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The Two Standpoints on the Will1

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  27 September 2011

Daniel Guevara
Daniel Guevara
Affiliation:
University of California, Santa Cruz
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Extract

Kant argues that we must regard the will from two mutually exclusive standpoints. One is the natural standpoint, according to which the will is determined entirely by natural causes in conformity with natural law. The other is the standpoint of freedom, according to which the will transcends the laws of nature and is free to determine itself in conformity with its own law. Kant's idea is that a complete account of the will necessarily involves both standpoints, shifting between the two. Thus it is sometimes called the two-standpoints account of the will.

Type
Articles
Information
Kantian Review , Volume 1 , March 1997 , pp. 82 - 114
Copyright
Copyright © Kantian Review 1997

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