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The “Gag Rule” Revisited: Physicians as Abortion Gatekeepers

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  29 April 2021

M. Gregg Bloche
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Extract

To the surprise of many and the dismay of some, the U.S. Supreme Court took it upon itself last term to proclaim a national compromise on the question of abortion. The Court's announced truce, an elaboration on Justice O’Connor's “undue burden” idea, is pragmatic in design but unlikely to prove stable in practice. The three justices who spoke for the Court disparaged Roe with reluctant praise, then upheld its outer shell on the ground that social expectations and the need to sustain the appearance of the rule of law made it impolitic to do otherwise. This awkward doctrinal invention seem unlikely to yield a lasting peace. However artful as political brokerage, it is unpersuasive as principled jurisprudence. Its explicitly political calculus invites skepticism about its authors’ commitment to principled method even as it purports to preserve public regard for judicial legitimacy. Moreover, there is an unexplained “disconnect” between the opinion's avowed preservation of Roc's “essential holding” and its abandonment of Roe's commitment to reproductive freedom as a compelling interest.

Type
Article
Information
Law, Medicine and Healthcare , Volume 20 , Issue 4 , Winter 1992 , pp. 392 - 402
Copyright
Copyright © American Society of Law, Medicine and Ethics 1992

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