This paper analyzes two aspects of China's economic relationship with Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC). First, we examine the extent to which China's economic growth is affecting trade and investment flows between China and LAC. Second, we analyze the extent to which the emergence of China as a world exporter affects the ability of LAC countries to compete in world markets both in terms of exports as well as in the capacity to attract foreign investment. For each of these questions, we provide a critical assessment of a new body of work in this area, as well as offer a series of analyses that build on and confirm some of this previous work. Furthermore, we offer implications for policy and future research. We show that there is an emerging consensus regarding China and LAC. With respect to trade and investment flows, China accounts for a significant amount of the boost in LAC exports and foreign investment in recent years, but is exporting more than it imports. In terms of global competitiveness, LAC is not significantly threatened by Chinese exports in global markets, with the exception of Mexico.

Traditionally, Western scholars have spoken about “the” Soviet view of this or that question—even about “the” Soviet ideology with respect to it—and hence they have considered it legitimate to draw quotations from a wide range of persons and types of sources in order to assemble a composite summary of that view. Even if it has been recognized that there must be private differences of opinion among Soviet officials and specialists, it has usually been assumed that the censorship prevents any from being expressed in public. This assumption is simply incorrect. In the words of Brezhnev, “a party and state leader. cannot consider himself the sole and indisputable authority in all areas of human activity. ” While jealously guarding their own right of ultimate decision, Soviet leaders now talk about problems being solvable only by “collective reason,” and insist that “it is necessary to listen to specialists and scholars, and, moreover, not only of one orientation or school.”

Este artículo problematiza la construcción de las categorías de víctima y victimario en el Informe Rettig (1991) y el Informe Valech (2004) desde la óptica de la teoría de género. El estudio de estas construcciones discursivas compele a mirar hacia atrás y adelante: atrás en el sentido de localizar las raíces de ciertos discursos en los nuevos movimientos sociales y la lucha democrática de los años setenta y ochenta, y adelante en el sentido que la hegemonía de ciertos discursos elegidos por la Concertación como legítimos siguen estableciendo los parámetros del actual escenario político chileno y probablemente lo seguirán haciendo en el futuro cercano. Esta investigación propone que una de las grandes desventajas de la política actual y su forma de enmarcar los discursos, es su capacidad de producir una falsa ruptura entre la violencia de antes y la violencia de hoy, particularmente en relación a la violencia de género.

The Catholic clergy and the military have played crucial roles in Mexican history yet have been largely ignored in recent twentieth-cenury scholarship. The military received some attention in the early post-revolutionary period because it was intertwined with political leadership, but religious elites and the Catholic Church, which were separate from the state and suppressed by it, have not been analyzed. As a rule, cohesive leadership groups in Mexico with values differing from politicians, strong institutional structures, and autonomy from the state have rarely been examined, especially in relationship to the state and politics in general. Conversely, the greater a group's ties to the Mexican political establishment, as measured by exchanges between leadership, the more scholars have learned about that group. Whereas intellectuals, entrepreneurs, military officers, and even opposition politicians share some ties with the state, the Catholic Church has no direct links, and its contemporary leaders, goals, and institutional structures remain relatively unknown and little understood.

This article examines how the organizational structure of a social movement affects the tactics it is likely to adopt. Hybrid movements gained prominence at the start of the twenty-first century. Like movements of the past, they protested on the streets; but unlike the movements of the past, they also acted like interest groups by lobbying government over policy. Considered through the lens of traditional scholarship, this phenomenon presents a puzzle. Loose networks of activists are thought to be good at contentious politics but incapable of negotiating with government. By contrast, federations of interest groups are seen to be good at insider lobbying but subject to co-optation. This article theorizes the middle ground between social movements and interest groups by proposing a third structure for social movement organizing, the federative coalition, which incorporates some of the advantages of hierarchy while avoiding some of its pitfalls. The article illustrates this argument through a case study of Brazil’s AIDS movement.

Gangs’ territorial control affects the lives of residents in thousands of neighborhoods across Latin America, particularly in northern Central American countries. I argue that gang dominance constrains the ability of neighborhood residents to mobilize politically and consequently resist gang violence through institutionalized channels. Living in gang-controlled neighborhoods results in fewer incentives and opportunities to make political elites accountable for one’s personal safety. Even residents who have already experienced crime firsthand are discouraged from turning to politics as a strategy to change the status quo. My theoretical insights identify mechanisms through which gangs’ neighborhood control affects nonelectoral and electoral participation. To test my hypotheses, I rely on census and public opinion data collected in seventy-one neighborhoods in El Salvador. This article offers the first systematic statistical analysis of the effect of gangs’ territorial control on political participation in the Latin American context. The findings suggest that living under gang rule undermines residents’ right to engage freely in politics in nuanced ways.

Scholarship on the decade-long rule of Alberto Fujimori emphasizes the surprising popularity and support for Fujimori's rule. This essay, which analyzes the politics of fear in Fujimori's Peru, suggests that this presents a partial view of the nature of Fujimori's authority. Drawing on a Gramscian conceptualization of power, it explains how coercion achieved a consensual façade by manipulating fear and creating a semblance of order in a context of extreme individual and collective insecurity. It traces the roots of this insecurity in the economic crisis and political violence of the 1980s and 1990s, and explains how the Fujimori regime manipulated fear and insecurity to buttress its authoritarian rule. This essay also complements existing studies on Peruvian civil society, which point to economic factors, such as the economic crisis of the 1980s and neoliberal reforms, to explain civil society weakness. This paper explores the political factors that contributed to this process, particularly the deployment of state power to penetrate, control and intimidate civil society.

In the age of corporate empires and free trade, little attention has been paid to those who live and work on the margins of the mainstream capitalist economies. In Ecuador, these workers constitute a vast sector of the national population. Some 60 percent of urban dwellers and probably a much larger proportion of rural families exist below the poverty line, eking their living out of family plots of land or micro-enterprises (World Bank, cited in Larrea and North n.d.). Many of these belong to indigenous ethnic groups and nationalities. What is the effect of capitalist expansion on these workers and the way in which they organize their economy? Are they destined for Marx's “dustbins of history,” or have they been able to adapt to and even take advantage of capitalism without losing their historical specificity as noncapitalist producers?

For the last ten years, Central America has been in upheaval, experiencing fundamental social and political change, with the Nicaraguan revolution representing the most dramatic rupture with the past. This revolution, the civil war in El Salvador, two recent coups in Guatemala, and the militarization of Honduras by the United States are all aspects of the crisis currently transforming the region. This article will argue that these dramatic events comprise a general disintegration of what might be called the “old order” in Central America. While the particular characteristics of each country must be taken into account, a process of creative destruction can be identified that is best understood at the level of the region as a whole.

Interracial marriage is common in Brazil today despite an overall preference for racial endogamy. Fully one-fifth of all Brazilian unions in 1980 were racially exogenous (Silva 1987), although only a small portion of those marriages involved persons of widely differing colors. Indeed, 93 percent of interracial unions in 1980 were between whites and browns (pardos—persons of mixed race or mulattos) or between browns and blacks; only the remaining 7 percent (1.3 percent of all unions) took place between whites and blacks (Silva 1987, 73). Because intermarriage is the ultimate indicator of social distance or assimilation, these rates suggest little or moderate social distance between persons who are proximate in color but greater social distance between persons at the extremes ends of the color spectrum.

This work will sketch some methodogical and theoretical guidelines for studying the historical process by which national states were formed in Latin America. It is a suggested method for studying this process, not a rigorous interpretation of it. Such an interpretation would be difficult without first having studied in depth the experiences of several nations from which to infer and generalize a pattern of historical development. Studies of this sort have been undertaken recently, so I will confine myself here to a discussion of certain conceptual elements and a research strategy that may prove useful in the work that lies ahead. Several hypotheses on the process of state formation will be advanced to illustrate the perspective from which I propose to undertake its study.

The thirty-four-year reign of President Porfirio Díaz (1876–1910) is generally acknowledged to have been the period of Mexico's great economic transformation. In reality, Mexico was unable to avoid the accelerated change that overtook it during the last quarter of the nineteenth century, as proliferating patterns of trade, which accompanied the burgeoning industrial development of the United States and Western Europe, tied Mexico ever more closely to the global economy. An international economic division of labor was negotiated between foreign industrialists and entrepreneurs—who urgently needed primary products, markets for goods, and opportunities for investment, and national and regional elites—who welcomed infrastructural improvements, modern machinery, an array of consumer goods, and the increasing availability of foreign capital.

Robert J. Sampson and W. Byron Groves (1989) analyzed data from 238 British neighborhoods to test the mediating effect of indicators of social disorganization. Basing their work on that of Clifford R. Shaw and Henry D. McKay (1942), these researchers created indicators such as friendship networks, organizational participation, and the control of street-corner teenaged peer groups, and developed a theory of community level. In this article, we apply the formal logic of Sampson and Groves using data from the first Belo Horizonte victimization survey. In addition, we use data from the 2000 Brazilian Census and the Military Police. The results support the social disorganization theory and demonstrate that crime-rate differences are an effect of community level.

Writers from Jorge Luis Borges to Alejo Carpentier have celebrated the role of literary journalism in Latin American cultural life. The periodical press mediates between author and public, between the heavy sea of tradition and the rising tide of the new, between the institutions that sustain convention and the spontaneous, vibrant eruptions that give life to the avant-garde. Literary journalism thus traces the struggles of writers against the canon while revealing their engagement in the political and aesthetic events of the day. But as one might expect, literary journalism also unravels the neat boundaries of the finished work or the book in the ongoing dialogue with contemporary publications and multifaceted speculations on culture. In this way, the pastiche of materials found in the modern review exposes the vivid heterogeneity of the intellectual field.

La importancia y el valor de las revistas literarias en el desarrollo de cualquier literatura es algo que no necesita justificación. Son ellas la bitácora y el recuento fidedigno de un momento, de un período y, a veces, la fuente generadora y receptora del fenómeno literario. Sin acudir a ellas, difícilmente podrían medirse y apreciarse en su dimensión más auténtica e inmediata el clima intelectual y la circunstancia históricosocial en que se originan muchas de las obras literarias. Dan prueba fehaciente de ello los diversos estudios al respecto, especialmente los dos libros de Boyd G. Carter acerca del papel desempeñado por las revistas literarias en la historia de la literatura hispanoamericana.

En los últimos treinta años, la asignación masiva de soluciones habitacionales vía subsidios estatales ha redefinido la relación entre los pobladores (pobres urbanos) chilenos y el Estado. Dichas transformaciones han tensionado los enfoques tradicionales sobre las movilizaciones por la vivienda, erigidas fundamentalmente desde el examen del llamado “Movimiento de Pobladores”, que tuvo lugar en los años sesenta e inicios de los setenta. Usando material etnográfico recabado entre 2010 y 2014, buscamos subsanar tales vacíos analíticos mediante el examen de la reconfiguración histórica de las protestas por derecho a la vivienda y, en este marco, la rearticulación del poblador como subjetividad política; y la relación de la demanda por vivienda digna con la reivindicación del derecho a la ciudad y la vida digna. Así, mostramos cómo el carácter subsidiario y segregador de las políticas de vivienda desarrolladas durante las últimas décadas es cuestionado por la acción colectiva de los pobladores y los procesos de subjetivación política asociados.

El régimen militar (1973–1990) ha sido investigado en diversos ámbitos: político, jurídico, institucional, económico, derechos humanos, mediático, entre otros. Sin embargo, poco se ha indagado respecto a los cambios y alteraciones que experimentó el entorno estético cotidiano como consecuencia de la dictadura. Menos aún se ha investigado sobre aquellas actividades culturales y/o manifestaciones artísticas que fueron promovidas o apoyadas por el régimen militar. Éstas, analizadas desde una perspectiva de conjunto, podrían dar cuenta de aquellos rasgos que marcaron su producción simbólica, ya sea promoviendo ciertos modos de ver, ritos y sensibilidades o reprimiendo aquellas prácticas e imaginarios propios del sistema democrático. El presente artículo considera algunos antecedentes del golpe estético que vivió Chile entre los años 1973 y 1975, como consecuencia del golpe militar generado el 11 de septiembre de 1973. La expresión golpe estético simboliza el proceso de transformación y cambio experimentado en aspectos de la vida cotidiana, producto del quiebre que se produjo con el proyecto socio-cultural de la Unidad Popular (UP).