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The Distribution of Ratings Assigned to Blind Replicates*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  02 August 2017

Jeffrey C. Bodington
Jeffrey C. Bodington*
Affiliation:
Bodington & Company, 50 California St., San Francisco, CA 94111; e-mail: jcb@bodingtonandcompany.com.
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Abstract

The inability of many wine judges to achieve perfect consistency by assigning the same rating to the same wine in a blind tasting is well established. Results for four wine tastings that include blind replicates are examined in this article. Although perfection is rare, the probability distributions of those results show that wine judges do tend to assign closer ratings to replicates than is likely due to chance alone. Approximately one-third of judges assign ratings that are within one rank of perfect consistency, and two-thirds assign ratings within two ranks of perfect consistency. This finding is sensitive to judges’ capabilities, the mechanics of the tasting protocol, and the extent to which the replicate is different from other wines in the tasting. Much wine-related research to date takes judges’ individual ratings as deterministic, yet these results show that those ratings are stochastic. These results yield a probability distribution that may guide future research concerning the uses and economic implications of wine ratings. (JEL Classifications: A10, C10, C00, C12, D12)

Keywords

blindrandomreplicatesstatisticswine tasting
Type
Articles
Information
Journal of Wine Economics , Volume 12 , Issue 4 , November 2017 , pp. 363 - 369
Copyright
Copyright © American Association of Wine Economists 2017 

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Footnotes

*

The author thanks Robert Hodgson for providing California State Fair Commercial Wine Competition data and essential explanations. The author also thanks Deborah Parker Wong and an anonymous reviewer for their perceptive and constructive comments. All remaining errors are the responsibility of the author alone.

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