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Transcendental Idealism and Ontological Agnosticism

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  27 January 2012

Dustin McWherter
Dustin McWherter*
Affiliation:
Middlesex University
*
Email: dmcwherter@hotmail.com
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Abstract

Since the initial reception of the Critique of Pure Reason transcendental idealism has been perceived and criticized as a form of subjective idealism regarding space, time, and the objects within them, despite Kant's protestations to the contrary. In recent years, some commentators have attempted to counter this interpretation by presenting transcendental idealism as a primarily epistemological doctrine rather than a metaphysical one. Others have insisted on the metaphysical character of transcendental idealism. Within these debates, Kant's rejection of ontology (of the kind exemplified by Wolff and Baumgarten) has received comparatively little treatment, although it is often acknowledged. The present essay seeks to contribute to the secondary literature on Kant by offering an analysis of this claim and elaborating its consequences for transcendental idealism. This will take the form of a critical examination of transcendental idealism's supposed ontological agnosticism—that is, its disavowal of any ontological claims. The overall conclusion is that Kant's rejection of ontology is deeply problematic, and to such an extent that it may be necessary to reconsider the possibilities of defending transcendental idealism as a purely epistemological, non-ontological doctrine.

Type
Articles
Information
Kantian Review , Volume 17 , Issue 1 , 27 January 2012 , pp. 47 - 73
Copyright
Copyright © Kantian Review 2012

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