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The reactive model of disaster regulation in international law and its shortcomings

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  23 August 2021

Rhys Carvosso Open the ORCID record for Rhys Carvosso [Opens in a new window]
Rhys Carvosso*
Affiliation:
Supreme Court of New South Wales, 184 Phillip Street, Sydney, NSW2000Australia Email: rhys.carvosso@gmail.com
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Abstract

This article presents a theoretical framework by which to understand how disasters are reconciled with a state’s existing obligations under international law. This ‘reactive’ model of disaster regulation hinges on two regulatory techniques, ‘disapplication’ and ‘exculpation’, both of which involve a deviation from the ordinary application of a norm owing to the occurrence of a disaster or to measures adopted by a state in relation to it. It proceeds to outline the various doctrines and mechanisms across different subfields of international law, including international human rights law, investment law and trade law, which may operationalize these techniques in disaster situations. Finally, it argues that the applicability of certain disapplication and exculpation mechanisms to disasters relies on an anachronistic view of such disasters as rare and episodic occurrences beyond human control. This puts these mechanisms at odds with the central objectives of international disaster law and their underlying sociological and scientific premises, which emphasize the need for an ‘adaptive’ model of comprehensive and prevention-oriented disaster regulation. Accordingly, this analysis exposes the conceptual limitations of the reactive model for disaster regulation and explains and validates the inclination toward an adaptive model within international disaster law. It also indicates how mechanisms within the reactive model could be recalibrated to better regulate disasters.

Keywords

derogationdisastersinternational disaster lawinternational human rights lawlaw of treaties
Type
ORIGINAL ARTICLE
Information
Leiden Journal of International Law , Volume 34 , Issue 4 , December 2021 , pp. 957 - 976
Copyright
© The Author(s), 2021. Published by Cambridge University Press

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Footnotes

*

This article builds on ideas first presented in an essay that won the IFRC International and Comparative Disaster Law Essay Contest in 2020. I am grateful to the anonymous peer reviewers for their comments. All errors are my own.

References

1 See, e.g., M. Aronsson-Storrier and K. Da Costa, ‘Regulating disasters? The role of international law in disaster prevention and management’, (2017) 26 Disaster Prevention and Management 502, at 502; C. Clement, ‘International Disaster Response Laws, Rules, and Principles: A Pragmatic Approach to Strengthening International Disaster Response Mechanisms’, in D. Caron, M. Kelly and A. Telesetsky (eds.), The International Law of Disaster Relief (2014), 67, at 69.

2 Cited in Clement, ibid., at 69.

3 Aronsson-Storrier and Da Costa, supra note 1, at 502.

4 J. Viñuales, ‘Sources of International Investment Law: Conceptual Foundations of Unruly Practices’, in S. Besson and J. d’Aspremont (eds.), The Oxford Handbook on the Sources of International Law (2017), 1069, at 1069–70. See also J. Viñuales, ‘Cartographies imaginaires: Observations sur la portée juridique du concept de “régime special” en droit international’, (2013) 140 Journal du droit international (Clunet) 405.

5 See International Law Commission, Report of the Study Group of the International Law Commission on the Fragmentation of International Law, UN Doc. A/CN.4/L.682 (13 April 2006), para. 193 (‘ILC Fragmentation Study’): ‘[T]he term “self-contained regime” is a misnomer. No legal regime is isolated from general international law. It is doubtful whether such isolation is even possible …’.

6 Ibid., (emphasis in original).

7 D. Farber, ‘International Law and the Disaster Cycle’, in Caron, Kelly and Telesetsky, supra note 1, at 7.

8 United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction, Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015–2030, UN Doc. A/CONF.224/CRP.1 (18 March 2015), adopted in UNGA Res. 69/283, UN Doc. A/RES/69/283 (23 June 2015) (‘Sendai Framework’).

9 International Law Commission, Draft Articles on the Protection of Persons in the Event of Disasters, UN Doc. A/71/10 (2016), Art. 3(a) (‘ILC Draft Articles’).

10 Report of the Sixty-Eighth Session of the International Law Commission, Supplement No. 10 to UN Doc. A/71/10 (2016), para. 46. See also G. Bartolini, ‘A universal treaty for disasters? Remarks on the International Law Commission’s Draft Articles on the Protection of Persons in the Event of Disasters’, (2017) 99 International Review of the Red Cross 1103.

11 International Federation of the Red Cross, World Disasters Report (2000), 145. For a theoretical account of certain law-making techniques employed to transpose norms into IDL see S. Sivakumaran, ‘Techniques in International Law-Making: Extrapolation, Analogy, Form and the Emergence of an International Law of Disaster Relief’, (2018) 28 EJIL 1097.

12 See, e.g., F. Zorzi Giustiniani et al. (eds.), Routledge Handbook of Human Rights and Disasters (2018); K. Cedervall Lauta, ‘Human Rights and Natural Disasters’, in S. Breau and K. Samuel (eds.), Research Handbook on Disasters and International Law (2016), 91; D. Cubie and M. Hesselman, ‘Accountability for the Human Rights Implications of Natural Disasters’, (2015) 33 Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights 9.

13 See, e.g., D. Cubie, ‘Clarifying the “Acquis Humanitaire”: A Transnational Legal Perspective on the Internalization of Humanitarian Norms’, in Caron, Kelly and Telesetsky, supra note 1, at 338; C. Gribbin and I. Maiolo, ‘Legal Framework Applicable to Humanitarian Actors Responding to Disasters in Weak and Fragile States’, in ibid., at 139; C. Allan and T. O’Donnell, ‘A Call to Alms?: Natural Disasters, R2P, Duties of Cooperation and Unchartered Consequences’, (2012) 17 Journal of Conflict and Security Law 337.

14 See, e.g, G. Adinolfi, ‘Strengthening Resilience to Disasters through International Trade Law: The Role of WTO Agreements on Trade in Goods’, (2021) 2 Yearbook of International Disaster Law 1; G. Adinolfi, Natural Disasters and Trade Research: Study II – A legal mapping, 2019, available at www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/devel_e/study2_sympnaturaldisaster29112019_e.pdf.

15 For literature on the relationship between international environmental law and IDL see, e.g., J. Peel and D. Fisher (eds.), The Role of International Environmental Law in Disaster Risk Reduction (2016).

16 ILC Draft Articles, supra note 9, Commentary to Art. 5, para. 7.

17 Sendai Framework, supra note 8, para. 19(c).

18 Aronsson-Storrier and da Costa, supra note 1, at 502.

19 See, e.g., discussion of particular interfaces in E. Sommario, ‘Derogation from Human Rights Treaties in Situations of Natural or Man-Made Disasters’, in A. de Guttry, M. Gestri and G. Venturini (eds.), International Disaster Response Law (2012), 323 (on derogation under IHRL); L. Choukroune, ‘Disasters and international trade and investment law – the state’s regulatory autonomy between risk protection and exception justification’, in Breau and Samuel, supra note 12, at 204 (touching on the disapplication of investment protection norms in disaster scenarios).

20 Aronsson-Storrier and da Costa, supra note 1, at 502.

21 This term was adopted by the ILC in its Fragmentation Study, supra note 5, para. 492 to refer to sets of interlinked treaties with some degree of independent conceptual and operational existence (e.g., WTO law and human rights law), but without assigning the legal status of ‘self-contained regime’. See ibid., paras. 123–37.

22 ILC Draft Articles, supra note 9, Art. 3(a).

23 J. Peel and D. Fisher, ‘International Law at the Intersection of Environmental Protection and Disaster Risk Reduction’, in Peel and Fisher, supra note 15, 1, at 15.

24 ILC Draft Articles, supra note 9, Art. 18(2).

25 Ibid., Commentary on Art. 3(a), para. 2: ‘Subparagraph (a) defines the term “disaster” solely for the purposes of the draft articles. The definition has been delimited so as to properly capture the scope of the draft articles, as established in draft article 1, while not, for example, inadvertently also dealing with other serious events, such as political and economic crises, which may also undermine the functioning of society, but which are outside the scope of the draft articles.’

See also UNGA Res. 71/276, UN Doc. A/RES/71/276 (2017), endorsing the UNISDR’s definition of a disaster as ‘[a] serious disruption of the functioning of a community or a society at any scale due to hazardous events interacting with conditions of exposure, vulnerability and capacity, leading to one or more of the following: human, material, economic and environmental losses and impacts’ (emphasis added).

26 See the discussion in Section 3.2.1.2., infra, of the conflation of non-precluded measures clauses and the customary defence of necessity in certain ISDS jurisprudence.

27 J. Viñuales, ‘Seven Ways of Escaping a Rule: Of Exceptions and Their Avatars in International Law’, in L. Bartels and F. Paddeu (eds.), Exceptions in International Law (2020), 65, at 65–6.

28 C. Henckels, ‘Scope Limitation or Affirmative Defence? The Purpose and Role of Investment Treaty Exception Clauses’, in ibid., at 363.

29 See, e.g., F. Paddeu, Justification and Excuse in International Law (2016).

30 Viñuales,, supra note 27, at 66.

31 Second Report on State Responsibility by Roberto Ago, Special Rapporteur, (1970) Yearbook of the ILC, Vol. II, 177 at 179, para. 11.

32 Though the value of this distinction has been questioned, it remains in vogue. See, e.g., International Law Commission, First Report on State Responsibility by Special Rapporteur James Crawford, UN Doc. A/CN.4/490 (1998), at 6–7, paras. 12–18, in which Crawford notes that while the distinction has been maligned on the basis that ‘secondary’ rules are ‘mere abstractions’, that they overlook the possibility that particular substantive rules ‘may generate their own specific secondary rules’, and that the draft articles ‘fail to apply the distinction consistently’ (para. 14), it nonetheless serves a useful function as a consensus-building placeholder by which to avoid ‘having to resolve a myriad of issues about the content and application of particular rules’ (para. 16).

33 Viñuales, supra note 27, at 80–2.

34 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature 23 May 1969, 1155 UNTS 331 (entered into force 27 January 1980), Art. 26 (‘VCLT’). It has been called the ‘basis of all treaty law’: G. Fitzmaurice, Second Report on the Law of Treaties, (1957) Yearbook of the ILC, Vol. II, 18 at 20, para. 6 (UN Doc. A/CN.4/107).

35 M. Villiger, Commentary to the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (2009), 363.

36 C. Binder, ‘Stability and Change in Times of Fragmentation: The Limits of Pacta Sunt Servanda Revisited’, (2012) 25 LJIL 909, at 910.

37 A. Tzanakopoulos and S. Lekkas, ‘Pacta sunt servanda versus Flexibility in the Suspension and Termination of Treaties’, in C. Tams and A. Tzanakopoulos (eds.), Research Handbook on the Law of Treaties (2014), 312, at 313. See also C. Tomuschat, ‘Pacta sunt servanda’, in A Fischer-Lescano et al. (eds.), Frieden in Freiheit – Peace in Liberty – Paix en liberté: Festschrift für Michael Bothe zum 70. Geburtstag (2008), 1047, at 1048.

38 Case Concerning the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary v. Slovakia), Judgment of 25 September 1997, [1997] ICJ Rep. 7, at 38, para. 46; at 62, para. 99, subject to the qualification that VCLT Arts. 60–62 reflect custom ‘in many respects’; see also Fisheries Jurisdiction Case (United Kingdom v. Iceland), Jurisdiction and Admissibility, Judgment of 2 February 1973, [1973] ICJ Rep. 3, at 18, para. 36 (acknowledging Art. 62 as custom); Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion of 21 June 1971, [1971] ICJ Rep. 16, at 47, para. 94 (acknowledging Art. 60 as custom).

39 VCLT, supra note 34, Arts. 57, 58.

40 Ibid., Arts. 54–56.

41 Ibid., Art. 42(2).

42 Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project, supra note 38, at 38, para. 46; at 62, para. 99.

43 VCLT, supra note 34, Art. 61.

44 Ibid., Art. 62.

45 Ibid., Arts. 70(1)(a), 72(1)(a).

46 Binder, supra note 36, at 912–14; M. Shaw and C. Fournet, ‘Article 62 1969 Convention: Fundamental Change of Circumstances’, in O. Corten and P. Klein (eds.), The Vienna Conventions on the Law of Treaties: A Commentary (2011), 1411, at 1418–19. See, e.g., Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project, supra note 38, at 63–4, para. 103.

47 Binder, ibid., at 913.

48 H. Lauterpacht, The Development of International Law by the International Court (1982), 86.

49 Tzanakopoulos and Lekkas, supra note 37, at 332.

50 Binder, supra note 36, at 912.

51 P. Bodeau-Livinec and J. Morgan-Foster, ‘Article 61 1969 Convention: Supervening Impossibility of Performance’, in Corten and Klein, supra note 46, 1382, at 1389. The ICJ did not decide on whether a legal regime could qualify in Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project, supra note 38, at 63–4, para. 103.

52 Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project, supra note 38, at 63, para. 102.

53 The ILC expressly proposed this hypothetical in its Commentary on then-Draft Art. 58, alongside the ‘submergence of an island’ or the ‘destruction of a dam or hydro-electric installation’: International Law Commission, Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties with Commentaries, (1966) Yearbook of the ILC, Vol. II, at 256, para. 2 (UN Doc. A/6309/Rev.1).

54 World Bank Data, ‘Haiti’, available at data.worldbank.org/country/HT.

55 Congressional Research Service, ‘Haiti’s Political and Economic Conditions’, 5 March 2020, at 5, available at fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R45034.pdf.

56 Ibid. See also European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations, ‘Haiti plagued by unprecedented drought’, available at ec.europa.eu/echo/blog/haiti-plagued-unprecedented-drought_en.

57 Fisheries Jurisdiction Case, supra note 38, at 63, para. 36.

58 Ibid., at 65, para. 43.

59 Binder, supra note 36, at 913–14.

60 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature 16 December 1966, 999 UNTS 171 (entered into force 23 March 1976) Art. 4 (‘ICCPR’); Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, opened for signature 4 November 1950, 213 UNTS 221 (entered into force 3 September 1953) Art. 15 (‘ECHR’); American Convention on Human Rights, opened for signature 22 November 1969, 1144 UNTS 123 (entered into force 18 July 1978) Art. 27 (‘ACHR’).

61 The ICJ declined to decide whether the presence of a derogation clause in a human rights treaty left room for a state to also invoke the customary plea of necessity (an exculpation mechanism) in order to avoid the consequences of breaching a norm from which derogation was possible. An answer in the affirmative would have confirmed the characterization of derogation clauses as disapplication mechanisms which operate at a different stage to customary defences: Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion of 9 July 2004, [2004] ICJ Rep. 136, at 196, para. 140.

62 G. Neuman, ‘Constrained Derogation in Positive Human Rights Regimes’, in E. Criddle (ed.), Human Rights in Emergencies (2016), 15, at 21.

63 ILC Draft Articles, supra note 9, Commentary to Art. 5, para. 7.

64 See ICCPR, supra note 60, Art. 4(1); ECHR, supra note 60, Art. 15(1); ACHR, supra note 60, Art. 27(1).

65 ICCPR, ibid., Art. 4(1).

66 Joseph, Schultz and Castan propose that ‘a severe natural disaster, such as a major flood or earthquake’ would meet the threshold of public emergency under Art. 4 ICCPR: S. Joseph, J. Schultz and M. Castan, The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: Cases, Materials and Commentary (2013), 911. See also E. Sommario, ‘Limitation and Derogation Provisions in International Human Rights Law Treaties and Their Use in Disaster Settings’, in Giustiniani et al., supra note 12, at 98, at 106; E. Sommario, ‘Derogation from Human Rights Treaties in Situations of Natural or Man-Made Disasters’, in de Guttry, Gestri and Venturini, supra note 19, at 323.

67 Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 29: States of Emergency (article 4), UN Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.11 (2001), para. 4.

68 See ICCPR, supra note 60, Art. 4; ECHR, supra note 60, Art. 15; ACHR, supra note 60, Art. 27.

69 Viñuales,, supra note 27, at 74.

70 Sommario (2018), supra note 66, at 111–12.

71 Current as of 11 May 2021.

72 This includes ten from the ECHR, 15 from the ACHR, and seven additional states not covered by regional treaties from the ICCPR. For all derogation notices, see Council of Europe, Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ETS No. 5), Notifications under article 15 of the Convention in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, available at www.coe.int/en/web/conventions/full-list/-/conventions/webContent/62111354; Organization of American States, ‘Recent Suspensions of Guarantees regarding Multilateral Treaties’, available at www.oas.org/en/sla/dil/inter_american_treaties_suspension_guarantees.asp; Depositary Notifications (CNs) by the Secretary-General (Search: Treaty Reference IV-4), available at treaties.un.org/Pages/CNs.aspx?cnTab=tab2&clang=_en.

73 N. Coghlan, ‘Dissecting Covid-19 Derogations’, Verfassungsblog, 5 May 2020, available at verfassungsblog.de/dissecting-covid-19-derogations/.

74 L. Helfer, ‘Rethinking Derogations from Human Rights Treaties’, (2021) 115 AJIL 21, at 24 (and citations therein).

75 Ibid., at 31 et seq.

76 Sommario (2012), supra note 66, at 328.

77 Ibid., at 333.

78 Joseph, Schultz and Castan, supra note 66, at 923; see also E. Hafner-Burton, L. Helfer and C. Fariss, ‘Emergency and Escape: Explaining Derogations from Human Rights Treaties’, (2011) 65 International Organization 673, at 703 (a 2001 study into historical state practice of derogation).

79 Sommario (2018), supra note 66, at 112.

80 ICCPR, supra note 60, Arts. 12(3), 21, 22(2). See also A. Spadaro, ‘COVID-19: Testing the Limits of Human Rights’, (2020) 11 European Journal of Risk Regulation 317, at 321–2.

81 Sommario (2018), supra note 66, at 112.

82 See, e.g., Canada Model BIT (2004) Art. 10(4); Comprehensive Trade and Economic Agreement between Canada and the European Union, signed 30 October 2016 (provisionally entered into force 21 September 2017), Art. 28.3(2); Agreement between Australia and the Oriental Republic of Uruguay on the Promotion and Protection of Investments, signed 5 April 2019 (not yet in force), Art. 15(2)(b) (‘Australia-Uruguay BIT’).

83 Henckels, supra note 28, at 363. Similar clauses exist to similar effect in trade agreements, but these are not considered for present purposes: Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organisation, opened for signature 15 April 1994, 1867 UNTS 3 (entered into force 1 January 1995) annex 1A (‘General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994’) Arts. XI(2)(a), XXI(b)(iii) (‘GATT 1994’). For discussion of WTO jurisprudence concerning the application of these clauses in a post-disaster context see G. Adinolfi, ‘International Economic Law (2018)’, (2020) 1 Yearbook of International Disaster Law 426.

84 Treaty Between United States of America and the Argentine Republic Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Investment, signed 14 November 1991 (entered into force 20 October 1994), Art. XI.

85 See Henckels, supra note 28.

86 Viñuales, supra note 27, at 69.

87 See CMS Gas Transmission Company v. Argentine Republic (Award) (ICSID Arbitral Tribunal, Case No. ARB/01/08, 12 May 2005) paras. 353–356; Enron Corporation Ponderosa Assets L.P. v. Argentine Republic (Award) (ICSID Arbitral Tribunal, Case No. ARB/01/3, 22 May 2007) paras. 333–334; Sempra Energy International v. Argentine Republic (Award) (ICSID Arbitral Tribunal, Case No. ARB/02/16, 28 September 2007) para. 344.

88 Henckels, supra note 28; J. Kurtz, ‘Adjudging the Exceptional at International Law: Security, Public Order and Financial Crisis’, (2010) 59 ICLQ 325; CMS Gas Transmission Company v. Argentine Republic (Decision on Annulment) (ICSID Ad Hoc Committee, Case No. ARB/01/08, 25 September 2007) para. 129 (‘CMS Annulment Decision’). See also D. Desierto, ‘Necessity and “Supplementary Means of Interpretation” for Non-Precluded Measures in Bilateral Investment Treaties’, (2010) 31 University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Law 827.

89 CC/Devas (Mauritius) Ltd., Devas Employees Mauritius Private Limited and Telecom Devas Mauritius Limited v. India, PCA Case No. 2013-09, Award on Jurisdiction and Merits, 25 July 2016; Deutsche Telekom v. India, PCA Case No. 2014-10, Interim Award, 13 December 2017. See generally R. Kabra, ‘Return of the Inconsistent Application of the “Essential Security Interest” Clause in Investment Treaty Arbitration: CC/Devas v India and Deutsche Telekom v India’, (2019) 34(3) ICSID Review 723.

90 Devas, ibid., para. 360; Deutsche Telekom, ibid., para. 260.

91 Deutsche Telekom, ibid., para. 281. See a similar statement in Devas, ibid., para. 360.

92 ILC Draft Articles, supra note 9, Commentary to Art. 9, para. 18.

93 See, e.g., Australia-Uruguay BIT (2019), supra note 82, Art. 15(1)(a).

94 For a discussion of these decisions see Kurtz, supra note 88.

95 Viñuales, supra note 27, at 85.

96 Ibid., at 69.

97 However, if one takes a precise, limited view of lex specialis purely as a conflict of norms rule that resolves direct inconsistency between two norms to the extent of the inconsistency, then this technique might better be characterized as an expression of systemic integration, whereby a broad norm is interpreted harmoniously with other norms in order to avoid inconsistency. See J. Zrilic, The Protection of Foreign Investment in Times of Armed Conflict (2019), 186; V. Todeschini, ‘The ICCPR in Armed Conflict: An Appraisal of the Human Rights Committee’s Engagement with International Humanitarian Law’, (2017) 35 Nordic Journal of Human Rights 203; L. Hill-Cawthorne, ‘Just Another Case of Treaty Interpretation? Reconciling Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Law in the ICJ’, in M. Andenas and E. Bjorge (eds.), A Farewell to Fragmentation: Reassertion and Convergence in International Law (2015), 272; A. Orakhelashvili, ‘The Interaction between Human Rights and Humanitarian Law: Fragmentation, Conflict, Parallelism, or Convergence’, (2008) 19 EJIL 161.

98 See Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion of 8 July 1996, [1996] ICJ Rep. 226, at 240, para. 25, cited in Israeli Wall Advisory Opinion, supra note 61, at 178, para. 105.

99 But see an analogous discussion of the potential difficulties in resolving normative conflicts between IEL and investment law norms in favour of the former in J. Viñuales, ‘Foreign Investment and the Environment in International Law: An Ambiguous Relationship’, (2009) 80 BYIL 244, at 288–302.

100 See Y. Arai-Takahashi, The Margin of Appreciation Doctrine and the Principle of Proportionality in the Jurisprudence of the ECHR (2002); M. Hutchinson, ‘The Margin of Appreciation Doctrine in the European Court of Human Rights’, (1999) 48 ICLQ 638.

101 See, e.g., Handyside v. The United Kingdom, Judgment of 7 December 1976, [1976] ECHR 5, para. 48.

102 See, e.g., International Thunderbird Gaming Corporation v. The United Mexican States (Award) (UNCITRAL Arbitral Tribunal, 26 January 2006) paras. 147, 196; Total S.A. v. Argentine Republic (Decision on Liability) (ICSID Arbitral Tribunal, Case No. ARB/04/01, 27 December 2010) para. 119.

103 See, e.g., Methanex Corporation v. United States of America (Award) (UNCITRAL Arbitral Tribunal, 3 August 2005), Part IV, Ch. D, para. 7; Saluka Investments B.V. v. The Czech Republic (Partial Award) (UNCITRAL Arbitral Tribunal, 17 March 2006) para. 262; Chemtura Corporation (formerly Crompton Corporation) v. Government of Canada (Award) (UNCITRAL Arbitral Tribunal, PCA Case No. 2008-01, 2 August 2010) para. 266. The doctrine has generally been raised as a defence (i.e., exculpation mechanism) in investment arbitration, but this may not be conceptually correct: see J. Viñuales, ‘Sovereignty in Foreign Investment Law’, in Z. Douglas, J. Pauwelyn and J. Viñuales (eds.), The Foundations of International Investment Law: Bringing Theory into Practice (2014), 317, at 326–44.

104 In this regard see Viñuales’ explanation of ‘legitimacy conflicts’ (referring to circumstances where a state enacts a measure in service of a public objective that is recognized under international law, e.g., in soft law instruments such as the ILC Draft Articles, but not enshrined as a binding obligation, and then seeks in adjudication to circumvent the application of a binding norm (e.g., a substantive protection in an investment agreement) in respect of the impugned measure) in J. Viñuales, supra note 99, at 302–24.

105 See Henckels, supra note 28. See also Tzanakopoulos and Lekkas, supra note 37, at 326–7, who observe that treaty suspension and customary defences can have identical effects, but remain functionally distinguishable, since defences apply ‘only after all the constituent requirements of the obligation have been found to exist, and there has been a breach of that obligation’.

106 Binder, supra note 36, at 910.

107 See, e.g., Paddeu, supra note 29.

108 Viñuales, supra note 27, at 76; CMS Annulment Decision, supra note 88, para. 132.

109 Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, Supplement No. 10, UN Doc. A/56/10, Ch. IV.E. (November 2001) (‘ARS’), Art. 23.

110 Paddeu, supra note 29, at 285.

111 See S. Szurek, ‘Circumstances Precluding Wrongfulness in the ILC Articles on State Responsibility: Force Majeure’, in J. Crawford, A. Pellet and S. Olleson (eds.), The Law of State Responsibility (2010), 475.

112 Paddeu, supra note 29, at 285.

113 C. Calvo, Dictionnaire de droit international public et privé (1885), 342, cited in F. Paddeu, ‘A Genealogy of Force Majeure in International Law’, (2012) 82 BYIL 381, at 422.

114 See Paddeu, supra note 29, at 289–94 and cases discussed therein.

115 ARS, supra note 109, Commentary to Art. 23, para. 3; Paddeu, supra note 113, at 394.

116 French Company of Venezuelan Railroads (France v. Venezuela) (1903) 10 RIAA 285, at 316.

117 Paddeu, supra note 113, at 493.

118 A. Rougier, Les guerres civiles et le droit des gens (1903), 473, cited in Paddeu, supra note 113, at 414.

119 F. Paddeu and F. Jephcott, ‘COVID-19 and Defences in the Law of State Responsibility: Part I’, EJIL:Talk!, 17 March 2020, available at www.ejiltalk.org/covid-19-and-defences-in-the-law-of-state-responsibility-part-i/.

120 ARS, supra note 109, Commentary to Art. 23, para. 2.

121 Paddeu and Jephcott, supra note 119.

122 Rainbow Warrior (New Zealand v. France) (1990) 20 RIAA 215, para. 77. Cf. J. Crawford, State Responsibility: The General Part (2013), 299.

123 ARS, supra note 109, Art. 25(1)(a); confirmed as custom in Israeli Wall Advisory Opinion, supra note 61, at 195, para. 140. See also A. Bjorklund, ‘Emergency Exceptions: State of Necessity and “Force Majeure”’, in P. Muchlinski, F. Ortino and C. Schreuer (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of International Investment Law (2008), 459.

124 ARS, ibid., Art. 25(1)(b).

125 Ibid., Arts. 25(2)(a), (b).

126 Kurtz, supra note 88.

127 CMS (Award), supra note 87, paras. 353–78 (implied); Sempra (Award), supra note 87, paras. 376–8 (explicit); Enron (Award), supra note 87, para. 333.

128 There are hints of the view in Continental Casualty v. Argentine Republic (Award) (ICSID Arbitral Tribunal, Case No. ARB/03/09, 5 September 2008) para. 168; LG&E Argentine Republic (Decision on Liability) (ICSID Arbitral Tribunal, Case No. ARB/02/1, 3 October 2006) para. 257; El Paso Energy International Company v. Argentine Republic (Award) (ICSID Arbitral Tribunal, Case No. ARB/03/15, 31 October 2011) para. 552.

129 See CMS Annulment Decision, supra note 88, para. 129; Continental Casualty (Award), ibid., para. 166.

130 See Kurtz, supra note 88.

131 See Henckels, supra note 28, at 374; Kurtz, ibid. This view is also shared by the Annulment Committee in CMS Annulment Decision, supra note 88, and A. Reinisch, ‘Necessity in Investment Arbitration’, (2010) Netherlands Yearbook of International Law 156.

132 LG&E Energy v. Argentina (Decision on Liability), supra note 128, para. 257.

133 Enron (Award), supra note 87, paras. 306–7; Sempra (Award), supra note 87, para. 349; CMS (Award), supra note 87, para. 322.

134 LG&E Energy (Decision on Liability), supra note 128, para. 257; Continental Casualty (Award), supra note 128, para. 180; Total S.A (Decision on Liability), supra note 102, para. 223.

135 Enron (Award), supra note 87, paras. 306–307; Sempra (Award), supra note 87, para. 348.

136 See Binder, supra note 36, at 916–19.

137 Paddeu and Jephcott, supra note 119.

138 See C. Foster, ‘Necessity and Precaution in International Law: Responding to Oblique Forms of Urgency’, (2008) 23(2) New Zealand Universities Law Review 265.

139 T. Christakis, ‘“Nécessité n’a pas de loi”? La nécessité en droit international’, in Société Française pour le Droit International (ed.), La nécessité en droit international – Colloque de Grenoble (2007), 11.

140 Urbaser S.A v. Argentine Republic (Award) (ICSID Arbitral Tribunal, Case No. ARB/07/26, 8 December 2016), para. 711.

141 See, e.g., Impregilo S.p.A v. Argentine Republic (Award) (ICSID Arbitral Tribunal, Case No. ARB/07/17, 21 June 2011), para. 356, in which the tribunal held that ‘well-intended but ill-conceived policies’ can amount to contribution.

142 M. Waibel, ‘Two Worlds of Necessity in ICSID Arbitration: CMS and LG&E’, (2007) 20 LJIL 643.

143 GATT 1994, supra note 83, Art. XX.

144 See Section 3.1.2.2, supra.

145 Henckels, supra note 28, at 373; Appellate Body Report, Korea – Measures Affecting Imports of Fresh, Chilled and Frozen Beef, adopted 10 January 2001, AB-2000-8, WT/DS161/AB/R, WT/DS169/AB/R, at 47–8, para. 157. But see also C. Henckels, ‘Permission to Act: The Legal Character of General and Security Exceptions in International Trade and Investment Law’, (2020) 69 ICLQ 557.

146 GATT 1994, supra note 83, Art. XX(a).

147 Ibid., Art. XX(b).

148 Ibid., Art. XX(g).

149 Ibid., Art. XX(d).

150 See, e.g., S. S. Aatreya, ‘Are COVID-19 Related Trade Restrictions WTO-Consistent?’, EJIL:Talk!, 25 April 2020, available at www.ejiltalk.org/are-covid-19-related-trade-restrictions-wto-consistent/.

151 IFRC, ‘Checklist on Law and Disaster Risk Reduction: An Annotated Outline’, October 2015, available at www.ifrc.org/Global/Publications/IDRL/Publications/The%20Checklist%20on%20law%20and%20DRR%20Oct2015%20EN%20v4.pdf; IFRC, ‘Introduction to the Guidelines for the Domestic Facilitation and Regulation of International Disaster Relief and Initial Recovery Assistance’, 2011, available at www.ifrc.org/PageFiles/41203/1205600-IDRL%20Guidelines-EN-LR%20(2).pdf.

152 Korea – Various Measures on Beef, supra note 145, paras. 163, 166.

153 IPCC, ‘Summary for Policymakers’, in T. Stocker et. al (eds.), Climate Change 2013: The Physical Science Basis (2013), 7. See also D. Farber, ‘Climate Change and Disaster Law’, in K. Gray, R. Tarasofsky and C. Carlarne, The Oxford Handbook of International Climate Change Law (2016), 588; J. McDonald and A. Telesetsky, ‘Disaster by Degrees: The Implications of the IPCC 1.5oC Report for Disaster Law’, (2020) 1 Yearbook of International Disaster Law 179.

154 See ILC Draft Articles, supra note 9, preamble.

155 Clement, supra note 1, at 77–8. See also R. Lyster, Climate Justice and Disaster Law (2016), 139–55, which advocates for a Capabilities Approach for climate justice, in part because the uneven distribution of vulnerabilities to climate change-induced disasters between states and regions risks creating entrenched cycles of vulnerability and destruction in poorer states of the Global South.

156 Farber, supra note 7.

157 See Farber, ibid.; Lyster, supra note 155.

158 P. O’Keefe, K. Westgate and B. Wisner, ‘Taking the “Naturalness” out of “Natural Disaster”’, (1976) 260 Nature 566, at 566–7.

159 M. Cooper, ‘Seven Dimensions of Disaster: The Sendai Framework and the Social Construction of Catastrophe’, in K. Samuel, M. Aronsson-Storrier and K. Nakjavani Bookmiller (eds.), The Cambridge Handbook of Disaster Risk Reduction and International Law (2019), 17, at 17.

160 G. Dodds, ‘“This Was No Act of God”: Disaster, Causality and Politics’, (2015) 6(1) Risk, Hazards & Crisis in Public Policy 44, at 49–51; D. Fidler, ‘Disaster Relief and Governance After the Indian Ocean Tsunami: What Role for International Law?’, (2005) 6 Melbourne Journal of International Law 458, at 467; R. Perry, ‘What Is a Disaster?’, in H. Rodríguez, E. Quarantelli and R. Dynes (eds.), Handbook of Disaster Research (2007); H. Fischer, ‘The Sociology of Disaster: Definitions, Research Questions, & Measurements Continuation of the Discussion in a Post-September 11 Environment’, (2003) 21 International Journal of Mass Emergencies and Disasters 91; B. Boruff, W. Lynn Shirley and S. L. Cutter, ‘Social Vulnerability to Environmental Hazards’, (2003) 84 Social Science Quarterly; B. Wisner et al., At Risk: Natural Hazards, People’s Vulnerability and Disasters (2004).

161 K. Hewitt, Regions of Risk: A Geographical Introduction to Disasters (1997), 18–19.

162 Cedervall Lauta, supra note 12, at 95. See also E. Klinenberg, Heat Wave: A Social Autopsy of Disaster in Chicago (2002), 11, who described the 739 heat wave deaths in Chicago in 1995 as being ‘biological reflections of social fault lines’.

163 Fidler, supra note 160, at 467.

164 L. Grow Sun, ‘Climate Change and the Narrative of Disaster’, in Peel and Fisher, supra note 15, 27, at 35–6.

165 Cooper, supra note 159, at 17.

166 International Law Commission, Fifth report on the protection of persons in the event of disasters by Special Rapporteur Eduardo Valencia-Ospina, UN Doc. A/CN.4/652 (9 April 2012), at 31, para. 114.

167 A. Surat and J. Lezaun, ‘Introduction: The Challenge of Crisis and Catastrophe in Law and Politics’, in A. Surat and J. Lezuan (eds.), Catastrophe: Law, Politics, and the Humanitarian Impulse (2009), 1, at 7, cited in Cooper, supra note 159, at 19.

168 Ibid.

169 See ARS, supra note 109, Arts. 23(2)(a), 25(2)(b).

170 See M. Dellinger, ‘Rethinking Force Majeure in Public International Law’, (2017) 37 Pace Law Review 455.

171 ARS, supra note 109, Commentary to Art. 23, para. 9.

172 IPCC, supra note 153, at 17, Sec. D.3.

173 ARS, supra note 109, Art. 23(2)(b); Dellinger, supra note 170, at 478–9.