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Space, Law, and Justice in Leibniz: Leibniz as a Theorist of Spatial Justice

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  10 September 2018

Ekaterina Yahyaoui Krivenko Open the ORCID record for Ekaterina Yahyaoui Krivenko [Opens in a new window]
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Abstract

This article argues that Leibniz should be viewed as a predecessor of the idea of spatial justice and that Leibniz's heritage remains a valuable source for inspiration and critical reading of the contemporary literature on spatial justice. The article first demonstrates interdependency between Leibniz's conceptualisation of space and his conceptualisation of law and justice. This is the first time that this argument is made in relation to Leibniz, therefore significant space is devoted to justifying this argument. The article then proceeds to comparing Leibniz's views on space, law and justice to one of the most “spatial” contemporary articulation of the idea of spatial justice, namely that proposed by Andreas Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos. The article concludes by pointing out some aspects of Leibniz's thought that are most valuable for the further study of law, space and spatial justice in contemporary scholarship.

Type
Original Article
Information
Law and History Review , Volume 36 , Issue 4 , November 2018 , pp. 891 - 914
Copyright
Copyright © the American Society for Legal History, Inc. 2018 

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Footnotes

A significant portion of research for this article was undertaken during her research stay at the Max-Planck Institute for European Legal History (March–May 2017). The stay at the Institute was made possible thanks to the fellowship she was awarded from the Institute, for which she is most grateful. She also expresses her gratitude to anonymous reviewers for their comments on the earlier version of this article.

References

1. The timing of the spatial turn differs among different scholarly disciplines.  See, for example, Warf, Barney and Arias, Santa, “Introduction: The Reinsertion of Space into Social Sciences and Humanities,” in The Spatial Turn: Interdisciplinary Perspectives, ed. Warf, Barney and Arias, Santa (Oxon, NY: Routledge, 2009), 3–4Google Scholar. More specifically on spatial turn in law, see Blank, Yishai and Rosen-Zvi, Issi, “The Spatial Turn in Legal Theory,” Hagar: Studies in Culture, Polity and Identity 10 (2010): 1–24Google Scholar.

2. The article focuses on one articulation of spatial justice; namely, that presented by Andreas Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos in his book Spatial Justice: Body, Lawscape, Atmosphere (Oxon, NY: Routledge, 2015)Google Scholar, which very convincingly argues that his is the most spatial idea of spatial justice. It would be impossible to provide a broader overview of contemporary theorization of spatial justice in the framework of this article.

3. Costa, Pietro, “A ‘Spatial Turn’ for Legal History? A Tentative Assessment,” in Spatial and Temporal Dimensions for Legal History, ed. Mecarelli, Massimo and Sastre, Maria Julia Solla (Frankfurt am Main: Max Planck Institute for European Legal History, 2016), 48Google Scholar.

4. For slightly more detail on this, see section entitled “Leibniz's Mature Writings.” Two works in which this view is expressed most clearly and in more detail are: Leibniz, Gottfried W., The New Method of Teaching and Learning Jurisprudence, trans. de Iulii, Carmelo Massimo (Clark, NJ: Talbot Publishing, 2017 [first published 1667])Google Scholar, and “Specimen of Philosophical Questions and Perplexing Cases in the Law” (“Specimen quaestionum philososophicarum ex jure collectarum” 1665), trans., in Leibniz: Logico-Philosophical Puzzles in the Law: Philosophical Questions and Perplexing Cases in the Law, ed. Artosi, Alberto, Pieri, Bernardo, and Sartor, Giovanni (Dordrecht: Springer, 2013), 1–48CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

5. Some examples of discussion of Leibniz's broad views on space include: Anapolitanos, Dionysios A., Leibniz: Representation, Continuity and the Spatiotemporal (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1999)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Futch, Michael, Leibniz's Metaphysics of Time and Space (Dordrecht: Springer, 2008)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Risi, Vincenzo De, Geometry and Monadology: Leibniz's Analysis Situs and Philosophy of Space (Dordrecht: Springer, 2007)CrossRefGoogle Scholar. An example of a focused discussion of Leibniz/Clarke correspondence is Khamara, Edward J., Space, Time and Theology in the Leibniz-Newton Controversy (Heusenstamm: Ontos Verlag, 2006)CrossRefGoogle Scholar. The topic is also discussed in numerous articles. The literature on Leibniz's concept of juridical science is more limited, especially in English. See, for example, Berkowitz, Roger, The Gift of Science: Leibniz and the Modern Legal Tradition (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2005)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Johns, Christopher, The Science of Right in Leibniz's Moral and Political Philosophy (London: Bloomsbury, 2013)Google Scholar; and Riley, Patrick, Leibniz’ Universal Jurisprudence: Justice as the Charity of the Wise (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

6. A good example in relation to law and justice is Busche, Hubertus, Leibniz’ Weg ins perspektivische Universim. Eine Harmonie im Zeitalter der Berechnung (Hamburg: Meiner Verlag, 1997)Google Scholar, in which the discussion of his natural law theory is integrated into a broader reconstruction of Leibniz's philosophy. All the books mentioned in the previous footnote also discuss links between Leibniz's philosophy and his views on specific issues addressed by each book. However, they are usually less encompassing than Busche's study.

7. Leibniz published comparatively few of his works during his lifetime, which could be another indicator of the fact that he was still working on refining some of the concepts. See Jolley, Nicholas, Leibniz (London, New York: Routledge, 2005), esp. 201–2Google Scholar; or Savile, Anthony, Routledge Philosophy Guidebook to Leibniz and the Monadology (London, New York: Routledge, 2000), 6Google Scholar.

8. For an English edition of Theodicy see, for example, Gottfried W. Leibniz, Theodicy, edited with an introduction by Austin Farrer, trans. E.M. Huggard (Chicago: Open Court, 1985 [first published 1710]).  Gottfried W. Leibniz, “The Principles of Philosophy, or, the Monadology” dated 1714 [hereafter The Monadology] exists in various translations in English. This article uses the following translation: Leibniz, Gottfried W., Philosophical Essays, trans. Arew, Roger and Garber, Daniel (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1989), 213–25Google Scholar. However, references are made to paragraphs of The Monadology so that the reader can use any translation or refer to the original text, which being written in French, is still accessible to many contemporary readers.

9. On this point in relation to law, see, for example, Armgardt, Matthias, “Die Rechtstheorie von Leibniz im Licht seiner Kritik an Hobbes und Pufendorf,” in “Das Recht kann nicht ungerecht sein…” Beiträge zu Leibniz’ Philosophie der Gerechtigkeit, ed. Li, Wenchao (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 2015), 26Google Scholar; and, more broadly, Armgardt, Matthias, “Die Monadologie als Vollendung der Rechtsphilosophie von G. W. Leibniz,” in 1716 – Leibniz’ letztes Lebensjahr. Unbekanntes zu einem bekannten Universalgenie, ed. Kempe, Michael (Hannover: Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz Bibliothek, 2016) 343–53Google Scholar. In relation to space and other issues, see, for example, heavy reliance on The Monadology in De Risi, Geometry and Monadology and Busche, Leibniz’ Weg.

10. See, for example, Lefebvre, Henri, The Production of Space, trans. Nicholson-Smith, Donald (Oxford, Cambridge: Blackwell, 1991), 169–72Google Scholar; or Harvey, David, Justice, Nature and the Geography of Difference (Oxford, Cambridge: Blackwell, 1996), 69–76, 249–55Google Scholar.

11. To my knowledge, Isolde de Villiers's brief piece is the only attempt by a legal scholar to discuss Leibniz from a spatial justice perspective: de Villiers, Isolde, “Leibniz, Lefebvre and the Spatial Turn in Law,” HTS Teologiese Studies/Theological Studies 72 (2016): 1–6CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

However, her engagement with Leibniz as a thinker of spatial justice is limited to reminders about his influence on Lefebvre. There is not a single citation of Leibniz's works in this piece except a short epigraph.

12. A third example might be the concurrent attribution of parts, for example through bequest, in Doctrina Conditionum. However, the analogy evoked in this particular case is far removed from the concept of space, but rather focuses on “a physical principle derived from the nature of movement.” See Leibniz, Gottfried W., Doctrina Conditionum. Texte intégral, présenté, traduit et annoté par Pol Boucher (Paris: Institut Michel Villey, 1998), esp. 111–17Google Scholar. For a useful commentary on Doctrina Conditionum from a legal perspective, see Armgardt, Matthias, Das rechtslogische System der Doctrina Conditionum von Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (Marburg: Elwert, 2001)Google Scholar.

13. In 1664, Leibniz completes and publishes Specimen quaestionum philososophicarum ex jure collectarum (translated into English as “Specimen of Philosophical Questions and Perplexing Cases in the Law” [see note 4] [hereafter Specimen]). In 1665, he completes Disputatio juridica de conditionibus (not translated, Latin text contained in Leibniz, Gottfried W., Sämtliche Schriften und Briefe, series VI, vol. 1 (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1999) 97–150Google Scholar. [Hereafter all references to this collection of Leibniz's works are labelled as “A” followed by series, volume, and page.] In November 1666, he completes Disputatio inauguralis de casibus perplexis in jure (translated into English as “Inaugural Dissertation on Perplexing Cases in the Law,” in Leibniz: Logico-Philosophical Puzzles in the Law. Philosophical Questions and Perplexing Cases in the Law, ed. Artosi, Alberto, Pieri, Bernardo, and Sartor, Giovanni [Dordrecht: Springer, 2013], 71–123CrossRefGoogle Scholar [hereafter Perplexing Cases]), while his Dissertatio de arte combinatoria (“Dissertation on the Art of Combinations” selections translated into English in Leibniz, Gottfried W., Philosophical Papers and Letters, trans. Loemker, Leroy E. [Dordrecht: D.Reidel, 1969], 73–84)Google Scholar is completed earlier in 1666.

14. Leibniz, De arte combinatoria, 82. Leibniz never abandoned this aim in relation to his development of juridical science. For example, writing about Leibniz's period after his return from Paris (1672) and referring to his letter to Vincenz Placcius of July 1678 (A II 1, 421) one author states: “Der unübersehbare Bestand geltender Rechtsnormen erschien ihm wie eine unedliche Reihe von Zahlen, zu dessen Vereinfachung man das Recht nur aus dem Unendlichen in die Endlichkeit zurückzuführen brauche [The immeasurable inventory of applicable legal norms appeared to him as an infinite series of numbers the simplification of which only required to bring the law from the infinite to the finitude].” Schneider, Hans-Peter, “Erfindergeist und Innovation im Rechtswesen: Leibniz als Jurist,” in Der universale Leibniz: Denker, Forscher, Erfinder, ed. Reydon, Thomas A.C., Heit, Helmut, and Hoyningen-Huene, Paul (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 2009), 89Google Scholar.

15. Leibniz, De arte combinatoria, 77, in Latin: “Situs est localitas partium.”

16. See, similarly, De Risi, Geometry and Monadology, 42–43.

17. On different trajectories in the development of the geometrical concept of space and the physical understanding of space that partially overlap but do not merge together, see, respectively: Rosenfeld, Boris A., A History of Non-Euclidean Geometry: Evolution of the Concept of a Geometric Space (Dordrecht: Springer, 1988)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Maudlin, Tim, Philosophy of Physics. Space and Time (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2012)Google Scholar.

18. Specimen, 11.

19. Perplexing Cases, 101.

20. Specimen, 11.

21. Perplexing Cases, 102.

22. De Risi, Geometry and Monadolgy, 166.

23. Leibniz, Gottfried W., “Fifth Paper to Clarke,” in Philosophical Papers and Letters, trans. Loemker, Leroy E. (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1969), 714Google Scholar.

24. Gottfried W. Leibniz, “On Space and Point,” in De Risi, Geometry and Monadology, 624.

25. Leibniz, Gottfried W., “On the Origin of Things from Forms,” in The Labyrinth of the Continuum. Writings on the Continuum Problem, 1672–1686, trans. Arthur, Richard T.W. (New Haven: Yale University Press 2001), 119Google Scholar.

26. Ibid.

27. Leibniz, Gottfried W., “Dynamica de potentia et legibus naturae corporeae,” in Mathematische Schriften, 7 vols., ed. Gerhardt, Karl Immanuel (Berlin: H.W. Schmidt, 1860), VI:370Google Scholar.

28. Deleuze, Gilles, The Fold. Leibniz and the Baroque (London: Athlone Press, 1993)Google Scholar.

29. Leibniz, Gottfried W., “Placidius Philaleti,” in Opuscules et fragments inédits de Leibniz, ed. Couturant, Louis (Paris: Félix Alcan, 1903), 614–15Google Scholar; trans. in Deleuze, The Fold, 6.

30. De Risi, Geometry and Monadology, 174.

31. Leibniz, Gottfried W., “Fourth Letter to Clarke,” in Philosophical Papers and Letters, trans. Loemker, Leroy E. (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1969), 687–91Google Scholar.

32. For a brief general discussion of absolute space, see Harvey, David, “Space as a Keyword,” in David Harvey: A Critical Reader, ed. Castree, Noel and Gregory, Derek (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2006), 70–93CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

33. For a detailed discussion of the origin and context of The Monadology, see, for example, Strickland, Lloyd, “The Origins and Fate of the Monadology,” in Leibniz's Monadology: A New Translation and Guide (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2014), 5–12Google Scholar.

34. Leibniz, Gottfried W., “Reflections on the Advancement of True Metaphysics and Particularly on the Nature of Substance Explained by Force,” in Leibniz's ‘New System’ and Associated Contemporary Texts, ed. Woolhouse, Roger Stuart and Francks, Richard (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), 32CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

35. The Monadology, para 1.

36. Ibid., para 3.

37. See Leibniz, Gottfried W., “Letter to Des Bosses Dated 30 or 24 April 1709,” in Philosophical Papers and Letters, trans. Loemker, Leroy E. (Dordrecht: D. Reidel 1969), 596–99Google Scholar, and note 3 at 615. See also important remarks on this letter in De Risis, Geometry and Monadology, note 12 at 313–14.

38. The Monadology, para. 17.

39. Leibniz, Gottfried W., “What is an Idea,” in Philosophical Papers and Letters, trans. Loemker, Leroy E. (Dordrecht: D. Reidel 1969), 207–8Google Scholar.

40. The Monadology, para. 13, 14.

41. Ibid., para. 9.

42. Ibid., para. 58, 62.

43. Ibid., para. 57.

44. Ibid., para. 59: “every substance expressing exactly all the others through the relations it has to them.”

45. De Risi, Geometry and Monadology, 319.

46. Ibid., 320.

47. Ibid., 323.

48. De Risi at some point raises the issue of which comes first, the phenomena or the monads? “Do monads express phenomena or do phenomena express monads?” De Risi. Geometry and Monadology, note 17 at 320.

49. Ibid., 314.

50. Leibniz, “Fourth Letter to Clarke,” 690. In this correspondence, Clarke defends Newton's view of space. For an introductive summary to Newton's concept of space, see DiSalle, Robert, “Newton's Philosophical Analysis of Space and Time,” in The Cambridge Companion to Newton, ed. Cohen, Bernard I. and Smith, George E. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 33–56CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

51. See also Leibniz, “Fifth Paper to Clarke,” in which Leibniz affirms: “Since space in itself is an ideal thing like time, space out of the world must needs be imaginary,” 701.

52. Leibniz, Gottfried W., “Sur la nature de la bonté et de la justice” in “Das Recht kann nicht ungerecht sein…” Beiträge zu Leibniz’ Philisophie der Gerechtigkeit, ed. Li, Wenchao (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 2015), 154Google Scholar. This passage is translated as follows into English by Riley, Patrick: “Right cannot be unjust, it is a contradiction; but law can be. For it is power which gives and maintains law; and if this power lacks wisdom or good will, it can give and maintain quite evil laws”: Leibniz, Gottfried W., Political Writings, 2nd ed., trans. Riley, Patrick (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 50Google Scholar.

53. On this aspect of Leibniz's work, see, for example, Berkowitz, The Gift of Science, 7 and the book in general.

54. Ibid., 20.

55. For an interesting discussion of perspectivism in Leibniz in relation to law, diversity, and the individual, see de Salas, Jaime, “Perspectivism, Pragmatism and Monadology in the Reception of Leibniz's Legal Thought: Comments on Alain Renaut's L’ère de l'individu,” in Pluralität der Perspektiven und Einheit der Wahrheit im Werk von G.W. Leibniz. Beiträge zu seinem philosophischen, theologischen und politischen Denken, ed. Beiderbeck, Friedrich and Waldhoff, Stephan (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 2011) 21–36Google Scholar.

56. See, for example, Leibniz, Gottfried W., New Essays on Human Understanding, trans. Remnant, Peter and Bennett, Jonathan (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996)CrossRefGoogle Scholar (hereafter New Essays with reference to book, chapter, paragraph); Leibniz, Gottfried W., “Meditations on the Common Concept of Justice,” in Political Writings, 2nd ed., trans. Riley, Patrick (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 50Google Scholar. See also Brown, Stuart and Fox, N.J., Historical Dictionary of Leibniz's Philosophy (Lanham, MD: The Scarecrow Press, 2006), 146Google Scholar.

57. The Monadology, para. 29.

58. For a good overview of various scholarly opinions on the possibility of discussing Leibniz's theory of knowledge, see, for example, Leduc, Christian, Substance, individu et connaissance chez Leibniz (Montreal: Les Presses de l'Université de Montreal, 2009), 10–17Google Scholar.

59. Usually, Leibniz's New Essays are given as an example of a written piece focused on discussing issues related to a theory of knowledge, but it is just a commentary on Locke, and for this reason, rather fragmentary on certain aspects.  On Leibniz’s theory of knowledge, see, for example, Leduc, Substance; McRae, Robert, Leibniz: Perception, Apperception, and Thought (Toronto: Toronto University Press, 1976)Google Scholar; Rescher, Nicholas, “The Epistemology of Inductive Reasoning in Leibniz,” in Leibniz's Metaphysics of Nature, ed. Rescher, Nicholas (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1981), 20–28CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Russel, Bertrand, The Philosophy of Leibniz (London, New York: Routledge, 1900), chap. XIVGoogle Scholar.

60. Leibniz, Gottfried W., “Letter to Arnaud of 9 Oct 1687,” in Die Philosophischen Schriften, 7 vols., ed. Gerhardt, Karl Immanuel (Berlin: Weidmannsche Buchhandlung, 1879), II:112Google Scholar; and New Essays, 2.21.5.

61. Leibniz, “Letter to Arnaud,” 112.

62. Leibniz, Gottfried W., “Principles of Nature and Grace, Based on Reason,” in Philosophical Essays, trans. Arew, Roger and Garber, Daniel (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1989), 207, 208 para 4Google Scholar.

63. Going into details of Leibniz's distinction among different types of knowledge—for example, distinction between concepts and principles—more precision might be required in connecting perception, apperception, and thought. However, for the present purposes, the general dependence of thought on perception and apperception as discussed in this section is sufficient. For a more detailed discussion of the various connections among perception, apperception, and thought see McRae, Leibniz.

64. New Essays, 2.11.17.

65. Ibid.

66. Ibid.

67. Leibniz, “Meditations on the Common Concept of Justice,” 45.

68. Ibid., 49.

69. Ibid., 50.

70. In his New Method for Teaching and Learning Jurisprudence, Leibniz identifies four parts of jurisprudence: didactical, historical, exegetical, and polemical (A VI 1, 293). Among these, the didactical and the polemical parts are called theoretical and proper parts of jurisprudence, whereas exegetical and historical parts are identified as practical, and are called “mere conditions.”  That these practical conditions of jurisprudence are based on facts is clear, for example, when Leibniz in the same treatise says that jus civile is a mere question of facts because it requires proof not based on the nature of things but on history and facts. Ibid., 341.

71. This absence of outside in monads might mean that what Leibniz said about innate knowledge in human understanding is also only figuratively spatial. However, a more detailed and definitive answer to this question cannot be provided in the framework of this article. Whatever the answer, it does not undermine general conclusions of this article, but might have an impact on the strength of some elements of the argument.

72. See Andreas Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos, Spatial Justice, chap. 1.

73. Ibid., i.

74. Ibid., 176.

75. To some extent, the second vision of space can be relativized if one assumes that when the author says that bodies occupy space he in reality means “place.”  However, the author follows this usage of the word “space” with a remarkable consistency through the whole book. Therefore, it is impossible to conclude that this is a simple arbitrary linguistic choice.

76. Ibid., 39–40.

77. Ibid., 40.

78. Ibid., 16.

79. Ibid., 40–43.

80. Ibid., 43.

81. Ibid., 52.

82. Ibid., with a particular reference to indigenous (Australian aboriginal and Maori) law.

83. Ibid., 55.

84. Ibid., 59.

85. Ibid.

86. See note 31.

87. In his earlier writings, especially in the above-discussed case of simultaneous possession in Question IV of the Specimen, Leibniz also presupposes space as given and pre-existent. However, I would argue that this is only because the main point in the Specimen defended by Leibniz relates to the use of scientific methods from other disciplines for dealing with legal questions, so he simply took the concept of physical space as it existed at the time without engaging in any critical discussion of the concept of space.

88. Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos, Spatial Justice, 57.

89. Ibid., 187.

90. It is important to keep in mind that in Leibniz's times, the now-familiar distinction among phenomenology, ontology, and epistemology did not exist. Therefore, it is extremely difficult to assess Leibniz's philosophy against these contemporary notions as already mentioned in relation to epistemology. For this reason, the argument in this paragraph should not be read as a statement on contemporary discussions on the relationship among epistemology, ontology, and phenomenology that has an important place in Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos's discussion of spatial justice.

91. See discussion in the section “Leibniz's Early Writings.”