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Political Institutions, Policymaking, and Policy Stability in Latin America

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  02 January 2018

Carlos Pereira ,
Shane P. Singh  and
Bernardo Mueller
Carlos Pereira
Affiliation:
School of Public Administration at the Getúlio Vargas Foundation. cpereira@brookings.edu
Shane P. Singh
Affiliation:
The Department of International Affairs at the University of Georgia. singh@uga.edu
Bernardo Mueller
Affiliation:
The Center for the Study of Regulation of Markets (CERME), University of Brasília. bmueller@unb.br
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Abstract

In some Latin American nations, policy change occurs frequently, while in others it is stable, less prone to shifts with the prevailing political climate or shocks. The conditions under which institutional rules and the powers of key actors influence the capacity for governance vary, and this variation is seldom addressed in the literature. This project examines the effects of the interactions between key policymakers (the executive and the legislature) in Latin America on policy stability across different institutional frameworks. Countries with simultaneously strong executives and weak legislatures are shown to have unstable policy environments, as are countries with a history of unified government and, to a lesser extent, candidate-centered electoral systems.

Type
Research Article
Information
Latin American Politics and Society , Volume 53 , Issue 1 , Spring 2011 , pp. 59 - 89
Copyright
Copyright © University of Miami 2011

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