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Kant on Moral Illusion and Appraisal of Others

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  24 August 2017

David Hakim
David Hakim*
Affiliation:
University of Western Ontario
*
Email: dhakim@uwo.ca
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Abstract

Kant’s accounts of moral education, appraisal respect and gratitude each depend on the assumption that human beings see and judge each other’s actions to be morally good. This assumption appears to stand in tension with the Opacity Thesis, Kant’s claim that we can never know if an action is morally good. This paper examines Kant’s discussion of moral illusion to relieve this tension. It is argued that we are required to uphold moral illusion, i.e. to represent others’ actions to be morally good (while knowing that we may be mistaken), due to the duty of beneficence for others’ moral well-being.

Keywords

Kantopacitymoral appraisalmoral illusionduty of beneficence
Type
Articles
Information
Kantian Review , Volume 22 , Issue 3 , September 2017 , pp. 421 - 440
Copyright
© Kantian Review 2017 

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