Following the implementation of the Lei das Cotas (Affirmative Action Law) in Brazil, there has been debate as to whether students who were admitted through affirmative action perform at the same level as students admitted through traditional methods. This article examines the results of the Exame Nacional de Desempenho dos Estudantes (ENADE) from 2009 to 2012 to determine whether there is a relationship between students’ performance at the university level and the manner of their admittance. We find that students admitted to public universities under affirmative action perform at similar levels to students who were not, whereas quota students in private universities perform slightly better than students admitted through traditional methods.

Economic development in Latin America has been explained largely in terms of the Economic Commission for Latin America school (ECLA) dominated by Raúl Prebisch. According to this school, “outward orientation” of the periphery, was the key characteristic of Latin America before 1930. The growth pattern was determined by the fortunes of the export sector (including the terms of trade) and its linkages with the developed Center. Since 1930, the massive import substitution policies undertaken by the periphery has led to a new phase of “inward orientation” where the strategic role of promoting growth has been played by the linkage-rich industry. Both growth and inflation have been explained in terms of the institutionalist “structuralist” school which has emphasized bottlenecks related to the land tenure system, market imperfections and deficiencies (both domestic and external), and to a lesser degree to the savings patterns of people (where the demonstration effect, income distribution and the taxation system play pivotal roles).

A recurring theme in the study of social stability is the relation of rural conditions to political violence and revolution as well as to subtler and less violent forms of opposition and resistance. El Salvador has served as an example for study because of its recent twelve-year civil war and the participation of its rural population. Given the depth and richness of data concerning rural conditions leading up to the civil war, it is somewhat baffling to find that rural social tensions are explained away in the terms used by Mitchell Seligson in “Thirty Years of Agrarian Transformation in El Salvador.”

Unlike other Latin American countries, the particular mode of dependent capitalist development that has occurred in Argentina has led to the emergence of a relatively large industrial bourgeoisie. Indeed, industrialists in Argentina have constituted an extremely important pressure group, in a society where the state has not been able to control the development and activities of societal organizations. Entrepreneurial organizations both of a general type, such as chambers of commerce and industry, and of a more specialized nature, such as trade associations, began to arise autonomously by the turn of the century. The events of the Perón years were particularly important in giving impetus to entrepreneurial organization. By the early 1950s, with the passage of the Law of Professional Associations of Employers, which granted them special legitimacy and importance, such entrepreneurial organizations became the most important means by which entrepreneurs attempted to influence government policy.

This study evaluates the role played by the legislature in one of Argentina's most important economic reforms of recent decades: the reform of tax incentives for regional development. As implemented by the last military government, this sytem of tax incentives provoked sharp distributive conflicts among provinces. Although a majority of legislators favored reform after the return to democracy in 1983, interprovincial conflicts created bargaining problems that prevented the passage of reform legislation through regular channels. Pro-reform legislators decided instead to delegate reform authority to President Raúl Alfonsín because he shared their interest in containing the fiscal cost of tax incentives. Subsequent uses of this delegated authority by two presidents promoted the interests of the enacting coalition that supported delegation. These findings support the usefulness of delegation models when carefully applied to Latin America and challenge theories that neglect the different ways that legislators shape economic reform.

Because of the prominence of the president in the Mexican political system, public opinion of the executive is a particularly important political indicator. Two models of public opinion are used here to explain changes in President Carlos Salinas de Gortari's approval rate from 1990 to 1994. The economic-performance model assumes that approval was based on public perception of trends in the economy. The statistical analysis shows that individuals' perceptions of economic performance had a strong positive effect on their opinions of the president. But basic economic indicators such as inflation, the real value of wages, and the level of unemployment are found to explain only partially Mexico City residents' opinions of the economy. The policy-initiatives model assumes that approval of President Salinas was based on public opinion of his economic policy initiatives. Citizens' approval of Salinas's economic initiatives was found to affect their opinions of the president substantially. Because many of these policy initiatives, such as NAFTA, had no immediate direct impact on the economic condition of the country, I conclude that Salinas's extraordinary popularity was largely due to the expectations that these initiatives created.

This article discusses the sustained and increasingly institutionalized transnational practice of repatriating the bodies of deceased Mexican migrants from the United States to their hometowns in Mexico. Far from being a strictly private transnational practice, migrants' desire for a posthumous return and burial in their homelands is popularly expressed in the memories, music, and everyday exchanges of the Mexican diaspora. Drawing on transnational ethnographic research in Los Angeles, California, and Zacatecas, Mexico, this article documents how the Mexican state has institutionalized this process at the transnational, national, state, and municipal levels of governance. Last, the article discusses the role of migrant family and social networks in these repatriations. The goals of this article are to provide a preliminary cultural and institutional understanding of the practice of repatriating cadavers from the United States to Mexico and to discuss the implications of this process for the scholarly debate on migrant transnationalism.

Social spending by central governments in Latin America has, in recent decades, become increasingly insulated from political manipulation. Focusing on the 3×1 Program in Mexico in 2002-2007, we show that social spending by local government is, in contrast, highly politicized. The 3×1 Program funds municipal public works, with each level of government—municipal, state, and central—matching collective remittances. Our analysis shows that 3×1 municipal spending is shaped by political criteria. First, municipalities time disbursements according to the electoral cycle. Second, when matching collective remittances, municipalities protect salaries of personnel, instead adjusting budget items that are less visible to the public, such as debt. Third, municipalities spend more on 3×1 projects when their partisanship matches that of the state government. Beyond the 3×1 Program, our findings highlight the considerable influence that increasing political and economic decentralization can have on local government incentives and spending choices, in Mexico and beyond.

When citizens lack stable political attitudes, leaders cannot easily be held accountable for their record in office, party system consolidation becomes more difficult, and public opinion is unable to offer much substantive guidance about policy-making. Ultimately, democratic governance is likely to suffer. In this article, we analyze a recent four-wave panel survey to assess the stability of political attitudes in Mexico. We find that the degree of attitude stability in Mexico varies across different types of dispositions. Although citizens hold reasonably firm views about the country's main political actors, preferences over issues are less consistent. These findings suggest both possibilities and constraints for democratic governance.

There has been much controversy over the nature of the institution of slavery, the relative humanity or lack of it in those slave holding nations which practiced it, and its benign or baleful effects upon the blacks on whom it was inflicted. Much has been said about the harshness of Anglo-American slavery and the relatively mild nature of Spanish American slavery, which respected a slave's basic humanity and rights of person, property, and family. Yet little has been done to quantify and document how those attitudes applied in practice. We have had little precise information about the slave family as it existed in the Spanish American colonies and the extent or use of slave property, or about the slaves' access to the legal system that might protect and defend his person, his property, or his family. New sources and methodology have begun to challenge long-held assumptions about both Anglo-American as well as Spanish American slavery. If any conclusion is warranted, it may be that slavery varied widely from place to place and was influenced perhaps as much by differing economic circumstances as by differences in cultural attitudes.

This article argues that descriptive representation, or demographic similarities between legislators and the public, can provide effective substantive representation of citizens’ concerns. We examine representation through the lens of opinion congruence or alignment in the policy preferences of legislators and citizens sharing various identities. Congruence may result from shared material interests or from self-selection into an identity group on the basis of policy views, but it can also be a product of networks and organizations that socialize masses and elites into a common worldview. Though political parties were historically the most important agents of political socialization, we argue that religious organizations constitute a more powerful socializing force in many new democracies. Examining the case of Brazil, we draw on three legislative surveys and fifteen mass surveys to analyze congruence across seven issue areas. Legislators and voters from underrepresented groups—women, Afro-Brazilians, evangelical Christians, and those of lower social class—are generally closer in their opinions than those sharing a party or electoral district. Evangelicals are often the most congruent. Analyzing original surveys of congregations and clergy, we argue that this finding results from the socializing role of churches.

While Haiti's economic dependency and poverty are shared by other Caribbean nations, its history of underdevelopment serves as a prototype for them. Haiti's political independence, achieved in 1804, set the stage for an increasingly difficult struggle to survive among imperialist states. Haiti prefigured the modern Latin American experience and thus provides a classic example of how national aspirations in the hemisphere were derailed. Equally significant, it illustrates the manner in which commerce, rather than plantation enterprise or extensive capital investment, could foster socioeconomic decline.

The ethnic question has been central to the historical process of nation-state building or “nationalization” in Mexico (Adams 1967). To a significant degree, this process has been a criollo and a mestizo project (Aguirre Beltrán 1976; compare Anderson 1983, 1988). Accordingly, indígena identity has been imposed on the non-criollo and non-mestizo population by the Mexican state, with the identification process historically displaying arbitrariness and inconsistency across a range of biological identifiers (especially phenotype) or cultural identifiers (especially language) or both (Marino Flores 1967). Following colonial precedents and in step with the evolving structure of political economy and society, the process of ethnic identification in postcolonial Mexico associated Hispanicity (via white skin color or Spanish descent or Spanish language) with the more valued locations higher in the ethno-class hierarchy and indígena identity with the lower, less-valued locations. In postrevolutionary Mexico, thanks to the contribution of anthropologist Manuel Gamio, the concept of mestizaje was stripped of biological content and culturized.

Within the past few years, the study of Latin American politics has been increasingly influenced by a theoretical perspective that the outcome of World War II temporarily relegated to the “dustbin of history.” This perspective is the corporate one, long associated with the political perversions of Hitler's Germany, Mussolini's Italy, and a handful of postwar continental regimes such as Spain and Portugal which were considered by most observers to be political backwaters.

The dependency perspective has become a major thrust, both in bourgeois and Marxist conceptions of development and underdevelopment in Latin America, but the distinctions between the two interpretations have been blurred. No unified theory of dependency yet exists, but a variety of theoretical tendencies tends to cluster in the literature on dependency. The discussion that follows differentiates between the bourgeois and Marxist interpretations by focusing on some fundamental weaknesses of dependency theory that emanate among those who utilize a Marxist analysis. In particular, there is concern that dependency theories ignore social classes and class conflict or that these theories tend to present mechanical schemes in which external rather than internal aspects are determinant. Further, it is argued that dependency theories are nationalist in ideology and advocate autonomous capitalist development rather than offering solutions or strategies for the transition from capitalism to socialism.

This essay explores the various ways Mexicans and Colombians envisioned and employed modernity in the nineteenth century, especially the flourishing and collapse of an alternative mentalité I call American republican modernity. I argue that in the late 1840s a vision of civilization emerged that privileged political progress, measured by the success of republican projects and the enactment of extensive citizens' rights, as a marker of modernity over older visions, defined by high culture or wealth. Because conceptions of modernity deeply affected the hegemonic rules of political life in Spanish America, I also suggest how such a discourse enabled subalterns to exploit this language to promote their inclusion in new nation-states. The article concludes by exploring the collapse of this alternative modernity in the last quarter of the nineteenth century, as Western notions of modernity—involving technological innovation, industrialization, and state power—became dominant.