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The Non-Conceptuality of the Content of Intuitions: A New Approach

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  04 February 2013

Clinton Tolley
Clinton Tolley*
Affiliation:
University of California, San Diego
*
Email: ctolley@ucsd.edu
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Abstract

There has been considerable recent debate about whether Kant's account of intuitions implies that their content is conceptual. This debate, however, has failed to make significant progress because of the absence of discussion, let alone consensus, as to the meaning of ‘content’ in this context. Here I try to move things forward by focusing on the kind of content associated with Frege's notion of ‘sense (Sinn)’, understood as a mode of presentation of some object or property. I argue, first, that Kant takes intuitions to have a content in this sense, and, secondly, that Kant clearly takes the content of intuitions, so understood, to be distinct in kind from that possessed by concepts. I then show how my account can respond to the most serious objections to previous non-conceptualist interpretations.

Keywords

appearancecognitive semanticscontentconceptualismexperienceFregeintuitionKantperceptionTranscendental Deduction
Type
Articles
Information
Kantian Review , Volume 18 , Issue 1 , March 2013 , pp. 107 - 136
Copyright
Copyright © Kantian Review 2013

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