, 27th June, 1947, MBI/D284/1, pp. 1–14.

100 Viceroy's Personal Report No. 10, Top Secret and Personal, 27 June 1947, MBI/D284/1, pp. 1–14.

101 Mountbatten refused on the ground that these courts were never appreciated by the people and politicians and therefore would open up another dispute. The more Government took actions against terrorists the more protests there would be from the people and politicians. Congress Party, Sikh leaders and even the Muslim League leaders protested against these acts. Even Iftikhar Hussain Mamdot, president of the Punjab Muslim League tendered his resignation when house to house search by the army was made in Lahore at Misri Shah. Viceroy's Conference Paper No. 48, Viceroy's Personal Report No. 7, 16 May 1947, MBI/D283/7.

102 The Auxiliary Force (India) consisted of a number of units manned entirely by Europeans and Anglo-Indians. These were mainly located in the few big cities, with detachments at railways centres. As the communal riots continued to mount and life and property of the British population in India came under threat, Mountbatten decided that Auxiliary Force (India) would not be disbanded until the transfer of power. General Auchinleck was informed accordingly. Ismay to Auchinleck, 17 April 1947, Mountbatten Papers, MBI/D 104/ p. 12; Ismay to Auchinleck, 30 April 1947, Mountbatten Papers, MBI/D 104, p. 17.

103 Mountbatten Papers: Viceroy's Personal Report, MBI/D284 Folder 2 (report 13–15), 19 July-1 August 1947.

104 It was also decided in the Punjab Partition Committee that the posting of officers should continue on the basis of the notional partition except in the case of the DC and Superintendent of Police in the districts of Gurdaspur, Amritsar, and Lahore. In those districts, which were the most disputed areas, British DCs and Superintendents of Police should remain in control until 15 August. Meeting of the Special Committee of the Indian Cabinet, 26 July, 1947, MBI/D85/1.

105 For details see Rees Papers, MSS/EUR/ F 274, British Library, London.

106 Hindus and Sikhs, owing to communal riots in the NWFP and the Baluchistan, had started migrating to the Punjab but after the Rawalpindi incident many of the local non-Muslim population started to move to the East of the Punjab. Moon, Penderel, Divide and Quit, (London, 1961), pp. 279–280 Google Scholar.

107 In Rawalpindi each clinic was put under a local medical practitioner and it was expected that the refugees themselves would take the most active part in this important work. All clinics would be under the general supervision of the Civil Surgeon who will co-ordinate their activities, wherever necessary, and arrange medical supplies, etc. Viceroy's Conference Paper No. 48, Viceroy's Personal Report No. 7, 16 May 1947, MBI/D283/7.

108 Viceroy's Conference Paper No. 160, Viceroy's Personal Report No. 16, 8 August 1947, MBI/D85/1.

109 Mountbatten visited Rawalpindi (May) Gurgaon (1 June) and Lahore (20 July) to witness the carnage done by perpetrators. Extract from Viceroy's 35th staff meeting, 31 May 1947, Mountbatten Papers MBI/D328/39.

110 Commenting about Nehru Mountbatten stated, “Almost alone in the turmoil of communalism, with all its variations, from individual intrigues to mass madness, he speaks with the voice of reason and charity”. Speech of Mountbatten on Nehru's 70th Birthday Dinner, Savoy, London, 16 November 1959, Mountbatten Papers MBI/M26.

111 Mountbatten wrote, “Within three weeks of the transfer of power the troubles in the Punjab had grown in a magnitude to a point where the existence of the Government of India was threatened. We sent a Punjab Boundary Force up there, 55,000 officers and men of the old undivided Indian Army. The transfer of population that took place was of the same order of magnitude as the entire population of the Dominion of Australia. We flew over those long routes of refuges-column extending fifty miles end to end along a single road, bullock carts and herds of people on the move”. See Mountbatten, “Transfer of Power”, Royal Empire Society, Vol. XXXIX., No. 6 (London, November-December 1948), pp. 271–276.

112 An Arbitral Tribunal was be set up at the same time as the Partition Council. It consisted of three members, all men of great judicial experience and the composition of it was settled by the Partition Committee. The service of the Arbitral Tribunal would be offered to the Provinces which are to be partitioned. Mountbatten to Sir William Patrick Spens, Chief Justice of Federal Court, 11 July 1947, Mountbatten Papers, MBI/D 93/ p. 10.

113 Ibid .

114 “Gandhi felt that if the Congress accepted a Jinnah led League or coalition Ministry in New Delhi, polarisation in Pujnab, Bihar and all of India(and in the interim government) could be reversed and the unity of India, Punjab and Bengal preserved.” In Gandhi, Rajmohan, Punjab A History from Aurangzeb to Mountbatten, (New Delhi, 2013), pp. 342–343 Google Scholar.

115 Gandhi urged Mountbatten “whatever happened to have courage to see the truth and act by it, even though correct solution might mean grievous loss of life on our departure on an unprecedented scale”. Record of Viceroy's Interview with Gandhi No 19, Meeting with Gandhi on 31 March 1947, MBI/D283/1.

116 Record of Meeting between Mountbatten and Gandhi, 12 April, Mountbatten Papers, Viceroy's Interview No. 54; Transfer of Power, Vol. X, pp. 211–213.

117 Mieville to Mountbatten, 11 April 1947, Mountbatten Papers, Official Correspondence File: Interviews.

118 Some highly activist political personalities in the Punjab, in pursuit of their personal agenda, played a leading role in inciting violence and one such figure was Master Tara Singh. “The episode of Tara Singh brandishing a sword on the footsteps of Punjab Assembly building ignited the tinderbox of communal animosity”. For more detail see Kamran, Tahir, ‘The Unfolding Crisis in Punjab: March-August 1947, the key Turning Points and the British Responses’, Journal of the Punjab Studies, 2007, Vol. 14, No, 2, pp. 187–220 Google Scholar.

119 Viceroy Personal Report No-4, 24 April 1947, MBI/D283/4.

120 Sikh leaders presented Mountbatten a book called “The Betrayal of the Sikhs” on this subject, written by Landon Sarasfield.Viceroy's Personal Report No. 4, 24 April 1947, L/PO/6/123 : ff 51–59.

121 Mountbatten's speech to the Members of the East India Association made at the Imperial Institute in London, 29 June 1948, Mountbatten Papers MBI/M6.

122 Ahmad Sherwani, Latif, The Partition of India and Mountbatten (Karachi: Council for Pakistan Studies, 1986), p. 110 Google Scholar.

123 Mountbatten to Secretary of State, No-1094-S, 20 May 1947, Mountbatten Papers, MBI/D261/ pp. 3–4.

124 Viceroy's Personal Report No 6, 8 May 1947, L/PO?6/123: ff 90–99; When the Boundary Commissions began its work it was deemed pertinent that; if they were to discharge their duties satisfactorily, it was essential that they should not be hampered by public speeches or writings threatening boycott or direct action, or otherwise interfering with their work. It was pledged that the both Governments would take appropriate steps to secure this end; and as soon as the awards announced, both Governments will enforce them impartially and at once. Viceroy's Conference Report Number Forty-Six, Viceroy's Personal Report No. 6, 5–June 1947, MBI/D283/6.

125 On this occasion Maharaja of Patiala also brought ten retired Sikh officers as a delegation to discuss about the Boundary Commission. Viceroy's Conference Paper No. 127, Viceroy's Personal Report No. 12, 12 July 1947, MBI/D84/3.

126 Viceroy's Conference Paper Number 149, Viceroy's Personal Report No. 15, 2 August 1947, MBI/D284/5.

127 Viceroy's Conference Paper No. 68, Viceroy's Personal Report No. 8, 5 June 1947, MBI/D83/8.

128 Young Tan, Tai and Kudaisya, Gyanesh, The Aftermath of Partition in South Asia (London: Routledge, 2005), p. 120 Google Scholar.

129 Jenkins, Muddie and Trivedi (the present Governor and two future Governors of the Punjab) considered the matter together, and unanimously decided that arrests should not be made until after the Boundary Commission's award was announced, and the new Governments were responsible for law and order. Jenking to Mountbatten, 9 August 1947, Disturbances in Punjab 1947, (Islamabad, National Documentation Centre, 1995), pp. 330–331.

130 Sir Zafrullah Khan, Foreign Minister of Pakistan and leader of the country's delegation at the Security Council, said that Viceroy Mountbatten knew the Sikh plans but failed to arrest the leaders and use the force to crush the trouble-makers. Abid, Mussarat, Britian, India, Pakistan, Partition and After, 1947-1951(Lahore, Pakistan Study Centre, 2013), pp. 86–87 Google Scholar.

131 Jeffrey, R., ‘The Punjab Boundary Force and the Problem of Order in the August 1947’, Modern Asian Studies, Vol. 8, No. 4, 1974, pp. 491–520 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

132 Garewal, Sher Muhammad, Jinnah-Mountbatten Correspondence 22 March–9 August 1947 (Lahore, Research Society of Pakistan, 1998), p. 208 Google Scholar.

133 Both declared that ‘It is their intention to safeguard the legitimate interests of all citizens irrespective of religion, caste or sex. In the exercise of their normal civic rights all citizens will be regarded as equal and both the Governments will assure to all people within their territories the exercise of liberties such as freedom of speech, the right to form associations, the right to worship in their own way and the protection of their language and culture”. Jinnah also assured in answering questions to correspondents that he assured that minorities will get fundamental rights in Pakistan. Times of India, 14 July 1947.

134 Mountbatten cared to see that the Boundary Commission's duties should be performed satisfactorily and it was essential that they should not be hampered by public speeches or writings threatening boycott or direct action, or otherwise interfering with their work.

135 After partition, Mountbatten as the Governor-General of India, continued to look after the matters relating to communal disturbances, He established the Emergency Committee to check the communal rioting and to make arrangement for transfer of refugees whom were pouring in millions by air, train, truck and foot. Mountbatten to Ismay, 17 October 1947, Mountbatten Papers MBI/D196/2.

136 Muhammad Iqbal Chawla, Wavell's Breakdown Plan, 1945-47: an Appraisal, Journal of Punjab Studies, Fall 2009, Volume 16, No. 2.

137 Mosley believes that the change of date from June 1948 to 15 August 1947 caused confusion and thereby communal disturbances grew in intensity and thus caused more harm than good. But this article argues that, from a British perspective, it was a wise decision to wrap up the Raj, have a safe exit and let the future rulers of India and Pakistan cope with the problem because it was not merely a matter of law and order, in fact it had been the matter of different mind-set whom could not be changed in a few months. Mosley, L., Last Days of the Raj (London, 1961 Google Scholar).

138 It was in the knowledge of the superior authorities that the morale of the civil services in India was completely gone. See Sir Eric Mieville, 24 February 1947, (Extracts) Mountbatten Papers MBI/D125/2.

139 Francis Mudie wrote to Liaquat Ali Khan on 21 September 1948 that “there is little doubt that the massacre of Muslims in East Punjab and their expulsion to Pakistan was planned and carried out with the knowledge and approval of at least two of the present Indian Ministers Sardar Baldev Singh and Sardar Patel”. Quoted in Khan Lodhi, Zahid, Mountbatten Facts About The Partition (Lahore, n.d.), p. 83 Google Scholar.

140 Dar, Farooq, Jinnah's Pakistan, Formation and Challenges of A State, (Karachi, 2014), pp. 45–47.Google Scholar

141 Wolpert writes “Two weeks before Mountbatten's partition deadline, violence escalated. Mountbatten wired the cabinet on the next day. He kept trying to assure Attlee's cabinet, as well as his own council, and his own weak and troubled mind that he was really doing the right thing.” See Wolpert, Stanley, Shameful Flight: The Last Years of the British Empire in India (Karachi, 2006), p. 165 Google Scholar.

142 According to Judith Brown, “It is hardly surprising that controversy surrounds the complex bargaining of these final months of British rule, partly because British participants, Congressmen and the founders of the new Pakistan all wished to throw blame for partition on one another party, because history became part of self-imagining of both India and Pakistan”. See Brown, Judith M., Nehru: Profiles in Power (Essex., 1999), p. 70 Google Scholar.

143 As Massarat Sohail writes, “The appalling communal disturbance in the Indian sub-Continent in 1947, created a general feeling in Pakistan, the Muslim population of which was most affected by these riots, that the British Government had changed the date for the transfer of power from June 1948 to August 1947”. See Sohail, Massarat, Partition And Anglo-Pakistan Relations, 1947–51 (Lahore: Vanguard, 1991), p. 106 Google Scholar.

144 Viceroy's Personal Report, 16 August 1947, MBI/D85/3, folder 2.

145 Brass, Paul R., “The Partition of India and Retributive Genocide in the Punjab, 1946–47: Means, Methods, and Purposes”, Journal of Genocide Research, 5 (1), (2003): 71–101 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.