Hostname: page-component-78c5997874-v9fdk Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-11-10T15:39:32.023Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Constituency Preferences and Committee Selection in the Mexican Cámara de Diputados

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 August 2019

Christopher D. Raymond Open the ORCID record for Christopher D. Raymond [Opens in a new window]  and
Sergio Bárcena Juárez Open the ORCID record for Sergio Bárcena Juárez [Opens in a new window]
Christopher D. Raymond*
Affiliation:
Christopher D. Raymond is a lecturer in politics at Queen’s University Belfast.
Sergio Bárcena Juárez*
Affiliation:
Sergio Bárcena Juárez is a profesor investigador in the Escuela de Humanidades y Educación, Tecnológico de Monterrey.
*
C.Raymond@qub.ac.uk.
sergio.barcena@tec.mx.
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

Previous research examining selection to legislative committees has assumed that the impact of constituency preferences on committee assignments is due to the incentives for individual legislators to use their committee seats to increase their personal chances of re-election. Examining the case of the Mexican Chamber of Deputies (where legislators were, until recently, barred from re-election), this study argues that the impact of constituency preferences on selection to committees also occurs because parties have incentives for their members to use committee assignments to increase the party’s chances of being re-elected. Analysis of assignments to 11 committees over 4 legislative terms provides support for the argument. These findings reinforce previous research arguing that concerns with constituency representation and its impact on re-election also apply to political parties and not solely to individual legislators.

Keywords

Constituency preferencescommittee assignmentslegislative organizationdistributive theorycartel theory
Type
Research Article
Information
Latin American Politics and Society , Volume 61 , Issue 4 , November 2019 , pp. 95 - 117
Copyright
© University of Miami 2019 

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

Acosta Díaz, Benjamín. 2016. Diputados indígenas en México. Master’s thesis, Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas.Google Scholar
Adler, E. Scott. 2000. Constituency Characteristics and the Guardian Model of Appropriations Subcommittees, 1959–1998. American Journal of Political Science 44, 1: 104–14.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Adler, E. Scott, and Lapinski, John S.. 1997. Demand-Side Theory and Congressional Committee Composition: A Constituency Characteristics Approach. American Journal of Political Science 41, 3: 895–918.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Alemán, Eduardo. 2013. Latin American Legislative Politics: A Survey of Peer-Reviewed Publications in English. Journal of Politics in Latin America 5, 1: 15–36.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Aparicio, Francisco Javier, and Langston, Joy. 2009. Committee Leadership Selection Without Seniority: The Mexican Case. Documento de Trabajo no. 217. Mexico City: Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas.Google Scholar
Battista, James Coleman. 2006. Jurisdiction, Institutional Structure, and Committee Representativeness. Political Research Quarterly 59, 1: 47–56.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Béjar, Luisa. 2006. Los partidos en el Congreso de la Unión. La representación parlamentaria después de la alternancia. Mexico City: UNAM-Gernika.Google Scholar
Béjar, Luisa. 2014. Cuando el ejecutivo es débil ¿Quién legisla en México? Política y Gobierno 21, 2: 325–47.Google Scholar
Cain, Bruce, Ferejohn, John, and Fiorina, Morris. 1987. The Personal Vote: Constituency Service and Electoral Independence. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Cantú, Francisco, and Desposato, Scott. 2012. The New Federalism of Mexico’s Party System. Journal of Politics in Latin America 4, 2: 3–38.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Carey, John M. 1996. Term Limits and Legislative Representation. New York: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Celis, Karen, Schouteden, Anke, and Wauters, Bram. 2015. Cleavage, Ideology and Identity: Explaining The Linkage Between Representatives and Interest Groups. Parliamentary Affairs 69, 2: 348–65.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Ciftci, Sabri, Forrest, Walter, and Tekin, Yusuf. 2008. Committee Assignments in a Nascent Party System: The Case of the Turkish Grand National Assembly. International Political Science Review 29, 3: 303–24.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Cox, Gary W., and McCubbins, Mathew D.. 1993. Legislative Leviathan: Party Government in the House. Berkeley: University of California Press.Google Scholar
Cunow, Saul, Ames, Barry, Desposato, Scott, and Rennó, Lucio. 2012 Reelection and Legislative Power: Surprising Results from Brazil. Legislative Studies Quarterly 37, 4: 533–58.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Gómez, Díaz, Rodrigo, Everardo. 2006. Desempeño legislativo y disciplina partidista en México: la Cámara de Diputados, 2000–2003. Confines 2, 3: 45–64.Google Scholar
Evans, Diana. 2004. Greasing the Wheels: Using Pork Barrel Projects to Build Majority Coalitions in Congress. New York: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Fenno, Richard F. Jr. 1978. Home Style: House Members in Their Districts. New York: Longman.Google Scholar
Fish, M. Steven, and Kroenig, Matthew. 2009. The Handbook of National Legislatures: A Global Survey. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Frisch, Scott A., and Kelly, Sean Q.. 2004. Self-Selection Reconsidered: House Committee Assignment Requests and Constituency Characteristics. Political Research Quarterly 57, 2: 325–26.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Fujimura, Naofumi. 2012. Electoral Incentives, Party Discipline, and Legislative Organization: Manipulating Legislative Committees to Win Elections and Maintain Party Unity. European Political Science Review 4, 2: 147–75.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Gilligan, Thomas W., and Krehbiel, Keith. 1990. Organization of Informative Committees by a Rational Legislature. American Journal of Political Science 34, 2: 531–64.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Tule, González, Antonio, Luis. 2010. Cohesión interna en el PRI frente a la ausencia de liderazgo unificador. Polis 6, 1: 97–130.Google Scholar
Groseclose, Tim. 1994. Testing Committee Composition Hypotheses for the U.S. Congress. Journal of Politics 56, 2: 440–58.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kerevel, Yann P. 2015a. Pork-barreling Without Reelection? Evidence from the Mexican Congress. Legislative Studies Quarterly 40, 1: 137–66.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Groseclose, Tim. 2015b. (Sub)national Principals, Legislative Agents: Patronage and Political Careers in Mexico. Comparative Political Studies 48, 8: 1020–50.Google Scholar
Kerevel, Yann, and Bárcena, Sergio. 2017. Democratización y representación legislativa en México. Revista Uruguaya de Ciencia Política 26, 1: 59–83.Google Scholar
Krehbiel, Keith. 1991. Information and Legislative Organization. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Langston, Joy. 2010. Governors and Their Deputies: New Legislative Principals in Mexico. Legislative Studies Quarterly 35, 2: 235–58.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Langston, Joy, and Aparicio, Francisco Javier. 2008. The Past as Future: Prior Political Experience and Career Choices in Mexico. Documento de Trabajo no. 207. Mexico City: Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas.Google Scholar
Latner, Michael, and McGann, Anthony. 2005. Geographical Representation Under Proportional Representation: The Cases of Israel and the Netherlands. Electoral Studies 24, 4: 709–34.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Lewis, Andrew R. 2014. Staffing the Front Lines of the Culture War: Constituency Religious Effects on Assignment to the Senate Judiciary Committee. Congress and the Presidency 41, 2: 167–89.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Londregan, John, and Snyder, James M.. 1994. Comparing Committee and Floor Preferences. Legislative Studies Quarterly 19, 2: 233–66.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Mann, Thomas E., and Wolfinger, Raymond E.. 1980. Candidates and Parties in Congressional Elections. American Political Science Review 74, 3: 617–32.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Martin, Shane. 2011. Electoral Institutions, the Personal Vote, and Legislative Organization. Legislative Studies Quarterly 36, 3: 339–61.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Mayhew, David R. 1974. Congress: The Electoral Connection. New Haven: Yale University Press.Google Scholar
Mickler, Tim A. 2018a. Not So Random After All? Revisiting Committee Assignments in Dáil Éireann. Irish Political Studies 33, 1: 112–35.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Mickler, Tim A. 2018b. Who Gets What and Why? Committee Assignments in the German Bundestag. West European Politics 41, 2: 517–39.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Nacif, Benito. 2002. Understanding Party Discipline in the Mexican Chamber of Deputies: The Centralized Party Model. In Legislative Politics in Latin America, ed. Morgenstern, Scott and Nacif, . New York: Cambridge University Press. 254–86.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Overby, L. Marvin, and Kazee, Thomas A.. 2000. Outlying Committees in the Statehouse: An Examination of the Prevalence of Committee Outliers in State Legislatures. Journal of Politics 62, 3: 701–28.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Overby, L. Marvin, Kazee, Thomas A., and Prince, David W.. 2004. Committee Outliers in State Legislatures. Legislative Studies Quarterly 29, 1: 81–107.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Palanza, Valeria, Scartascini, Carlos, and Tommasi, Mariano. 2016. Congressional Institutionalization: A Cross-National Comparison. Legislative Studies Quarterly 41, 1: 7–34.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Prince, David W., and Marvin Overby, L.. 2005. Legislative Organization Theory and Committee Preference Outliers. State Politics and Policy Quarterly 5, 1: 68–87.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Raymond, Christopher, and Holt, Jacob. 2014. Due North? Do American Theories of Legislative Committees Apply to Canada? Journal of Legislative Studies 20, 2: 174–92.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Raymond, Christopher, and Holt, Jacob. 2017. Constituency Pressures on Committee Selection: Evidence from the Northern Ireland Assembly and Dáil Éireann. Parliamentary Affairs 4, 1: 740–58.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Sánchez, Rivera, Abel, José. 2004. Cambio institucional y democratización: la evolución de las comisiones en la Cámara de Diputados de México. Política y Gobierno 11, 2: 263–313.Google Scholar
Rohde, David W., and Shepsle, Kenneth A.. 1973. Democratic Committee Assignments in the House of Representatives: Strategic Aspects of a Social Choice Process. American Political Science Review 67, 3: 889–905.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Rosas, Guillermo, and Langston, Joy. 2011. Gubernatorial Effects on the Voting Behavior of National Legislators. Journal of Politics 73, 2: 477–93.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Rundquist, Barry, Rhee, Jungho, Lee, Jeong-Hwa, and Fox, Sharon E.. 1997. Modeling State Representation on Defense Committees in Congress, 1959–1989. American Politics Quarterly 25, 1: 35–55.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
de Turismo, Secretaría. 2016. Estadísticas más recientes de la actividad del sector turismo. http://www.datatur.sectur.gob.mx/SiteAssets/Intranet/Intranet/Cuadernillo_2015_Semana_52.pdf. Accessed September 28, 2018.Google Scholar
Shepsle, Kenneth A. 1978. The Giant Jigsaw Puzzle: Democratic Committee Assignments in the Modern House. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.Google Scholar
Shepsle, Kenneth A., and Weingast, Barry R.. 1995. Positive Theories of Congressional Institutions. In Positive Theories of Congressional Institutions, ed. Shepsle, and Weingast, . Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. 5–36.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Sprague, Mary. 2008. The Effects of Measurement and Methods Decisions on Committee Preference Outlier Results. Political Research Quarterly 61, 2: 309–18.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Stein, Robert M., and Bickers, Kenneth N.. 1994. Congressional Elections and the Pork Barrel. Journal of Politics 56, 2: 377–99.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Stratmann, Thomas, and Baur, Martin. 2002. Plurality Rule, Proportional Representation, and the German Bundestag: How Incentives to Pork-Barrel Differ Across Electoral Systems. American Journal of Political Science 46, 3: 506–14.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Strøm, Kaare. 1990. A Behavioral Theory of Competitive Political Parties. American Journal of Political Science 34, 2: 565–98.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Taylor, Michelle M. 1992. Formal versus Informal Incentive Structures and Legislator Behavior: Evidence from Costa Rica. Journal of Politics 54, 4: 1055–73.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Weingast, Barry R., and Marshall, William J.. 1988. The Industrial Organization of Congress. Journal of Political Economy 96, 1: 132–63.CrossRefGoogle Scholar