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Non-Conceptualism and Knowledge in Lucy Allais’s Manifest Reality

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 June 2016

Alexandra Newton
Alexandra Newton*
Affiliation:
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
*
Email: amnewton@illinois.edu
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Abstract

Lucy Allais’s Manifest Reality presents a systematic discussion of the role that Kant assigns to concepts in making knowledge of objects possible. In this paper, I ascribe to Allais a version of non-conceptualism, according to which knowledge is a ‘hybrid’ or loose unity of concept and intuition; concept relates to intuition as form relates to matter in an artefact. I will show how this view has trouble accommodating the distinction between knowledge and accidentally true belief, and how it leads to objectionable forms of idealism.

Keywords

conceptualismnon-conceptualismMcDowellknowledgeidealism
Type
Author Meets Critics
Information
Kantian Review , Volume 21 , Issue 2 , July 2016 , pp. 273 - 282
Copyright
© Kantian Review 2016 

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References

Kant, Immanuel (2008) Critique of Pure Reason. Trans. and ed. P. Guyer and A. Wood. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
McDowell, John (1995) ‘Knowledge and the Internal’. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 55(4), 877–893.CrossRefGoogle Scholar