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The Origins of Presidential Conditional Agenda-Setting Power in Latin America

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 October 2022

Eduardo Alemán  and
George Tsebelis
Eduardo Alemán
Affiliation:
University of Houston
George Tsebelis
Affiliation:
University of California, Los Angeles
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Abstract

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This paper examines the origins of amendatory vetoes in Latin America and shows why presidents' ability to present a redrafted bill after congressional passage gives them considerable power to affect legislation. The paper begins with a historical account that illustrates the workings of amendatory observations in nineteenth-century Latin America—the passage of the Electoral Law of 1874 in Chile. Next, it specifies the degree to which different constitutional procedures allow presidents to redraft legislation and shows why the power to introduce amendatory observations provides greater discretion than the power of the better-known block veto, regardless of override thresholds. Lastly, the paper traces the origins of amendatory observations back to the first wave of constitution writing that followed the wars of independence. Our findings challenge prior classifications of veto powers in Latin America and highlight the positive agenda-setting power afforded to the president at the last stage of the lawmaking process.

William H. Riker, “Lincoln at Freeport”

Resumen

Resumen

Este trabajo examina los orígenes del veto sustitutivo en América Latina y muestra por qué la habilidad de responder con una propuesta de ley modificada luego de que el congreso haya pasado su versión, suministra a los presidentes suficiente poder para influir en la legislación. El trabajo comienza con una narración histórica que ilustra el funcionamiento del veto sustitutivo en el siglo XIX en América Latina— la aprobación de la Ley Electoral chilena de 1874. Luego, especifica cuán lejos pueden llegar los presidentes bajo diferentes procedimientos constitucionales y muestra por qué el poder para introducir vetos sustitutivos provee mayor autoridad que el poder del más conocido veto total. Por último, el trabajo traza los orígenes constitucionales del veto sustitutivo comenzando con las versiones iniciales escritas luego de las guerras de independencia. Los resultados desafían las clasificaciones anteriores del poder del veto en América Latina destacando la influencia del veto sustitutivo en la agenda parlamentaria, el cual proporciona al presidente un poder crucial en la última fase del proceso legislativo.

Type
Research Article
Information
Latin American Research Review , Volume 40 , Issue 2 , June 2005 , pp. 3 - 26
Copyright
Copyright © 2005 by the University of Texas Press

Footnotes

*

Earlier versions of this article were presented at the annual meetings of the Midwest Political Science Association, (April 15–17, 2004, Chicago, Illinois) and the American Political Science Association, (September 2–4, 2004, Chicago, Illinois). The authors would like to thank Gustavo Grohmann, Mark P. Jones, Barbara Geddes, John Carey, Andrés Mejía Acosta and the anonymous reviewers for their comments. All errors and omissions are our own.

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