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Contextual review: the instinctive impulse and unstructured normativism in judicial review
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 20 March 2020
Abstract
Contextual review is a judicial method that rejects doctrinal or categorical methods to guide judicial supervision of administrative action. Judges are invited to assess the circumstances of a claim in the round without any doctrinal scaffolding to control the depth of scrutiny; in other words, intervention turns on an instinctive judicial impulse or overall evaluative judgement. This paper identifies and explains the various instances where this method is deployed in judicial review in Anglo-Commonwealth administrative law. The efficacy of this style of review is also evaluated, using rule of law standards to frame the analysis. Its increasing popularity is a worrying turn, in part because its reliance on unstructured normativism undermines the rule of law.
Keywords
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- Winner of the SLS Annual Conference Best Paper Prize 2019
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- Copyright © The Society of Legal Scholars 2020
Footnotes
†
This is a revised version of the paper that was awarded the prize for best conference paper at the Society of Legal Scholars 110th Annual Conference at the University of Central Lancaster, Preston, England in September 2019. Thanks, with the usual caveat, to Mark Aronson, Eddie Clark, Aileen McHarg, Geoff McLay and Nicole Moreham, along with two anonymous reviewers, for comments and feedback on draft versions of the paper. Thanks also to Conor Gearty, Martin Loughlin and Tom Poole for earlier conversations on this topic and to William Britton for research assistance.
References
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