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Rationing and Professional Autonomy

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  29 April 2021

George J. Agich
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Extract

The effort to control inflation of the cost of health care in the United States in recent years has focused on a strategy of introducing competition by encouraging prospective payment systems such as DRGs and HMOs. Changes associated with these new payment systems have engendered a debate that has been conducted partly in terms of medical ethics. Because they tend in various ways to provide physicians with incentives to reduce medical costs, prospective payment systems have been alleged to create ethical conflicts for physicians. The obligation to practice cost-effective medicine is said to conflict with the obligation of physicians under the traditional professional view of medical ethics to provide the best care to patients without regard to cost or other matters. At bottom is the concern that the net effect of these changes will be to force physicians to ration medical services. Not only will patients suffer thereby, but professional authority will be weakened as efficiency protocols and various bonuses or inducements alter the norms of clinical decision-making.

Type
Article
Information
Law, Medicine and Healthcare , Volume 18 , Issue 1-2 , Summer 1990 , pp. 77 - 84
Copyright
Copyright © 1990 American Society of Law, Medicine & Ethics

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References

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