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Never Mind the Intuitive Intellect: Applying Kant’s Categories to Noumena

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  23 February 2018

Colin Marshall
Colin Marshall*
Affiliation:
University of Washington
*
Email: crmarsh@uw.edu
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Abstract

According to strong metaphysical readings of Kant, Kant accepts noumenal substances and causes. Against such readings, Markus Kohl has recently argued that, for Kant, (a) an intuitive intellect is a decisive measure for reality, but (b) an intuitive intellect would not represent noumena as substances or causes. Against Kohl, I argue that the intuitive intellect might indirectly represent noumenal substances and causes, which is enough to save the strong metaphysical reading. In addition, I show how Kant’s apparently anti-metaphysical statements about the content of the categories can be read in a metaphysically friendly way.

Keywords

Kantnoumenacategoriesintuitive intellectMarkus Kohl
Type
Articles
Information
Kantian Review , Volume 23 , Issue 1 , March 2018 , pp. 27 - 40
Copyright
© Kantian Review 2018 

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