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Decentralization and law enforcement in EC competition law*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  02 January 2018

Jo Shaw
Jo Shaw*
Affiliation:
Keele University
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Extract

In a Notice on cooperation between national courts and the Commission published in early 1993, the European Commission made the following policy pronouncements about its future role in the enforcement of the competition rules contained in the EC Treaty:

‘As the administrative authority responsible for the Community's competition policy, the Commission must serve the Community's general interest. The administrative resources at the Commission's disposal to perform its task are necessarily limited and cannot be used to deal with all the cases brought to its attention. The Commission is therefore obliged, in general, to take all organizational measures necessary for the performance of its task and, in particular to establish priorities.’

Type
Research Article
Information
Legal Studies , Volume 15 , Issue 1 , March 1995 , pp. 128 - 163
Copyright
Copyright © Society of Legal Scholars 1995

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References

1. Notice on co-operation between national courts and the Commission in applying arts 85 and 86 of the EEC Treaty, OJ 1993 C39/6 (hereinafter ‘Notice’).

2. Notice, para 13.

3. Notice, para 14.

4. Ibid.

5. Notice, para 15.

6. Case 127/73 BRT v SABAM (1974) ECR 51.

7. The state of the case law in the various member states is being charted in a cross-EU project based at the Europa Kolleg, Hamburg. Reports for the UK and Italy are published as Behrens (ed), EEC Competition Rules in National Courts, Part One, ‘United Kingdom and Italy’, Shaw and Ligustro, Nomos, Baden-Baden, 1992, and reports for the Benelux and Ireland as Behrens (ed), EEC Competition Rules in National Courts, Part Two, Noirfalisse, Sevinga and Maher, Nomos, Baden-Baden, 1994.

8. OJ Sp Ed 1962, No 204/62 p87.

9. Council Decision 88/591 establishing an EC Court of First Instance OJ 1988 L319/1; jurisdiction over competition cases was transferred in 1989, with appeal to the Court of Justice only on points of law (Article 51 of the Statute of the Court of Justice).

10. See, for example, the complaint by Reynolds Tobacco against the acquisition of an interest in Philip Morris by Rothmans: Cases 142 & 156/34 BAT and Reynolds v Commission (1987) ECR 4487.

11. Forrester and Norrall ‘The Laicization of Community Law: Self-help and the Rule of Reason: How Competition Law is and could be Applied’, (1984) 21 CML Rev 11 at 45.

12. Ehlermann ‘The Contribution of EC Competition Policy to the Single Market’, (1992) 29 CML Rev 257; Frazer ‘Competition Policy After 1992: The Next Step’, (1990) 53 MLR 609.

13. See for example EC Commission ‘Making the Most of the Internal Market’ Com (93) 632 of December 22 1993; ibid ‘Reinforcing the Effectiveness of the Internal Market’ Com (93) 256 of June 2 1993.

14. On comfort letters see Waelbroek ‘New Forms of Settlement of Antitrust Cases and Procedural Safeguards: Is Regulation 17 Falling into Disuse?’ (1986) 11 EL Rev 268; Van Bael ‘The Antitrust Settlement Practice of the EC Commission’, (1986) 23 CML Rev 61; Stevens ‘The “Comfort Letter”: Old Problems, New Developments', (1994) 2 ECLR 81.

15. The focus is principally on complaints under Regulation 17 about alleged infringements of arts 85 and 86. It does not deal directly with applications by third parties under the Merger Regulation (Article 18(4) of Regulation 4064/89 OJ 1989 L395/1; corrected version: OJ 1990 L257/1), complaints under measures applying Articles 85 and 86 to special sectors (eg art 10 of Regulation 1017/68 on the application of arts 85 and 86 to transport by road, rail and inland waterway, OJ Sp Ed 1968, p302), or complaints concerning alleged breaches of art 90 EC.

16. Above, n 6 (1974) ECR 51 at 62.

17. According to AG Tesauro in Case C-231/89 R v Secretary of State for Transport ex parte Factortame (No 2) (1990) ECR 1-2433 at 2454, art 5 isthe ‘key’ to the interpretation of the system of protection and enforcement of Community rights in the national courts.

18. Case 48/72 (1973) ECR 77.

19. Notice, para 30.

20. Case 63/75 Fonderies Roubaix-Wattrelos v Fonderies Roux (1976) ECR 111 at 118.

21. The application of the sanction of nullity raises the question of severance of offending terms: see generally, Bellamy and Child Common Market Law of Competition (4th edn, London, Sweet and Maxwell, p 652 ff). Article 85(2) may provide the remedy, but it does not set the procedural conditions; forum shopping could be possible, since the Brussels Convention allows the plaintiff to choose in some situations where to litigate. See in favour of some harmonisation of procedural conditions, Whish ‘The Enforcement of EC Competition Law in the Domestic Courts by Member States’, in Lonbay (ed), Frontiers of Competition Law (Wiley Chancery, London, 1994) p 97 at p 103.

22. For an analysis of Community law rights and duties see Coppe ‘Rights, Duties and the End of Marshall’, (1994) 57 MLR 859.

23. See generally Snyder ‘The Effectiveness of European Community Law: Institutions, Processes, Tools and Techniques’, (1993) 56 MLR 19.

24. Case 811/79 Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v Ariete SPA (1980) ECR 2545.

25. Case 158/80 Rewe v Hauptzollamt Kiel (1981) ECR 1805 at 1838.

26. Private enforcement of UK competition law is not generally possible; there are minor exceptions: s 35(2) of the Restrictive Trade Practices Act 1976 (failure to furnish particulars of an agreement to the DGFT, s 25(2) of the Resale Prices Act 1976 (action for breach of statutory duty under the Act).

27. Case 45/76 Comet v Produktschap (1976) ECR 2043.

28. Above, n 17.

29. Case C-177/88 (1990) ECR 1-3941.

30. Case 271/91 Marshall v Southampton and South West Hampshire AHA (1993) 3 CMLR 293; (1993) ECR 1–4367.

31. See below Section IV.

32. Case C-234/89 Delimitis v Henniger Bräu (1991) ECR 1–935.

33. OJ 1983 L173/5.

34. Requiring Community officials and members of Community institutions not to disclose information covered by the obligation of professional secrecy.

35. [1991) ECR 1–935 at 994.

36. Case C-2/88 Zwartveld (1990) ECR 1–3365.

37. Case T-64/89 Automec v Commission (Automec No 1) (1990) ECR II-367; Case T-3/90 Vereniging Prodifarma v Commission (1991) ECR II-1; Case T-24/90 Automec Sri v Commission (Automec No 2) and Case T-28/90 Asia Motor France SA v Commission (Asia Motor No 1) (1992) 5 CMLR 431; (1992) ECR II-2223; Case T-16/91 Rendo v Commission (1992) ECR II-2417; Case T-36/92 SFEI v Commission (1992) ECR II-2479 (now annulled by the Court of Justice Case C-39/93P SFEI v Commission ((1994) ECR I-2681); Case T-7/92 Asia Motor France SA v Commission (Asia Motor No 2) (1993) ECR II-669; Case T-37/92 BEUC and NCC v Commission (1994) ECR II-285.

38. Case 26/76 Metro-SB-Grobmärkte GmbH & Co KG v Commission (1977) ECR 1875; Case 125/78 GEMA v Commission (1979) ECR 3173; Case 210/83 Demo-Studio Schmidt v Commission (1983) ECR 3045; Case 293/83 CICCE v Commission (1985) ECR 1105; Cases 142 & 156/84 BAT and Reynolds v Commission above, n 10.

39. Above, n 37.

40. [1992) 5 CMLR 431 at 479.

41. EC Commission, XIIIth Report on Competition Policy (1983), para 217.

42. Above, n 6.

43. See generally Van der Heuvel ‘Civil Law Consequences of Violations of the Antitrust Provisions of the Rome Treaty’, (1963) AJCL 172; Temple Lang, ‘EEC Antitrust Law-Compliance and Enforcement’, (1981) 18 CML Rev 335.

44. XIIIth Report, para 217.

45. The last point is perhaps an inadvertent early echo of the subsidiarity principle; see now Article A of the Treaty on European Union: ‘This Treaty marks a new stage in the process of creating an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe, in which decisions are taken as closely as possible to the citizen’.

46. XVth Report on Competition Policy (1985), paras 38–39; XVIth Report on Competition Policy (1986), para 41; XVIIth Report on Competition Policy (1987), para 55; XXIst Report on Competition Policy (1991), para 69.

47. Ehlermann, op cit above, n 12 at 280.

48. Resolution on the XXIst Competition Report of the EC Commission, OJ 1993 C21.

49. Report to the EEC Commission by the High Level Group on the Operation of the Internal Market The Internal Market after 1992: Meeting the Challenge.

50. Ibid, Recommendation 19, pp 12–13.

51. Ibid, Recommendation 26, p 14.

52. ‘Draft Antitrust Enforcement (National Courts) Guidelines’ [1992) 4 CMLR 524.

53. Notice on cooperation, above, n 1.

54. XXIInd Report on Competition Policy (1992), para 299.

55. This echoes the comment in the XIIIth Report, above, n 44. The link between decentralization and subsidiarity has been drawn explicitly by Alford, ‘Subsidiarity and Competition: Decentralized Enforcement of EU Competition Laws’ (1994) 27 Cornell IL LJ 271.

56. On the effect of explanatory notes in the context of the Customs Union, see Case 149/73 Otto Witt KG v Hauptzollamt Hamburg-Ericus (1973) ECR 1587 at 1593: notes are ‘an important factor as regards interpretation in all cases where the provisions of the tariff provoke uncertainty .’.

57. Notice, para 16.

58. See below, Section V, 1.

59. Editorial, (1993) 30 CML Rev 681.

60. House of Lords Select Committee on the European Community: Enforcement of Community Competition Rules, Session 1993–94, 1st Report (hereinafter ‘Select Committee’).

61. See eg Riley ‘More Radicalism, Please: The Notice on Cooperation between National Courts and the Commission in Applying Articles 85 and 86 of the EEC Treaty’, (1993) 3 ECLR 91; Goh ‘Enforcing EC Competition Law in Member States', (1993) 3 ECLR 114; Van Bael ‘The Role of the National Courts', (1994) 1 ECLR 3; Whish ‘The Enforcement of EC Competition Law in the Domestic Courts of Member States', (1994) 2 ECLR 60; Hutchings and Levitt ‘Concurrent Jurisdiction’, (1994) 3 ECLR 119.

62. See Select Committee, above, n 60, ‘Evidence from the Department of Trade and Industry’ p 138.

63. Ibid, Memorandum submitted by Ehlermann, Director-General for Competition, Evidence, p 113.

64. Budgett v British Sugar Corporation (unreported; noted by Korah, (1979) 4 EL Rev 417); ECS v AKZO (referred to in OJ 1983 L25/13); Cutsforth v Mansfield Inns (1986) 1 WLR 558; Holleran v Thwaites plc (1989) 2 CMLR 917.

65. Some cases have, however, been settled with sizeable awards agreed between the parties; eg An Board Bainne Cooperative Ltd v Milk Marketing Board (1984) 1 CMLR 519.

66. On the older case law see Picañol ‘Remedies in National Law for Breach of Articles 85 and 86 of the EEC Treaty: A Review’, Legal Issues of European Integration (1983/2), 1; more recent evidence can be found in the works cited at n 7.

67. Notice, para 16.

68. [1992) 4 CMLR 524, para 12; see Shaw ‘Competition Complainants: A Comprehensive System of Remedies’, (1993) 18 EL Rev 427 at 441.

69. Above, n 6.

70. See, for example, Temple Lang, op cit above n 43; Whish, op cit above, n 61.

71. Eg Banks ‘National Enforcement of Community Rights-A Boost for Damocles’, (1984) 21 CML Rev 669; Davidson ‘Actions for Damages in the English Courts for Breach of EEC Competition Law’, (1985) 34 ICLQ 178; Meade ‘Decentralisation in the Implementation of EEC Competition Law-A Challenge for the Lawyers’, (1986) 37 NILQ 101 at 113; Hoskins ‘Garden Cottage Revisited: The Availability of Damages in the National Courts for Breaches of the EEC Competition Rules’, (1992) 6 ECLR 257.

72. [1984) AC 130.

73. Bourgoin SA v Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food (1986) 1 CMLR 267; Merson v Rover Group unreported, judgment of May 22 1992.

74. [1984) AC 130 at 144.

75. [1984) AC 130 at 151.

76. Bellamy and Child Common Marker Law of Competition (Sweet and Maxwell, London, 1987, 3rd edn) p 459.

77. Above text accompanying n 23 ff.

78. Jacobs ‘Damages for Breach of Article 86 EEC’, (1983) 8 EL Rev 353 at 356 ibid ‘Civil Enforcement of EEC Antitrust Law’, (1984) 82 Michigan Law Review 1364 p 1368 ff. See also Friend and Shaw ‘Damages for Abuse of Dominant Position’, (1984) 100 LQR 188.

79. Case 45/76 above, n 27.

80. (1983) 8 EL Rev 353 at 356.

81. Shaw, in Behrens op cit above, n 7 at p 74 ff.

82. Above, n 29. See Whish, op cit above n 21 at p 106.

83. Eg Bridge ‘Procedural Aspects of the Enforcement of European Community Law through the Legal Systems of Member States’, (1984) 9 EL Rev 28; Green and Barav ‘Damages in the National Courts for Breach of Community Law’, (1986) 6 YEL 55; Oliver ‘Enforcing Community Rights in the English Courts’, (1987) 50 MLR 881; Steiner ‘How to Make the Aaction Suit the Case: Domestic Remedies for Breach of EEC Law’, (1987) 12 EL Rev 102; Ward ‘Government Liability in the United Kingdom for Breach of Individual Rights in European Community Law’, (1990) 19 Anglo-Am L Rev 1; Hoskins, op cit above, n 71.

84. See Green ‘The Treaty of Rome, National Courts, and English Common Law, The Enforcement of European Competition Law after Milk Marketing Board’, RabelsZ 48 (1984) 509; Shaw, op cit above n 7, at p 101. Whish has also supported the same approach: op cit above n 61 at 65.

85. Kerse EC Antitrust Procedure (Sweet and Maxwell, London, 3rd edn, 1994) p 369.

86. Cases C-6 & 9/90 Francovich et al v Italian State (1991) ECR I-5357.

81. See generally Craig ‘Fiancovich, Remedies and the Scope of Damages Liability’, (1993) 109 LQR 595; Steiner, ‘From Direct Effect to Francovich Shifting Means of Enforcement of Community Law’, (1993) 18 EL Rev 3; Ross ‘Beyond Francovich’, (1993) 56 MLR 55; Caranta ‘Governmental Liability after Francovich’, (1993) CLJ 272; Lewis and Moore ‘Duties, Directives and Damages in European Community Law’, (1993) PL 151.

88. [1991) ECR I-5357 at 5414.

89. See Whish, op cit above n 61 at 64; Opinion of AG Van Gerven in Case C-238/92 Banks & Co Ltd v British Coal Corporation (1994) ECR I-1209 at 1244 (para 37) restating the position taken by the Commission.

90. The point is perhaps clearer when one bears in mind also the additional interpretative obligation imposed on national courts by virtue of Article 5 EC; national courts are under a duty, wherever possible, to interpret national law in the light of Community law (Case C-106/89 Marleasing SA v La Comercial Internacional de Alimentacion SA (1990) ECR I-4135); see generally, De Bruca ‘Giving Effect to European Community Directives’, (1992) 55 MLR 215. A gradual reduction in the emphasis placed upon direct effect alone as the arbiter of the effectiveness of Community law was foreseen by Pescatore in his seminal article ‘The Doctrine of “Direct Effect”: An Infant Disease of Community Law’, (1983) 8 EL Rev 155.

91. This is the question raised by Case C-46/93 Brasserie de Pêcheur (pending) in respect of art 30 EC and by Case C-221/89 R v Secretary of State for Transport, exp Factortame (Factortame No 3) (pending) in respect of art 52.

92. See Bellamy and Child, op cit above, n 21 at p 664. See on this Bell ‘Enforcing Community Law Rights before National Courts-Some Developments’, Legal Issues of European Integration 1994/1 p iii at pp 123–4.

93. Case 13/77 INNO v ATAB (1977) ECR 2115; Case 311/85 Vereniging van Vlaamse Reisbureaus v Sociale Dienst (1987) ECR 3801.

94. Above, n 89.

95. [1994) ECR I-1209 at 1245 (para 38).

96. Directives are only vertically directly effective in relations between the State and private parties: Case 152/84 Marshall v Southampton and SW Hants AHA (Marshall No 1) [1986) ECR 723; Case C-188/89 Foster v British Gas plc (1990) ECR 1–3326.

97. [1994) ECR I-1209 at 1249 (para 43).

98. Ibid. Emphasis in the original. It should be noted, however, that as AG Van Gerven appears to link his argument to the direct effect of arts 85 and 86, it is not clear whether he sees the Francovich reasoning as providing a separate avenue of redress, as argued here.

99. Case 152/84 Marshall (No 1) above, n 96.

100. Case C-91/92 Faccini Dori v Recreb Srl, [1994) ECR 1–3325. The Court of Justice addressed a number of questions to the member atates and the Commission, specifically on the issue of the horizontal direct effect of Directives in order to identify whether an extension of the Marshall doctrine would meet with approval. Generally speaking, with the exception of those coming from the Commission and Greece, the responses were negative. Compare however AG Lenz's Opinion (February 9 1994) and the Opinion of AG Jacobs in Case C-316/93 Vaneetveld v SA Le Foyer (1994) ECR I-763 as well as the approach of Coppel, op cit above n 22.

101. Case 34/73 Variola v Italian Finance Administration (1973) ECR 981.

102. Case 26/62 Van Gend en Loos v Nederlandse Administratie der Belastingen (1963) ECR 1 at 12; emphasis added.

103. Three conditions must be satisfied the result prescribed by the provision must involve the conferring of rights on individuals; the content of the rights must be capable of definition on the basis of the Directive; and there must be a causal link between the violation of the Treaty obligation by the member state and the loss suffered by the individual. The Court is currently considering these conditions in more detail in Cases C-46 & 48/93 above n 91.

104. Above, n 49, Recommendation 26, p 14. See also the uniform approach advocated by AG Van Gerven in Banks (1994) ECR I-1209 at 1251 (para 46).

105. Above, n 100.

106. Council Directive 85/577 concerning protection of the consumer in respect of contracts negotiated away from business premises, OJ 1985 L372/31.

107. Judgment, para 29. In Banks AG Van Gerven suggested using the Court's own case law on the Community's non-contractual (ie tortious) liability under art 215 as the basis for a uniform set of rules on the liability of Community subjects for loss caused by infringements of Community law: [1994) ECR I-1209 at 1251 ff.

108. Case C-238/92 Banks &Co Ltd v British Coal Corporation above at n 89.

109. [1994) ECR 1209 at 1275 (para 17). The Court's reasoning could be criticised as ignoring a fundamental parallelism between the FC and ECSC Treaties.

110. Above text accompanying n 23.

111. Above Section IV. See generally, Riley, op cit above n 61 at p 92 ff, Whish, op cit above n 61 at pp 61–2 and AG Edward in Case T-24/90 Automec (No 2) [1992) 5 CMLR 431 at p 458 ff.

112. Above, n 49.

113. Notice, para 44.

114. [1992) 5 CMLR 431 at 458.

115. Case 102/81 Nordsee v Reederei Mod (1982) ECR 1095.

116. But see Jolowicz ‘Comparative Law and the Reform of Civil Procedure’, (1988) 8 LS 1 who warns against simplifying contrasts between the different national civil procedure systems.

117. Rio Tinto Zinc Corporation v Westinghouse Electric Corporation (1978) AC 547.

118. This decision was followed and applied by Graham J in British Leyland Motor Corporation Ltd v Wyatt Interpart Company Ltd (1979) FSR 39; (1979) FSR 583.

119. Case 374/87 Orkem v Commission (1989) ECR 3283. The specific restriction in Community law allows an undertaking to refuse to answer questions where to answer would quire it to admit an infringement.

120. Case C-60/92 judgment of 10.11.93, noted by Kerse (1994) 31 CML Rev 1375.

121. Shearson Lehman Hutton Inc v Maclaine Watson & Co Ltd (1989) 2 Lloyd's Rep. 570; (1989) 3 CMLR 429.

122. Cases 29, 301/83 Compagnie Royale Asturienne de Mines and Rheinzink v Commission (1984) ECR 1679.

123. Masterfoods Ltd v HB Ice Cream Ltd (1993) ILRM 400, (1992) 3 CMLR 830.

124. Valor International Ltd v Application des Gaz SA (1978) 3 CMLR 87 at 99; quoted with approval by Vivian Price QC in Levi Strauss & Co v Tacchella (Northern Europe) Ltd, unreported, 29.1.82.

125. Shaw, in Behrens, op cit above n 7 at p 111 ff.

126. British Leyland Motor Corporation Ltd v TI Silencers Ltd (1980) 1 CMLR 598.

127. Per Templeman LJ in Lansing Bagnall Ltd v Buccaneer Lift Parts Ltd (1984) 1 CMLR 224.

128. Above, n 30.

129. See Holleran v Thwaites plc and Cutsforth v Mansfield Inns above, n 64. Compare the approach taken by the House of Lords in Factortame, after obtaining guidance from the Court of Justice (above, n 17): R v Secretary of State for Transport, ex p Factortame Ltd(No 2) (1990) 3 WLR 818. For a comment, see Zuckennann, ‘Interlocutory Injunctions on the Merits’, (1991) 107 LQR 196.

130. American Cyanamid Co v Ethicon Ltd (1975) AC 396.

131. Chelmkarm Motors v Esso Petroleum (1979) 1 CMLR 73.

132. These include Garden Cottage Foods above, n 72,75 and, of the more recent cases, Argyll Group v Distillers (1986) 1 CMLR 764; Plessey v GEC (1990) ECC 384; Megaphone International Ltd v British Telecom plc The Independent 1.3.89; Macarthy plc v Unichem Ltd, unreported, 27.7.1989.

133. Notice, para 16.

134. See, for a review of the criticisms, Burrows Remedies for Torts and Breach of Contract (Butterworths, London, 2nd edn, 1994) p 430 ff.

135. R v Secretary of State for Employment, exp Equal Opportunities Commission (1994) IRLR 176; (1994) 2 WLR 409.

136. Eg Deakin ‘Part Time Employment, Qualifying Thresholds and Economic Justification’, (1994) 23 ILJ 151; Moore ‘Sex Discrimination and Judicial Review’, (1994) 19 EL Rev 425.

137. Jacobs, op cit above n 78 at p 1371 suggests that there is an imperfect analogy between enforcing Community rights against member states and enforcing arts 85 and 86 against undertakings.

138. See Behrens and Korb-Schikaneder ‘Europäisches Wettbewerbsrecht ver französischen Gerichten’. (1984) 48 RabelsZ 457.

139. See, most famously, the Spanish fishing boat case R v Secretary of State for Transport, ex p Factortame above n 129 (award of interim relief against the Crown).

140. See generally Shaw, in Behrens, op cit above, n 7 at p 77 ff; Maher, in Behrens, Part Two, op cit above, n 7.

141. Charny ‘Non-Legal Sanctions in Commercial Relationships’, (1990) 104 Harv LR 373; Macaulay ‘Non-Contractual Relations in Business: a Preliminary Study’, (1963) Am Soc Rev 55; Harris and Veljanovski ‘Remedies under Contract Llaw’, (1983) 5 Law and Policy Quarterly 97; Beale and Dugdale, ‘Contracts between Businessmen: Planning and the Use of Contractual Remedies’, (1975) BJLS 45.

142. (1990) 11 Company Lawyer 134 at 137.

143. Jacobs, op cit above n 78 at p 1368.

144. Above, n 121.

145. See generally Van Bael and Bellis Competition Law of the European Community (3rd edn, CCH Europe, Bicester, 1994), pp 559–566.

146. Above, n 32.

147. Case 48/72 Brasserie de Haecht (No 2) above, n 18; Case 99/79 Lancome v Eros (1980) ECR 2511.

148. [1991) ECR I-935 at 993.

149. Article 4(2) of Regulation 17: single state agreements.

150. [1991) ECR I-935 at 993.

151. Notice, paras 20–32.

152. Notice, para 32.

153. A rather different point concerns the effect of decisions taken by the Commission under arts 65 and 66 ECSC. Since the Court held in Banks (above n 89) that the Commission has exclusive jurisdiction to take decisions in application of these articles, it follows that such decisions, once taken, are binding on the national court (judgment, para 23). The Notice does not apply to the ECSC Treaty (para 45).

154. Bellamy and Child, op cit above, n 21 at p 651.

155. Above, n 73.

156. Case 226/84 British Leyland v Commission (1986) ECR 3263.

157. Notice, para 25.

158. Cases 253/78 etc Procureur de la République v Giry und Guerlain (1980) ECR 2327.

159. See Galinsky ‘The Resolution of conflicts between UK and community Competition Law’, [1994) 1 ECLR 16 at 19.

160. Notice, para 12. Case 14/68 Walt Wilhelm v Bundeskartellamt (1969) ECR 3.

161. Case 99/79 Lancôme v Etos (1980) ECR 2511.

162. Notice, para 25.

163. Editorial, above n 59 at p 683.

164. [1993) 2 CMLR 293.

165. Notice, paras 28–30.

166. Stevens, op cit above n 14 at p 86.

167. Kon, ‘Article 85, para 3: A Case for Application by National Courts’, (1982) 19 CML Rev 541.

168. See below Section VI, 3.

169. Forrester and Norrall, op cit above n 11; Korah ‘EEC Competition Policy-Legal Form or Economic Efficiency’, [1986) CLP 85; Whish and Sufrin ‘Article 85 and the Rule of Reason’, (1987) 7 YEL 1.

170. Meade, op cit above n 71 at p 122; see also Van Bael, op cit above n 61 at p 6.

171. Delimitis above n 32 at para 55 (1991) ECR I-935 at p 994.

172. Hutchings and Levitt, op cit above n 61 at p 125. See also the concerns of Gerber ‘The Transformation of Community Competition Law’ (1994) 35 Harv IL LR 97 at 141–143.

173. Notice, paras 33–44. See generally Bellamy and Child, op cit, above n 21 at p 647 ff.

174. Notice, para 41. This is not explained by the Commission.

175. See also Case C-67/91 Dirección General de Defensa de la Competencia v AEBP (1992) ECR I-4785 on the strict limitations placed on the use of information given to the Commission in the context of Regulation 17 investigations.

176. Cf Cumming ‘Automec and Asia France v Commission’, [1994) 1 ECLR 32 at 40 discussing Order 40 r 1 of the Rules of the Supreme Court on the Court's power to appoint experts upon questions of fact or opinion.

177. Whish, op cit above n 61 at p 66, Van Bael, op cit above n 61 at p 6. See also the evidence submitted to the Select Committee above n 60 esp. Department of Trade and Industry at p 138, and the Joint Working Party on Competition Law pp 62–65.

178. Commission Regulation 99/63 on the hearings provided for in art 19(1) and (2) of Regulation 17: OJ Sp Ed 1963 No 2268/63, p 47.

179. Cf art 11(3) of Regulation 1017/68 on the implementation of arts 85 and 86 in the context of rail, road and inland waterway transport (the equivalent of Regulation 17) JO 1968 L175/1, as well as the related Regulations on maritime and air transport, which specifically provide that the Commission must issue a decision when it rejects a complaint as unfounded.

180. See generally Kerse, op cit above, n 85 at p 79 ff.

181. Case 210/81 Demo-Studio-Schmidt above n 38 at para 19.

182. Above, Section I.

183. Drijber, (1993) 30 CML Rev 1237 at 1247.

184. See generally Forster ‘Taking on the Commission: Procedural Possibilities for an Applicant Following Submission of a Complaint’ [1993) 6 ECLR 256.

185. Above n 37. See generally Spinks, (1991) 28 CML Rev 453.

186. Case 60/81 IBM v Commission (1981) ECR 2639.

187. Spinks, op cit above n 185 at p 460.

188. Above, n 37.

189. This was not explicity recognised by the Court, but appears to follow from the judgment. Friend (‘Rights of Complainants in EC Competition Proceedings’) (1994) 110 LQR 209 at 211) and Vesterdorp, (‘complaints Concerning Infringements of Competition Law within the Context of European Community Law’) (1994) CML Rev 77 at 94) regret the lack of clarity in the Court's judgment in this respect. Kerse, op cit above n 85 notes that the Court has yet to rule definitively on this issue.

190. EC Commission, XVth Report on Competition Policy, para 1.

191. Case T-28/90 Asia Motor No 1) above, n 37.

192. Case C-39/93P SFEI et al v Commission judgment of June 16 1994, annulling Case T-36/92 SFEI et al v Commission (1992) ECR II-2479, rejecting the applicants' challenge to the Commission decision to reject their complaint about alleged infringements of arts 85, 86 and 92 (state aids) in the French postal sector.

193. Case T-7/92 Asia Motor (No 2); Case T-37/92 BEUC and NCC v Commission above, n 37. See now also Case T-114/92 Bureau European des médias de l'industrie musicale v Commission, judgment of 24 January 1995; and Case T-5/93 Tremblay et al v Commission, judgment of 24 January 1995, and Case T-74/92 Ladbroke Racing (Deutschland) GmbH v Commission, judgment of 24 January 1995.

194. Case 26/76 Metro above n 38; Case T-16/91 Rendo above, n 37.

195. See the works cited above, n 141.

196. Sharpe ‘British Competition Policy in Perspective’, (1985) 1 Oxford Review of Economic Policy 80 at 93.

197. See Jacobs ‘Europe after 1992: The Legal Challenge’, [1992) University of Chicago Legal Forum 1 at pp 4–7, who is gradually lifting his earlier hostility to decentralized enforcement.

198. EC Commission, XXIIIrd Report on Competition Policy, 1993, para 208.

199. Commission Regulation 3932/92 OJ 1992 L388/7.

200. Para 208.

201. Ibid.

202. The suggestion was trawled by Ehlennann in 1992: Ehlermann, op cit above, n 12 at p 280; it has also been suggested by Riley, op cit above n 61 at pp 994–96, Hutchings and Levitt, op cit above n 61 at p 119.

203. Paras 190–191.

204. Above Section V, 3, a.

205. Confederation of British Industry ‘Refocussing the Competition Rules, Making the Single Market Work’ 1994, London, p 8. See also Van Bael, op cit above n 61 at pp 6–7.

206. XXIIIrd Report, para 588; see Noirfalisse ‘Belgium and Luxembourg’ in Behrens, Part Two, op cit above n 7 at pp 56–58.

207. Ibid. para 589.

208. Irish Centre for European Law ‘The Competition Act: One Year On’ (Dublin, 1992); see also Maher, ‘Ireland’, in Behrens, Part Two, op cit above n 7 at pp 255–259.

209. Macconi and Colvin ‘Competition Law in Italy. Italy Tries Antitrust-Again!’, (1989) 13 World Competition 21.

210. XXIIIrd Report, para 590, see also Sevinga ‘The Netherlands’, in Behrens, Part Two, op cit above n 7 at pp 147–148.

211. ‘Review of Restrictive Practices Policy’(Cm 331, 1988); ‘Opening Markets: New Policy on Restrictive Trade Practices’ (Cm 727, 1989); ‘The Abuse of Market Power. A Consultative Document on Possible Legislative Options’ (Cm 2100, November 1992).

212. Case 56/65 Société Technique Miniere v Maschinenbau Ulm (1966) ECR 235 at 249.

213. See Case 73/74 Groupements des Fabricants de Papiers Peints de Belgique v Commission (1975) ECR 1491, one of the few cases in which the Court of Justice has overturned a finding of an effect on interstate trade by the Commission.

214. Above, n 121.

215. [1989) 3 CMLR 429 at 451.

216. Competition Law (Butterworths, London, 2nd edn, 1989) pp 244–5.

217. Whish Competition Law (Butterworths, London, 1993) p 215.

218. Whish, op cit above n 21 at p 109; Riley, op cit n 61 at p 94.

219. Council Directive 89/665 OJ 1989 L395/33. See generally Arrowsmith (ed) Remedies for Enforcing the Public Procurement Rules (Earlsgate Press, Winteringham, 1993); Weiss Public Procurement in European Community Law (Athlone Press, London, 1993) p 103 ff.

220. The Public Supply Contracts Regulations 1991, SI 1991/2679, r 26: The Public Works Contracts Regulations 1991, SI 1991/2680.