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Substantive and Reflexive Elements in Modern Law
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 01 July 2024
Abstract
The most comprehensive efforts to develop a new evolutionary approach to law are found in the work of Nonet and Selznick in the United States and Habermas and Luhmann in Germany. While these theorists are concerned with a common problem—the crisis of formal rationality of law—they differ drastically in their accounts of the problem and their vision of the future. This paper tries to resolve these differences by first decomposing and then restructuring the diverse neo-evolutionary models. Using a more comprehensive model of socio-legal covariation, the author identifies an emerging kind of legal structure which he calls “reflexive law.” Reflexive law is characterized by a new kind of legal self-restraint. Instead of taking over regulatory responsibility for the outcome of social processes, reflexive law restricts itself to the installation, correction, and redefinition of democratic self-regulatory mechanisms. The author identifies areas of private law in which reflexive solutions are arguably emerging, and he spells out the consequences which a concern for reflexivity has for a renewed sociological jurisprudence.
- Type
- Research Article
- Information
- Law & Society Review , Volume 17 , Issue 2: Special Issue: Psychology and Law , 1983 , pp. 239 - 285
- Copyright
- Copyright © 1983 The Law and Society Association.
Footnotes
This article has changed from a one-man business into almost a transatlantic enterprise. It started at the Center for the Study of Law and Society at Berkeley, where I gave a seminar on comparative legal theory. In this challenging atmosphere, especially due to the presence of Philippe Nonet and Philip Selznick, I wrote the first draft, which then underwent critical examination by many colleagues, among them Richard Buxbaum, Johannes Feest, Wolfgang Fikentscher, Wolf von Heydebrand, James Nickel, and Rainer Walz. I have to thank the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft for financial support.
On the other side of the Atlantic the paper met considerable criticism. My colleagues at Bremen especially and also elsewhere helped me with critical suggestions. I want to mention Gert Brüggemeier, Peter Derleder, Dieter Hart, Christian Joerges, Karl-Heinz Ladeur, Eike Schmidt, Klaus Sieveking, Helmut Willke, and Gerd Winter. Then the paper was exposed to the pleasant surroundings of Florence. I am grateful to the participants of the seminar on “New concepts of jurisprudence,” particularly Werner Maihofer and Joseph Weiler, and I also received valuable suggestions from Marc Galanter and Niklas Luhmann. Presenting the paper to an American audience created the urgent need to “de-teutonize” it. David Trubek and Richard Lempert made extremely valuable suggestions regarding the final version. In fact, their cooperation was so intensive and their contributions went so far beyond usual editing activities that one can no longer speak of an individual article but of a collective enterprise. To be sure, this does not mean collective responsibility; here we should stick to more old-fashioned notions of individual liability.
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