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Corruption and Inequality at the Crossroad: A Multimethod Study of Bribery and Discrimination in Latin America

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 September 2022

Brian J. Fried ,
Paul Lagunes  and
Atheendar Venkataramani
Brian J. Fried
Affiliation:
Yale University
Paul Lagunes
Affiliation:
Yale University
Atheendar Venkataramani
Affiliation:
Yale University, Washington University
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Abstract

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How does corruption interact with inequality? To answer this question, we employ a field experiment that examines the manner in which police officers in a major Latin American city respond to socioeconomic distinctions when requiring a bribe. In this experiment, four automobile drivers commit identical traffic violations across a randomized sequence of crossroads, which are monitored by transit police. We identify the effect of citizens' perceived wealth on officers' propensity to solicit bribes and on the size of the bribes that they solicit. We complement our experimental results with qualitative findings from interviews with police officers. Our core finding is that officers are more likely to target lower class individuals and let more affluent drivers off with warnings. The qualitative results suggest that officers associate wealth with the capacity to exact retribution and therefore are more likely to demand bribes from poorer individuals. We conclude that a multimethod approach provides a richer account of corrupt behavior than that found in most contemporary research.

Resumen

Resumen

La corrupción y la desigualdad socioeconómica mantienen una relación. Buscando entender cómo es que interactúan ambos fenómenos, realizamos un experimento de campo en una de las capitales más importantes de América Latina. En este estudio aleatorio cuatro participantes repitieron la misma infracción de tránsito en cruces monitoreados por agentes de la policía. De esta manera identificamos la probabilidad de que un oficial solicite un soborno en respuesta a la clase socioeconómica de quien comete el ilícito. Descubrimos que las autoridades de tránsito tienden a pedirle dinero con mayor frecuencia a los de menores recursos. A las personas más adinerada se les deja ir con una advertencia. Las entrevistas que realizamos señalan que nuestros resultados se podrían deber a que los agentes temen pedirle dinero a las personas de clase socioeconómica alta, ya que estos pueden usar sus conexiones para vengarse. Concluimos, además, que la estrategia de métodos de investigación mixtos es muy efectiva para estudiar temas como la corrupción.

Type
Research Article
Information
Latin American Research Review , Volume 45 , Issue 1 , 2010 , pp. 76 - 97
Copyright
Copyright © 2010 by the Latin American Studies Association

Footnotes

We would first like to thank Donald Green, who offered invaluable support through all stages of this process. We would also like to thank Susan Rose-Ackerman, Susan Stokes, Alan Gerber, Ana De La O, Nicholas Sambanis, Andira Hernández-Monzoy, Sigrid Arzt, and Mark Axelrod, the participants of Yale University's Comparative Politics Workshop, and the three anonymous LARR reviewers for many helpful comments. Xavier Ruiz de Rio, Daniel Navarro, and Elias Badui provided invaluable assistance in the field. Yale University's Institute for Social Policy Studies and the MacMillan Center for International and Area Studies provided research funding.

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