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Regulation of Judicial Misconduct from Late Antiquity to the Early Middle Ages

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 October 2011

M.H. Hoeflich
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In a well-known chapter in the book known as the Mirror of Justices, the anonymous author recounts King Alfred's drastic solution to the problem of misbehaving judges:

It is an abuse that justices and their officers who slay folk by false judgments are not destroyed like other homicides. And King Alfred in one year had forty-four judges hanged as homicides for their false judgments.

Unfortunately, as Maitland has conclusively demonstrated, we cannot rely on this passage as historical evidence of Alfred's reign. Nevertheless, the passage illustrates both a problem and a solution common in the Roman and medieval periods. The problem was judicial misconduct and corruption. The solution was to impose personal liability upon miscreant judges for their behavior.

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Law and History Review , Volume 2 , Issue 1 , Spring 1984 , pp. 79 - 104
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Copyright © the American Society for Legal History, Inc. 1984

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References

1. Whittaker, W.J., ed., The Mirror of Justices, intro. Maitland, F.W., Selden Society Publications 7 (London, 1895)Google Scholar.

2. Ibid. ch. 108, 106 and following.

3. Maitland's analysis of this section is contained in Whittaker, The Mirror, supra note 1, xxvi–xxvii.

4. There is an extensive body of literature on judicial misconduct in the modern period; see, Corr, K.R. and Berkson, L., Literature on Judicial Misconduct (Chicago, 1977)Google Scholar. The problem of judicial misconduct in classical Roman law is particularly the preserve of Professor J.M. Kelly; see Kelly, J.M., Roman Litigation (Oxford, 1966) esp. 31–69, 102–18Google Scholar; Kelly, J.M., Studies in the Civil Judicature of the Roman Republic (Oxford, 1976)Google Scholar. Still, the basic study of medieval procedure is M.A. von Bethmann-Hollweg, Der Civilprozes des gemeinen Rechts in geschichtlicher Entwicklung, iv, pt. 1. Der germanisch-romanische Civilprozess in M.A. vom fünften bis achten Jahrhundert (Bonn, 1868)Google Scholar. The most complete modern study of the problem of judicial misconduct in the early Middle Ages is Schmitt-Weigand, A., Rechtspflegedelikte in der Fränkischen Zeit. Münsterische Beiträge zur Rechts-und Staats Wissenschaft. Heft 7 (Berlin, 1962)Google Scholar; see also, Fuhrmann, M., ‘Philologische Bemerkungen zu Theodulphs Paraenesis ad iudices,’ in Luig, K. and Liebs, D., eds., Das Profil des Juristen in der europäischen Tradition (Ebelsbach, 1980)Google Scholar; Monod, G., ‘Les Moeurs judicaires au VIIIe siècle d'apres La Paraenesis ad Judices de Théodulf,’ Revue Historique xxxv (1887) 1–20Google Scholar.

5. The centrality of judicial office to the proper functioning of a legal system is a concept that runs through Western legal literature. This obsession with judicial conduct is, in many ways, best illustrated by the late ancient and medieval sources discussed here, but it is also found even in modern jurisprudential writings as well as in modern practice; see, for instance, Hart, H.L.A., The Concept of Law (Oxford, 1961)Google Scholar, wherein Hart argues that even if the majority of participants in a legal system do not take a nondescriptive, normative attitude in regard to legal rules, the normativity and validity of that rule system can still be preserved if law officers and judges possess such a perspective. On the problem of judicial office and judicial disinterestedness in modern law, see Hoeflich, M.H. and Deutsch, J.G., ‘Judicial Legitimacy and the Disinterested Judge,’ ‘6 Hofstra Law Review 749–54 (1978)Google Scholar.

6. Wormald, P., ‘Lex Scripta and Verbum Regis: Legislation and Germanic Kingship from Euric to Cnut,’ in Sawyer, P.H. and Wood, I.N., eds., Early Medieval Kingship (Leeds, 1977) 105–38Google Scholar. Another recent article on the same subject but giving a more balanced view is Nehlsen, H., ‘Aktualität und Effektivität der ältesten germanischen Rechtsaufzeichnungen,’ in Classen, P., ed., Recht und Schrift im Mitlelaller, Vorträge und Forschungen Bd. xxiii (Sigmaringen, 1977) 449–502Google Scholar.

7. See Hart, The Concept of Law, supra note 5.

8. Leff, A.A., ‘Law And,’ 87 Yale Law Journal 989ff. (1978)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

9. Cassiodorus, , Senator, Variae, ed. Mommsen, Th.. MGH.AA XII, Ep. IV.33, (Zurich, 1970) 128–29Google Scholar; see Wormald, 'Lex Scripta and Verbum Regis,' supra note 6, 127.

10. On the importance of the concept of pax to ancient political thought, see Zampaglione, G., The Idea of Peace in Antiquity, trans. Dunn, R. (Notre Dame, 1973)Google Scholar. Disciplina was crucial to Augustinian political theory; see Arquilliere, H.X., L'Augustinisme Politique, 2d ed. (Paris, 1972)Google Scholar. On the notion of utilitas in secular governmental thought, see Merk, W., Der Gedanke des gemeinen Besten in der deutschen Staats-und Rechtsentwicklung (Darmstadt, 1968)Google Scholar and in ecclesiological theory, Hoeflich, M.H., ‘The Concept of Utilitas Populi in Early Ecclesiastical Law and Government,’ Zeitschrift der Savigny-Stiftung für Rechtsgeschichte, Kanon. Abteilung, lxvi (1981) 36–74Google Scholar. See also, on all these concepts and their relationship to early medieval concepts of governmental authority, Hoeflich, M.H., ‘The Speculator in the Governmental Theory of the Early Church,’ Vigiliae Christianae xxxiv (1980) 120–29CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

11. Isidore of Seville, Etymologiae, ed. Lindsay, W.M. (Oxford, 1971) IIGoogle Scholar. 10.6 (‘De Lege).

12. It remains unclear whether Isidore actually worked on the first book of the Leges Visigothorum or whether an unknown author made use of Isidore's Etymologiae as a source-book for the Leges. Unfortunately, the otherwise exhaustive study of the Leges by Karl Zeumer, their modern editor, does not comment upon this first book on the grounds that it is ‘Inhaltlose,’ devoid of content: see Zeumer, K., ‘Geschichte der westgöthischen Gesetzgebung II,’ Neues Archiv xxiv (1899) 44Google Scholar.

13. Zeumer, K., ed., Leges Visigothorum [hereafter ‘LV’], MGH.LLI.1 (Hannover, 1973)Google Scholar 1.2.4. (‘Qualis Erit Lex’).

14. Cicero, Pro Caecinia, 71 and following.; see Kelly, Roman Litigation, supra note 4, 33–34.

15. Ibid. 43 and following.

16. The concept of gratia in Roman political, social and legal thought has been the subject of substantial comment; see Garnsey, P., Social Status and Legal Privilege in the Early Empire (Oxford, 1970)Google Scholar; Sailer, R., Personal Patronage Under the Early Empire (Cambridge, 1982) esp. 23CrossRefGoogle Scholar and following, where Saller discusses the contractual and reciprocal nature of gratia in the Roman social context. It is also important to recognize that in the later Empire, gratia came to have significant negative connotations; see Myres, J.N.L., ‘Pelagius and the End of Roman Rule in Britian,’ Journal of Roman Studies 1 (1960) 21–36CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

17. Kelly, Roman Litigation, supra note 4, 44 and following and esp. 48.

18. Ibid. 42.

19. Ibid. 30 and following, esp. 33–42. Venality in judicial proceedings was a great concern in the later empire, especially among the early church Fathers; see for instance, a passage from Cyprian's letter Ad Donatum, quoted by Kelly at 41:

Incisae sint licet leges duodecim tabulis et publico aere praefixo iura proscripta sint: inter leges ipsas delinquitur, inter iura peccatur, innocentia nee illic, ubi defenditur, reservatur…. Quis inter haec vero subveniat? patronus? sed praevaricatur et decipit. Iudex? sed sententiam vendit…. Nullus de legibus metus est, de quaesitore, de iudice pavor nullus: quod potest redimi non timetur. [emphasis added]

If, however, he [the judge] shall have given an unjust judgment through

20. See Kelly, Roman Litigation, supra note 4, 10 and following.

21. This actio was classified as a quasi-delict in Roman law, that odd category of actions (four in all) which were neither delict nor contract actions, but something in between. On the actio in iudicem qui litem suam fecit; see Stojvevic, D., ‘Sur le caractère des quasidèlits en droit remain,’ IURA viii (1957) 57–74Google Scholar; MacCormack, D.N., ‘Iudex Qui Litem Suam Fecit,’ Acta Juridica 1977 (1979) 149Google Scholar and following; Pugsley, D., ‘Litem Suam Facere.’ The Irish Jurist iv (1969) 351–55Google Scholar; Stein, P., ‘The Nature of Quasi-Delictal Obligations in Roman Law,’ Revue Internationales des Droits de l'Antiquité v (1958) 564Google Scholar, and P.B.H. Birks, ‘The Problem of Quasi-Delict,’ Current Legal Problems (1969) 164–80; generally, see Kaser, M., Das römische Privatrecht ii (Munich, 1975) 428Google Scholar and following.

22. Justinian, , Institutiones, ed. Thomas, J.A.C. (Amsterdam, 1975) IV. 5Google Scholar;

Si iudex litem suam fecerit, non proprie ex maleflcio obligatus videtur. Sed quia neque ex contractu obligatus est el utique peccasse aliquid intelligitur, licet per imprudentiam: ideo videtur quasi ex maleflcio teneri, et in quantum de ea re aequum religioni iudicantis videbitur, poenam sustinebit. [emphasis added]

23. The difficulty arises from the seeming contradiction of Justinian, Institutes, supra note 22, IV.5 and Mommsen, Th., ed., Digesta [hereafter ‘D’] (Hannover, 1973) 5.1.15.1Google Scholar:

Iudex tunc litem suam facere intelligitur, cum dolo malo in fraudem legis sententiam dixerit (dolo malo autem videtur hoc facere, si evidens argualur eius vel gratia vel inimicitia vel etiam sordes), ut veram aestmationem litis praestare cogatur.

This passage from Ulpian's Twenty-First Book on the Edict suggests that judicial negligence would not be sufficient grounds for the actio to lic. It is interesting to note, also, that in the Institutes of Theophilus Antecessor, the seventh-century Greek paraphrase and translation of Justinian's Institutes, the negligence standard was retained, attesting further to its acceptance in Byzantine law; see Theophilus Antecessor, Institutiones, 2d ed., ed. C. Fabrot (1657) IV. 5, 597–98.

24. LV, supra note 13, II. 1.21:

Sin autem per ignorantiam iniuste iudicaverit et sacramentis se potuerit excusare, quod non per amicitiam vel cupiditate aut per commodum quolibet, sed tantumdem ignoranter hoc fecerit: quod iudicabit non valeat, et ipse iudex non inplicetur in culpa.

Schmitt-Weigand takes a different position on this point; he believes that generally, during the early medieval period, there was judicial liability for imprudentia; see Schmitt-Weigand, Rechtspflegedelikte, supra note 4, 32–33, but cf. 73 n. 534 citing contrary evidence from cap. 10 of the Fragmenta Gaudenziana, cited by Zeumer to LV II. 1.21, supra note 13, in his edition at 69 n. 1.

25. von Schwind, E., ed., Lex Baivariorum [hereafter ‘L.Baiv.’] (Hannover, 1926) MGH LL.1.5.2Google Scholar:

Si vero nec per gratiam, nec per cupiditatem, sed per errorem iniuste iudicaverit, iudicium ipsius, in quo errasse cognoscitur, non habeat firmitatem; iudex vero non vocetur ad culpam. [orthography has been altered: judex iudex]

The translation in the text is drawn from that of Rivers, Th.J., trans., Laws of the Alamans and Bavarians (Philadelphia, 1977) 129Google Scholar [II.1.18]. Rivers's translation is based upon the edition of Beyerle, K., ed., Lex Baivariorum: Lichtdruck Wiedergabe der Ingolstädter Handschrift des bayerischen Volksrechts (Munich, 1926)Google Scholar rather than on that of von Schwind. On this passage, see also Schmitt-Weigand, Rechtspflegedelikte, supra note 4, 83.

26. See Riché, P., Education et Culture dans l'Occident Barbare VIe - VIIIe siécles (Paris, 1962) 229ff and 316ffGoogle Scholar. It should be noted that Riché concludes that there was a larger literate population in the southern areas of Gallia than in the northern areas.

27. MacMullen, R., ‘Roman Bureaucratese,’ Traditio (1962) 134Google Scholar and following; see also the statement of Emperor Valentinian III in 451 about Italy in CTh Nov. Val XXXII.6: ‘Et causidicos et iudices defuisse hodieque gnaros iuris et legum aut raro aut minime repperiri.’ Mommsen, Th., ed., Codex Theodosianus, [hereafter ‘CTh’] (Dublin/Zurich, 1970)Google Scholar.

28. See supra note 6.

29. CTh, supra note 27, IV. 17.

30. During the later empire, magistrates and judicial officials, many of whom might well lack adequate legal training or other relevant expertise, were given assessores, legally trained clerks to assist them. Such assessores were civil servants and paid by the central authority; see, Hitzig, , Die Assessoren der römischen Magistrate (Munich, 1893)Google Scholar and Jones, A.H.M., The Later Roman Empire, 284–602, 2 vols. (Oxford, 1973) ii, 501–3Google Scholar. The use of trained advisers to lay magistrates continues in many legal systems to this day; see for example, Barnard, D., The Criminal Court in Action (London, 1979) 122–23Google Scholar (on clerks to English magistrates); see for applicable Roman law: D.1.22 and C.J. 1.51.

31. It is important to note, however, that the advice of an assessor, in Roman Law, was not binding upon the magistrate or judge; Berger, A., Encyclopedic Dictionary of Roman Law (Philadelphia, 1953)Google Scholars.v. ‘adsessor.’

32. It is interesting to note that the CTh passages on assessors were retained in the Lex Romana Visigothorum and in later Gallic abridgments thereof; see Haenel, G., ed., Lex Romana Visigothorum [hereafter ‘LRV’] (Aalen, 1962) 1.11Google Scholar.

33. CTh, supra note 27, II. 1.6 [LRV II.1.6].

34. The constitution reads:

Exceptis his, quibus extra ordinem subvenitur, omnes iacturam litis incurrant, qui non ante in proprio foro iurgaverint, siquidem possint venire ad altioris iudicis notionem, cum iudicatum quod displicet appellatione excluserint: ita ut, si quis litigator se vel fastidio vel gratia cognitoris aut non auditum aut dilatum docuerit, et eius litis quae protracta est aestimationem fisco nostro iudex praestet et in primores officii poena deportationis ilico deprometur.

35. It is interesting to note the linguistic usages contained in the interpretalio to this CTh passage:

Quicumque apud alium suum et non iudicem negotium quod habuerit in initio litis crediderit proponendum, exceptis aetate minoribus, quibus lege consultum est, litis ipsius de qua agitur actione damnetur: nisi forsitan contra sententiam, quae adversus eum dicta fuerit, crediderit appellandum, ut apud maioris dignitatis iudices audiatur. Sane si quis causam habens a iudice suo se vel per superbiam vel propter amicitiam adversarii sui probaverit non auditum, iudicem tantum, quantum res de qua agitur valuerit, fisco nostro iubemus exsolvere: et qui consiliis suis adhaerent, exilii poenam pro districtione sustineant.

Gratia has given way to amicitia, a less precise and heavily connotative term; see text, infra, 87 cf. LV II. 1.21, supra note 24.

36. CTh, supra note 27, 1.20.1 [LRV 1.7.1]:

Honorati, qui lites habere noscuntur, his horis, quibus causarum merita vel fata penduntur, residendi cum iudice non habeant facultatem: nec meridianis horis a litigatoribus iudices videantur. Quina itaque pondo auri tam iudici quam eius officio atque honoratis parem multam adscribendam esse cognoscas, si quis contra praeceptum huiusmodi venire temptaverit.

Interpretatio. Honorati provinciarum, id est ex curiae corpore, si et ipsi in lite sunt constituti, tempore, quo causae a iudicibus ventilantur, cum iudice non resideant, et litigatores meridianis horis iudicem non salutent. Si aliud praesumpserint, multam supra scriptae legis exsolvant,

37. See, e.g., ibid. II.2.1 (LRV II.2.1):

Promiscua generalitate decernimus neminem sibi esse iudicem debere. Cum enim omnibus in re propria dicendi testimonii facuhatem iura submoverint, iniquum ammodum est licentiam tirbuere sententiae.

INTERPRETATIO. Omnes praeceptio nostra constringat, ut nullus in sua causa iudex sit, quia, sicut testimonium unusquisque pro se dicere non potest, ita nec pro se poterit iudicare.

38. See also ibid. I.16.13 (28 July 377):

Ne quis domum iudicis ordinarii postmeridiano tempore ex occasione secreti ingredi familiariter affectet eiusdem dumtaxat provinciae, sive notus iudici sive etiam ignotus, gesti tamen honoris auctoritatem praeferens.

INTERPRETATIO. Ne quis notus aut ignotus, eius tamen provinciae homo meridianis horis aut secretis iudicem videat.

39. See supra note 32.

40. The interpretationes, while once thought to date from the period of the Alarician compilation (i.e. saec. vi), are now generally thought to be pre-Alarician, and possibly of Gallic origin; see Gaudemet, J., Le Bréviaire a'Alaric et les Epitome, Ius Romanum Medii Aevi [‘IRMAE’] P. 1, 2 B aa (Milan, 1965) 38Google Scholar and following; N.B. 39:

Le but de l'Interpretatio n'est pas toujours le même, et sans doute les compilateurs ont-ils fait usage d'oeuvres de nature differente selon la fin qu'ils se proposaient. Parfois l'lnterpretatio renvoie a d'autres textes, ou bien elle donne une definition; dans d'autres cas elle amplifie ou même modifie ou corrige le texte qu'elle prétend expliquer.

41. The Gallic provenance of the interpretationes is less certain than a second half of the fifth-century dating. Gaudemet points out that certain terms found in the interpretationes are also found in the writings of Gregory of Tours or Gallic Formularies of this period; see Gaudemet, Le Bréviaire, supra note 40, 38 n. 151. See also Buckland, W.W., ‘The Interpretationes to Pauli Sententiae and the Codex Theodosianus,’ Law Quarterly Review lx (1944) 361Google Scholar and following.

42. The text is to be found in a modern edition by Salis, R. de, ed., Leges Burgundionum, MGH.LL 1.t.11.Pars I (Hannover, 1973) [hereafter LRB]Google Scholar.

43. LRB, supra note 42, XLIII:

Legali sanctione constat expressum: neminem ad inludendum pulsantem et ad deferendum iusticiam potentum quorumcumque personas in lite posse praetendere, nec titulos suis adfigere, ut pulsantem aut terreat aut ab actione conpetenti excludat.

44. Such status-contingent rules are primarily and typically found in the criminal and delictal contexts in late antique and early medieval law; on this, in general, cf. Garnsey, Social Status and Legal Privilege in the Early Empire, supra note 16.

45. The concentration on contested title to property is found not only in LRB XLIII, but also in CTH II. 14.1 [LRV II.14.1], a law of Arcadius and Honorius, dated 27 November 400, clearly textually related to LRB, supra note 42, XLIII:

Animadvertimus plurimos iniustarum desperatione causarum potentium titulos et clarissimae privilegia dignitatis his, a quibus in ius vocantur, opponere. Ac ne in fraudem legum adversariorumque terrorem his nominibus abutantur et titulis, qui huiusmodi dolo scientes conivent, adficiendi sunt publicae sententiae nota. Quod si nullum in hac parte consensum praebuerint, ut libelli aut tituli eorum nominibus aedibus adfigantur alienis, eatenus in eos quo fecerint vindicetur, ut adfecti plumbo perpetuis metallorum suppliciis deputenlur. Quisquis igitur lite pulsatus, cum ipse et rei sit possessor et iuris et titulum inlatae sollemniter pulsationis exceperit, contradictoriis libellis aut titulis alterius nomen crediderit inserendum, eius possessionis aut causae, quam sub hac fraude aut retinere aut evitare tempaverit, amissione multetur nec repetendae actionis, etiamsi ei probabilis negotii merita suffragantur, habeat facultatem. Eos sane, qui se sponte alienis litibus inseri patiuntur, cum his neque proprietas neque possessio conpetat, veluti famae suae prodigos el calumniarum redemptores notari oportebit.

46. Note especially, the general language of the interpretatio to this passage, supra note 45:

Cognovimus multos causas suas per potentium personas excusare vei prosequi, ita ut libellos vel titulose eorum nominibus, qui dignitale praeclari sunt, quo facilius terreant possessores, in his domibus quae ab eis repetunlur, adfigant, aut certe, si aliquid repetatur, nomine magnorum et clarissimorum virorum prolatis libellis contradicloriis se specialiter excusare. Quod si ex eorum voluntate factum fuerit, quorum nomina libelli testantur, publice debet dignitas eorum pro omni vilitate notari. Illi vero, qui causas suas tali fraude agere praesumpserint, plumbatis caesi in metallum damnati perdurent. Unde quicumque conzentus de re, in qua dominus esse dinoscitur, si alterius nomine se voluerit defensare aut alium alterius nomine inquietare praesumserit, causam perdat: et rei, de qua agitur, seu possessionem seu repetitionem ammittat, quamvis boni meriti negotium possit habere.

The language of this passage is especially interesting, for it is different from the typically impersonal, third person explanatory mode of most of the interpretationes to the CTh and other LRV passages. Rather this uses the first person plural in large part. Is it possible that this may represent another hitherto separately unknown constitutio or, perhaps, variant form of the text of CTh, supra note 27, II.14.17?

47. Wäcke, A., ‘The Potentiores: Some Relations Between Power and Law in the Roman Administration of Justice,’ The Irish Jurist 13 (1978) 372–89Google Scholar.

48. See supra note 13; the best modern treatment of the LV in its social and ideological context is King, P.D., Law and Society in the Visigothic Kingdom (Cambridge, 1972)Google Scholar. See also Lear, F.S., ‘The Public Law of the Visigothic Code,’ in Lear, F.S., Treason in Roman and Germanic Law (Austin, 1965) 136Google Scholar and following. On the issue of the territoriality of the LV and its predecessor codes see King, P.D., ‘King Chindasvind and the First Territorial Law-Code of the Visigothic Kingdom,’ in James, E., ed., Visigothic Spain: New Approaches (Oxford, 1980) 131–58Google Scholar and King, P.D., ‘The Alleged Territoriality of Visigothic Law,’ in Tierney, B. and Linehan, P., eds., Authority and Power (Cambridge, 1980) 1–12Google Scholar. And see, generally, Guterman, S., From Personal to Territorial Law (Metuchen, 1972)Google Scholar.

49. See King, ‘King Chindasvind and the First Territorial Law-Code,’ supra note 48, 131–58.

50. LV, supra note 13, II.1.20; the full text reads:

Si quis iudici pro adversario suo querellam intulerit, et ipse eum audire noluerit aut sigillum negaverit et per diversas occasiones causam eius protaxerit, pro patrocinio aut amicitia nolens legibus obtemperare, et ipse, quo petit, hoc testibus potuerit adprobare: det ille iudex ei, quem audire noluit, pro fatigationem eius tantum, quantum ipse ab adversario suo secundum legalem iudicium fuerat accepturus, et ipsam causam ille, qui petit, usque ad tempus legibus constitutum ita habeat reservatam, ut, cum eam proponere voluerit, debitam sibi percipiat veritatem. Certe si fraudem aut dilationem iudicis non potuerit petitor adprobare, sacramento suam iudex conscientiam expiet, quod eum nullo malignitatis obtentu vel quolibet favore aut amicitia audire distulerit, et propter hoc culpabilis idem iudex nullatenus habeatur. Eidem tamen iudici liceat, ut in una ebdomada duobus diebus vel omnibus meridianis horis, si voluerit, absque causarum audientia sue vacet domui pro quiete. Reliquo vero tempore prolata sibi negotia frequens et absque dilatione qualibet examinet.

In translating passages from the LV in these notes, I have consulted, but not relied upon, the translation made by S.P. Scott; see Scott, S.P., trans., The Visigothic Code (Boston, 1910)Google Scholar. It should be noted that this translation is extremely unreliable in parts and should be used only with extreme caution.

51. I hope to return to the nature of this transitional state in the development of socio-legal relations in the early Middle Ages in a later article.

52. In this context however, it is interesting to note LV, supra note 13, II.1.29:

Nonnumquam gravedo potestatis depravare solet iustitiam actionis, que, dum sepe valet, certo est, quod semper nocet; quia, dum frequenter vigore ponderis iustitiam premit, numquam in statu sue rectitudinis hanc redire permittit. Ideoque, quia sepe principum metu vel iussu solent iudices interdum iustitie, interdum legibus contraria iudicare, propter hoc tranquillitatis nostre uno medicamine concedimus duo mala sanare, decernentes, ut, cum repertum fuerit, qualemcumque scripture contractum seu quodcumque iudicium non iustitia vel debitis legibus, sed iussu aut metu principum esse confectum, et hoc, quod obvium iustitie vel legibus iudicatum est adque concretum, in nihilo redeat, et eos, qui iudicaverunt vel hoc facere coegerunt, nullius infamie nota conspergat vel rei alicuius damnum adfligat; qui tamen iudices tunc erunt a legum damnis inmunes, si se iuramento firmaverint, non sua pravitate, sed regio vigore nequiter iudicasse.

This passage of the LV, first introduced by King Recessvind, suggests that judges were expected to be impartial in regard to cases and litigants before them, even at the expense of royal desires. One might suggest that this notion of impartiality might have been at least partially influenced by Isidoran ideas of law, justice and judging; cf. supra note 12.

53. See Vismara, G., Edictum Theoderici (Milan, 1967)Google Scholar. IRMAE Pars I, 2 B aa x (Milan, 1967).

54. Baviera, J., Edictum Theoderici Regis [hereafter ‘ETR’] in Fontes Iuris Romani Antejustiniani II (Florence, 1968) cap. IIGoogle Scholar:

Iudex si pecuniam contra statum aut fortunas cuiuslibet ut sententiam proferret, acceperit et ex hac re sub iusta fuerit examinatione convictus, in quadruplum quod venalitatis studio accepit, exsolvat, illi profuturum contra quem redemptus docebitur tulisse sententiam.

55. The modern edition is that of de Salis, L.R., Leges Burgundionum [hereafter ‘LB’] (Hannover, 1973)Google Scholar MGH.LL I.II.

56. The LB is no longer extant in contemporary manuscripts or manuscripts prior to saec.ix. However, internal evidence in the text of the LB suggests that the majority of provisions date from the last quarter of saec.v. and first quarter of saec.vi.

57. LB praef., supra note 55, s.2:

Amore iustitiae, per quant Deus placatur et potestas terrenae dominationis adquiritur, ea primum habito consilio comitum et procerum nostrorum studuimus ordinare, ut integritas et aequitas iudicandi a se omnia praemia vel corruptiones excludat.

The translation used in the text is that of Drew, K.F., The Burgundian Code (Philadelphia, 1972)Google Scholar.

58. LB, supra note 55, cap. vi:

Quod si quis memoratum corruptus contra leges nostras, aut etiam iuste iudicans, de causa vel iudicium praemium convictus fuerit accepisse, ad exemplum omnium probato crimine capite puniatur: ita ut facultatem eius in quo venalitas vindicatur, a filiis aut legitímis heredibus sius, quae in ipso punita est, culpa non auferat.

The translation in the text is that of K.F. Drew, The Burgundian Code,. supra note 53.

59. See e.g., LV, supra note 13, 1.1.20, II.1.21, II.1.16. It is extremely interesting to speculate upon the development of royal efforts to curb judicial venality and improper exaction of valuables from litigants and the relationship of this trend to the development of regulations concerning simony. Here again, I hope to return to this subject in a later work. For the present, see, generally, Yunck, J.A., The Lineage of Lady Meed (South Bend, 1963) esp. 23–61Google Scholar.

60. Schwind, ed., L.Baiv., supra note 25, MGH.LLI.5.II:

Iudex si accepta pecunia male iudicaverit, ille qui iniuste aliquid ab eo per sententiam iudicantis abstulerit, ablata restituat. Nam iudex qui perperam iudicaverit, in duplum ei cui damnum intulerit cogatur exsolvere, quia ferre sententiam contra legum nostrarum statuta praesumpsit, et in fisco cogatur quadraginta solidos persolvere.

An English translation of the L.Baiv. has been published in Rivers, Laws of the Alamans and Bavarians, supra note 25. This translation, however, is based not on the MGH edition, but rather upon K. Beyerle's edition of the Ingolstadt manuscript of the L.Baiv., supra note 25. Thus, the translation of the text differs from that made by Rivers (though not significantly). On this passage, see also Schmitt-Weigand, Rechtspflegedelikte, supra note 4, 87.

61. cf. ibid. 34.

62. Boretius, A., ed., Capitularia Regum Francorum (Hannover, 1960)Google Scholar MGH.LLCAPIT. I, 58:

Ut quibus data est potestas iudicandi iuste iudicent, sicut scriptum est: ‘iuste iudicate, filii hominum’, non in muneribus, ‘quia munera exocant corda prudentium et subvertunt verba iustorum‘, non in adolatione, nec in consideratione personae, sicut in deuteronomio dictum est: ‘quod iustum est iudicate; sive civis sit ille sive peregrinus, nulla sit distantia personarum, quia Dei iudicium est’. Primo namque iudicio diligenter discenda est lex a sapientibus populo conposita, ne per ignorantiam a via veritatis erret. Et dum ille rectum intellegat iudicium, caveat ne declinet, aut per adolationem aliquorum aut per amorem cuiuslibet amici aut per timorem alicuius potentis aut propter praemium a recto iudicio declinet; et honestum nobis videtur, ut iudices ieiuni causas audiant et discernant.

The scriptural quotation is Zachariah 8.16. It is also interesting to note the focus on proper judicial proceedings typical of the so-called Programmatic Capitulary of 802; the Capitulare Missorum Generale, edited by Boretius, supra, 91 and following; see also the Capitulare de Iustitiis Faciendis AD. 811–813, edited by Boretius, 176–77. On the significance of Programmatic Capitulary and the organization of the Carolingian system of justice, see Ganshof, F.L., ‘Charlemagne's Programme of Imperial Government,’ in Sondheimer, J., trans., The Carolingians and the Frankish Monarchy (Ithaca, 1971) 55–85Google Scholar and ‘The Impact of Charlemagne on Frankish Institutions,’ in ibid. 143–61, esp. 151 and following.

63. Boretius, Capitularia Regum Francorum, supra note 62, 70, cap. 28:

De praemiis et muneribus: ut munera super innocente nullus accipiat; et si quis hoc facere praesumpserit, nostrum bannum solvat. Et si, quod absit, forte comis hoc fecerit, honorem suum perdat.

Schmitt-Weigand, Rechtspflegedelikte, supra note 4, 55, argues that the Capitulare de Partibus Saxonicae is not typical of Charlemagne's laws and that this provision is unusually harsh and reflects Charlemagne's special dislike of the Bavarians (and their Duke Tassilo).

64. See Bethmann-Hollweg, Civilprozess, supra note 4. Also still valuable is Coulanges, Fustel de, La Monarchie Franque v in his Histoire des Institutions Politiques de l'Ancienne France, 5th ed. (Paris, 1888) 304–506Google Scholar. See also Goebel, J., Felony and Misdemeanor (Philadelphia, 1976)Google Scholar. On the Visigoths, see above all, King, Law and Society in the Visigothic Kingdom, supra note 48, 79 and following. On the Lombards, see now Wickham, C., Early Medieval Italy (London, 1981) 115 and followingGoogle Scholar.

65. On the ordeal process in the Middle Ages, see now, Hyams, P.R., ‘Trial by Ordeal: The Key to Proof in the Early Common Law,’ in Arnold, , Green, , Scully, and White, , eds., On the Laws and Customs of England: Essays in Honor of Samuel E. Thorne (Chapel Hill, 1981) 90Google Scholar.

66. See King, Law and Society in the Visigothic Kingdom, supra note 48.

67. For example, see LV, supra note 13, II.1.20.

68. It is interesting to note that LV II.1.20, as well as LV II.1.22, are both early texts, promulgated by King Chindasvind. On LV II.1.20 see Zeumer, ‘Geschichte der westgöthischen Gesetzgebung,’ supra note 12, 75–76.

69. See, for instance, Eckhardt, K.A., ed., Pactus Legis Salicae [hereafter ‘L. Sal.’] (Hannover, 1962)Google Scholar MGH.LL I t.iv, P.I., LVII (‘De Rachuburgiis.’) Variants of this text, acording to Eckhardt's apparatus criticus, are found in several classes of mss., dating from both the Merovingian and Carolingian epochs, including (in his stemma) Text Classes A, B, C (Merovingian), and H, and K (Carolingian). On L. Sal. 57 see also E. Mayer-Homburg, Die Fränkischen Volksrechte im Mittelalter I: Die fränkischen Volksrechte und das Reichsrecht (1912).

70. LV, supra note 13, II.1.22 reads in full:

Tranquille hac sollicite instantia mansuetudinis nostre premonet; iudices omnes non debere dilatare causidicos, ne gravi dispendio aliquatenus honorentur. Quod si dolo aut cailiditate aliqua ad hoc videtur iudex differe negotium, ut una pars aut ambe naufragium perferant, quidquid dispendiis super octo dies a die cepte accionis causantes pertulerint, reddito sacramenio, totum eis iudex reddere conpellatur. Sin autem vel egritudo vel publice utilitatis indictio suspenderit iudicem a negotio peragendum, nullam moram exibeat litigantibus, sed sub hac eos difinitione confestum absolvat, ut ad causam expediendam conpetenti tempore indubitanter occurrant.

And cf. CTh. II.6.2; see also Schmitt-Weigand, Rechtspflegedelikte, supra note 4, 70 who suggests that the motivation for this law was the fear that a delay in proceedings would permit self-help measures and feud to preempt legal proceedings.

71. A question raised by this injunction, found for instance in Charlemagne's Programmatic Capitulary is whether implicit in it is an assumption of the existence of written laws and their extensive use; see Schmitt-Weigand, Rechtspflegedelikte, supra note 4, 113 and Nehlsen, ‘Aktualität und Effektivität Germanischer Rechtsaufzeichnungen,’ supra note 6, 451 takes a contrary position. On this matter, I believe that Nehlsen too easily assumes that this injunction can only apply to lex scripta and actual forced judicial use of written law codes in court proceedings. I have commented extensively on this problem in a paper entitled ‘Law and the Commonweal in the Middle Ages: Ideology and Pragmatism’ presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Society for Legal History held on October 21–22, 1982. On the development of the notions expressed in this injunction in later medieval law and juristic commentary, see Nörr, K.W., Zur Stellung des Richters und gelehrten Prozess der Frühzeit: Iudex Secundum Allegata Non Secundum Conscientiam Iudicat, Münchener Universitäts-Schriften, Bd. 2 (Munich, 1962)Google Scholar.

72. For instance, LV, supra note 13, II.1.21

73. See Schmitt-Weigand, Rechtspflegedelikte, supra note 4, 92 and infra note 100 and text thereto, where the judge himself is to be condemned to death. It is interesting to note that the fear of the irreversibility of an incorrect capital judgment and its concommitant problems has persisted from the early Middle Ages to our own times, see Black, C., Capital Punishment, The Inevitability of Caprice and Mistake (New York, 1974)Google Scholar.

74. ETR, supra note 54, cap. I:

Priore itaque loco statuimus, ut si iudex acceperit pecuniam, quatenus adversum caput innocens contra legis et iuris publici cauta iudicaret, capite punialur.

And see sources cited supra note 73 and infra note 100.

75. Boretius, Capitularia Regum Francorum, supra note 62, cap. 26, 96:

Ut iudices secundum scriptam legem iuste iudicent, non secundum arbitrium suum.

Note also, cap. 25:

Ut comites et centenarii ad omnem iustitiam faciendum conpellent et iuniores tales in ministeriis suis habeant, in quibus securi confident, qui legem adque iustitiam fideliter observent, pauperes nequaquam oppriment, fures latronesque et homicidas, adulteros, malificos adque incantatores vel auguriatrices, omnesque sacrilegos nulla adulatione vel praemium nulloque sub tegimine celare audeat, sed magis prodere, ut emendentur et castigentur secundum legem, ut Deo largiente omnia haec mala a christiano populo auferatur.

And see sources cited at supra note 62.

76. Ibid 5. and nn. 21–23; an interesting Judaic parallel to this Roman action is found in Davis, A., ed., Pirkei Avos (New York, 1980) cap. 1:8Google Scholar.

77. Ibid. 4.

78. D.50.13.6; D.44.7.5.4; and see Kelley, Roman Litigation, supra note 4, 115.

79. Ibid. 104–7.

80. But cf. ibid. 103 commenting on D. 17.2.52.18. Kelley points out in this passage that, generally, at least according to D.20.1.31; D.3.20.16.13; and D.43.30.4, an unfair judgment against a litigant could be grounds for an exceptio rei iudicatae (i.e. could not be relitigated) and, presumably, an unfairly wronged plaintiff, therefore, could normally recover on the matter only through a collateral action brought against the judge.

81. MacCormack, ‘Iudex Qui Litem Suam Fecit,’ supra note 21, 150–51.

82. Unfortunately, we have almost no contemporary evidence for the use of the actio, although some rather general juristic commentary survives; see supra note 5.

83. See supra note 22.

84. ETR, supra note 54, cap. 1, 15.

85. ETR, supra note 54, cap. II.

86. Levy, E., Weströmisehes Vulgarrecht. Das Obligationenrecht. Forschungen zum römischen Recht (Weimar, 1956) 36Google Scholar and following. On later Visigothic developments in the calculation of penalties for theft, see the discussion of King, Law and Society in the Visigothic Kingdom, supra note 48, 251–58. See also for his comments on furtum and judicial corruption (a severely limited view). Schmitt-Weigand, Rechtspflegedelikte, supra note 4, 37–38.

87. See for instance, ETR, supra note 54, cap. III:

Iudex quod immerito provincialibus rapuerit, amissa dignitate qua male usus est, in quadruplum reddat his duntaxat, quibus immerito constat ablatum: et si defunctus fuerit, ab eius heredibus haec poena poscatur.

88. L. Lang. IV.28.10:

Si quis causam habuerit, et sculdais aut iudex ei secundum Edicti tenorem per legem iudicaverit, et ipse stare in eodem iudicio minime voluerit, componat illis, qui iudicavit, sold. xx. Nam de ea causa, quae per arbitrium iudicata fuerit, et ipse sibi non credideril legem iudicasse, et ad Regem clamavit, non sit culpabilis. Et si iudex contra legem iudicaverit, componat solidos xl medium regi, et medium cuius causa fuerit…

Another translation of this passage is found in Drew, K.F., The Lombard Laws (Philadelphia, 1973) 159Google Scholar, which I have consulted.

89. See, esp., Wormald, ‘Lex Scripta and Verbum Regis,’ supra note 6, 105–38 and Ullmann, W., Principles of Government and Politics in the Middle Ages (London, 1961) 117Google Scholar and following.

90. Boretius, ed., Capitularia Regum Francorum, supra 62, cap. 9, 93:

Ut nemo in placito pro alio rationare usum habeat defensionem alterius iniuste, sive pro cupiditate aliqua, minus rationare valente vet pro ingenio rationis suae iustum iudicium marrire vel rationem suam minus valente opprimendi studio. Sed unusquisque pro sua causa vel censum vel debito ratione reddat, nisi aliquis isti infirmus aut rationes nescius, pro quibus missi velpriores qui in ipso placito sum vel iudex qui causa huius rationis sciat rationetur con placito; vel si necessitas sit, talis personae largitur in rationem qui omnibus provabilis sit et qui in ipsa bene noverit causa: quod tamen omnino fiat secundum convenientiam priorum vel missorum qui praesentem adsunt. Quod et omnimodis secundum iustitiam legem fiat; adque praemium, mercedem vel aliquo malae adulationis ingenio vel defensione propinquitatis ut nullatenus iustitia quis marrire praevaleat. Et ut nemo aliquit alicui iniuste consentiat, sed omni studio el volunlate omnes ad iustitia perficiendam praeparati sunt.

Hec enim omnia supradicta imperiali sacramento observari debetur.

And see Ganshof, ‘Charlemagne's Programme of Imperial Government,’ supra note 62, 59; see also Schmitt-Weigand Rechtspflegedelikte, supra note 4, 22.

91. See supra note 90.

92. See C. Fadda, Azione Popolare (1894); Buckland, W.W., Text-Book of Roman Law, (Cambridge, 1966) 694–95Google Scholar. The Roman actio popularis was, apparently, similar to the early English writ Qui Tam; cf. Schmitt-Weigand, Rechtspflegedelikte, supra note 4, 107 on the notion that judicial misconduct constituted an offense against society. Actions derived from the actio popularis continue to be used in certain civil law countries today, e.g. Brazil, cf. Meirelles, H., Mandado de Seguranca e Acão Popular, 3d ed. (São Paulo, 1975) 63Google Scholar and following.

93. The theory of the actio popularis, i.e., that a wrong covered by the actio injured all members of society, so that proof of a specific wrong done by a particular individual was unnecessary, unlike the case of certain modern private-attorney generalship actions, where proof of damage to the litigant is required.

94. D.47.12.3 pr.; D.9.3.5.5.

95. See Buckland, Text-Book of Roman Law, supra note 92, 695.

96. See supra note 69.

97. L. Sal., supra note 69, 57.3; cf. Beyerle, F. and Buchner, R., eds., Lex Ribuaria [hereafter ‘L. Rib.’] (Hannover, 1965)Google Scholar cap. 56(55) (‘De rachinburgiis legem dicentibus’).

98. See supra note 63.

99. L. Rib., supra note 97, MGH.LL.I.III P.II.

100. Ibid. cap. 91, 1:

Hoc autem consensu et consilio seu paterna traditione et legis consuetudine super omnia iubemur, ut nullus optimatis, maior domus, domesticus, comes, gravio, cancellarus vel quibuslibet gradibus sublimitas in provintia Ribuaria in iudicio resedens munera ad iudicio pervertendo non recipiat. Quod si quis in hoc depraehensus fuerit, de vita conponat.

Cf. Schmitt-Weigand, Rechtspflegedelikte, supra note 4, 17, 73, 127.

101. See King, Law and Society in the Visigothic Kingdom, supra note 48.

102. LV, supra note 13, II.1.21, 5 and n.24. The text is labelled ‘antiqua’ in Zeumer's edition and begins:

ludex si per quodlibet commodum male iudicaverit et cuicumque iniuste quidquam auferre praeceperit, ille, qui a iudice ordinatus ad tollendem fuerat destinatus, ea, que tulit, restituat.

And see, Zeumer, K., ‘Uber Zwei Neuentdeckts westgöthische Gesetze,’ Neues Archiv xxiii (1897) 93Google Scholar and following for a discussion of LV II.1.21 and other Germanic parallels.

103. MacCormack, ‘Iudex Qui Litem Suam Fecit,’ supra note 21, 151.

104. Cf. Schmitt-Weigand, Rechtspflegedelikte, supra note 4, 75.

105. Cf. Feinman, J. and Cohen, R., ‘Suing Judges: History and Theory,’ 31 South Carolina Law Review 201–92 (1978)Google Scholar.

106. Certainly, this has been the experience in the United States. In the ancient world, appellate structures where they existed did not serve to deter most judicial misconduct. The volume of corrective legislation authorizing collateral actions and/or criminal proceedings for misconduct alone suggests this.

107. See Isidore of Seville, Sententiae, ed. Ruiz, J.C. and Melia, I.R.. Santos Padres Españoles II (Madrid, 1971) 505Google Scholar, cap. 54.1 (‘De Muneribus’):

Qui recte iudicat, et praemium remunerationes exspectat, fraudem in Deum perpetrat, quia iustitiam, quam gratis impertiri debuit, acceptione pecuniae vendit.

108. See supra note 57.

109. Boretius, ed., Capitularia Regum Francorum, supra note 62, 12 (10 November 585):

Cuncti itaque iudices iusta, sicut Deo placet, studeant dare iudicia…

See, also K. Lehmannand K.A. Eckhardt, eds., Leges Alamannorum. MGH.LLI.T.V., Pars. I, 100 §41.1 (Codex B):

Nullus causas audire praesumat, nisi qui a duce per conventionem populi iudex constitutus est, ut causas iudicet, qui nec mentiosus nec perurator nec munerum acceptor sit, sed causas secundum legem veraciter iudicet sine acceptione personarum et timens Deum sit. Et si iuste iudicaverit, credat se apud Deum mercedem recipere et laudem apud homines bonam possidere.

110. Boretius, Capitularia Regum Francorum, supra cap. 63.

111. See, for instance, LV, supra note 13, II.1.20; a similar process probably existed in Burgundy, Saxony, and West Francia.

112. See, for instance, ibid. II.1.20 and II.1.21.