Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 September 2022
The central hypothesis derived in this article is that the ability of Brazil's central government to bypass governors determined the success of delivering public goods federation-wide in the area of noncontributory social protection policy. The Workers' Party's (Partido dos Trabalhadores) first-term administration from 2003 to 2006 successfully reformed, expanded, and implemented four previously existing cash-transfer programs designed to alleviate poverty. The central administration's flagship program Bolsa Família was implemented in all of Brazil's municipalities, delivering benefits to more than 11 million households. A nonmajoritarian political system, the constitutional autonomy of municipalities, and the gradual hardening of post-1995 subnational budget constraints facilitated the ability of the central government to live up to the aspirations and expectations of the Brazilian public by combating hunger, poverty, and misery through this program. This article shows these institutional factors to have provided incentives for successful central-local collaboration in this social policy area.
Este artigo defende a hipótese de que o sucesso na concessão de benefícios sociais não-contributivos no Brasil foi determinado pela capacidade do governo federal em evitar os governadores. A administração petista no período 2003–2006 reformou, ampliou e implementou com sucesso quatro programas de transferência de renda desenhados para reduzir a pobreza. O programa mais importante do governo federal, denominado Bolsa Família, foi implementado em todas as cidades brasileiras, atingindo mais de 11 milhões de famílias. A capacidade do governo federal em satisfazer as expectativas e os desejos dos brasileiros no que diz respeito ao combate à fome, à pobreza e à miséria por meio desse programa foi determinada por um modelo de governo consensual, pela autonomia constitucional dos municípios e pelas restrições orçamentárias no plano subnacional após o ano 1995. Neste artigo mostra que estes aspectos institucionais contribuíram para a bem-sucedida cooperação governo federal/municípios nesse setor da política social.
The research in this article was funded by the Centre for Brazilian Studies and the Latin American Centre at the University of Oxford, whose support I appreciate. Thanks also to Anthony Hall, Natália Sátyro, Celina Souza, Argelina Figueiredo, and Aaron Schneider for suggestions and corrections on an earlier version of this paper presented at the workshop “State Politics and Institutions in Comparative Perspective: Lessons from Brazil” at the Centre for Brazilian Studies, Oxford, December 1, 2005. Last, thanks to my supervisors Laurence Whitehead and Timothy Power for comments and to Oswaldo Amaral for encouragement and suggestions on the final draft, plus the three anonymous LARR reviewers for their helpful insights and excellent feedback.