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Kantian Moral Striving

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  30 January 2015

Mavis Biss
Mavis Biss*
Affiliation:
Loyola University Maryland
*
Email: mlbiss@loyola.edu
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Abstract

This paper focuses on a single question that highlights some of the most puzzling aspects of Kant’s explanation of the duty of moral self-perfection. What kinds of activity count as striving for purity in one’s disposition to duty, or strength of will? I argue that a dominant strand of Kant’s approach to moral striving does not fit familiar models of striving. I seek to address this problem in a way that avoids the flaws of synchronic and atomistic approaches to moral self-discipline by developing an account of Kantian moral striving as an ongoing contemplative activity complexly engaged with multiple forms of self-knowledge.

Keywords

Kantmoral developmentself-knowledgeself-perfection
Type
Articles
Information
Kantian Review , Volume 20 , Issue 1 , March 2015 , pp. 1 - 23
Copyright
© Kantian Review 2014 

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