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Hard Bargains: The Impact of Multinational Corporations on Economic Reform in Latin America

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  02 January 2018

Patrick J. W. Egan
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Abstract

This article promotes the idea that multinational corporations have independent agency in the process of economic reform in Latin American host countries. Through a number of pooled cross-sectional time series analyses, it shows that accumulated foreign direct investment can affect policy reform in ways unanticipated by earlier theories predicated on the obsolescence of firms' influence after initial investment. The influence of firms varies across different reform areas, and competitive pressures lead firms to press alternately for liberal and illiberal reform measures. The study also considers sectoral issues, and argues that a preponderance of natural resource–oriented FDI can alter the impact of multinational investment on policy reform. Indexes of economic reform are measured against stocks of FDI and a number of political and economic control variables. Evidence shows that the dramatic increase in FDI in the region in recent years has bolstered firms' bargaining power and concomitant policy leverage.

Type
Research Article
Information
Latin American Politics and Society , Volume 52 , Issue 1 , Spring 2010 , pp. 1 - 32
Copyright
Copyright © University of Miami 2010

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