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Feeling and Orientation in Action: A Reply to Alix Cohen

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  02 December 2020

Melissa M. Merritt
Melissa M. Merritt*
Affiliation:
University of New South Wales
*
m.merritt@unsw.edu.au
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Abstract

Alix Cohen argues that the function of feeling in Kantian psychology is to appraise and orient activity. Thus she sees feeling and agency as importantly connected by Kant’s lights. I endorse this broader claim, but argue that feeling, on her account, cannot do the work of orientation that she assigns to it.

Keywords

KantagencyfeelingStoicism
Type
Article
Information
Kantian Review , Volume 26 , Issue 3 , September 2021 , pp. 363 - 369
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Copyright
© The Author(s), 2020. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of Kantian Review

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