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Public order as a protectable interest
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 26 March 2021
Abstract
Public order as a protectable interest is an important criterion for determining a consistent and rational scope of crimes against public order. From the specific perspective of everyday life, Feinberg's theory of minimum welfare interests neglects those kinds of interests that relate to a smooth or harmonious life. Socio-legal perspectives make it clear that safety interests, which directly concern basic living (bodily existence), do not include various kinds of order interests – and thus life order interests in convenience, comfort and peace, distinguishable from safety interests that are protected by English public order laws, can be construed as the public order interest. By critically adopting Feinberg's individualistic approach to analysing public interests in three types of case, the test of being public is further clarified. Typical categories of public order are socially and normatively identified before concluding with a discussion of the effects the identification made by the paper might make to the scope and nature of public order law and offences.
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- Copyright © The Author(s), 2021. Published by Cambridge University Press
Footnotes
†
I would like to thank Professor Lindsay Farmer, Professor James Chalmers, Professor Fiona Leverick and Dr Lewis Kennedy for their help during the writing and revision of this paper. This paper is supported by Program for Young Innovative Research Team in China University of Political Science and Law.
References
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