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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 31 May 2021
Previous research has analysed a range of domestic stakeholders that make national governments’ commitments to international human rights law credible, including an independent judiciary, legislative veto players, political opposition groups, and non-governmental organizations. But how do the power dynamics within the government affect state compliance with international human rights law? Building on the basic understanding that international human rights law needs to pass through domestic political and administrative processes before it can be implemented on the ground, this article articulates a reputation-based theoretical framework to explain how the lack of reputational mechanisms at the local level and national leaders’ shifting of blame for non-compliance to sub-national officials and the internal governance structure – two salient characteristics in a decentralized political system – make international human rights law less effective. A case study of US compliance with Article 36 of the 1963 Vienna Convention on Consular Relations sheds light on how international reputational concerns interact with divided authority structure to shape national leaders’ and subnational authorities’ policy responses to the enforcement of international human rights standards.
This project has been supported by the Purdue Research Foundation Research Grant and the Ludwig Kruhe Fellowship. Earlier versions of this article have been presented at the Annual Conference of the Midwest Political Science Association, the Annual Convention of the International Studies Association, and the Purdue Sears Panel. For valuable feedback, I thank Ann Marie Clark, Dara Kay Cohen, Rosalee A. Clawson, Kyle Haynes, Aaron M. Hoffman, Ñusta Carranza Ko, Cherie Maestas, James A. McCann, Thomas Mustillo, Swati Srivastava, Eric N. Waltenburg, S. Laurel Weldon, Dwayne Woods, and Kuan-Sheng Wu. All errors are my own.
1 D. B. Hollis, ‘Executive Federalism: Forging New Federalist Constraints on the Treaty Power’, (2006) 79 Southern California Law Review 1327, at 1327–8.
2 See Amnesty International, UA 247/05 (2005).
3 Ibid.
4 See Summary Record of the 669th Meeting of the Committee Against Torture, CAT/C/SR.669, 16 November 2005, paras. 15–16, 24.
5 These laws include the State Cases Act of 1993, the Compensation Relating to Torture Act of 1996, and the Human Rights Commission Act of 1997. See Addendum of Nepal, Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties under Article 19 of the Convention, CAT/C/33/Add.6, 14 January 2005, para. 126.
6 Ibid., para. 34.
7 E. M. Hafner-Burton and J. Ron, ‘Seeing Double: Human Rights Impact through Qualitative and Quantitative Eyes’, (2009) 61(2) World Politics 360; T. Risse, ‘Human Rights in Areas of Limited Statehood: From the Spiral Model to Localization and Translation’, in S. Hopgood et al. (eds.), Human Rights Futures (2017), at 135; E. L. Lutz and K. Sikkink, ‘International Human Rights Law and Practice in Latin America’, (2000) 54(3) International Organization 633; J. R. Nash, ‘Doubly Uncooperative Federalism and the Challenge of U.S. Treaty Compliance’, (2016) 55 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 3.
8 E. M. Hafner-Burton, ‘Trading Human Rights: How Preferential Trade Agreements Influence Government Repression’, (2005) 59(3) International Organization 593, at 598.
9 See Risse, supra note 7; A. Chayes and A. H. Chayes, ‘On Compliance’, (1993) 47(2) International Organization 175.
10 Y. Lupu, ‘Legislative Veto Players and the Effects of International Human Rights Agreements’, (2015) 59(3) American Journal of Political Science 578.
11 L. C. Keith, ‘Judicial Independence and Human Rights Protection around the World’, (2002) 85(4) Judicature 195–200.
12 M. Keck and K. Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics (1998); B. A. Simmons, Mobilizing for Human Rights: International Law in Domestic Politics (2009).
13 T. A. Börzel and T. Risse, ‘Human Rights in Areas of Limited Statehood: The New Agenda’, in T. Risse et al. (eds.), The Persistent Power of Human Rights: From Commitment to Compliance (2013), at 63; N. J. Mitchell et al., ‘The Impact of Pro-Government Militias on Human Rights Violations’, (2014) 40(5) International Interactions 812; see Risse, supra note 7.
14 See Nash, supra note 7. For the various ways in which subnational authorities bypass national governments to engage international human rights law see E. Durmuş, ‘A Typology of Local Governments’ Engagement with Human Rights: Legal Pluralist Contributions to International Law and Human Rights’, (2020) 38(1) Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights 30.
15 J. Kalb, ‘The Persistence of Dualism in Human Rights Treaty Implementation’, (2011) 30(1) Yale Law & Policy Review 71, at 77; C. Powell, ‘Dialogic Federalism: Constitutional Possibilities for Incorporation of Human Rights Law in the United States’, (2001) 150 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 245–95, at 246.
16 T. Hale, ‘The Role of Sub-state and Nonstate Actors in International Climate Processes’, available at www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/publications/research/2018-11-28-non-state-sctors-climate-synthesis-hale-final.pdf.
17 See Nash, supra note 7, at 6.
18 E. Posner, ‘Human Rights Law Is Too Ambitious and Ambiguous’, New York Times, 28 December 2014, available at www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2014/12/28/have-human-rights-treaties-failed#:˜:text=Human%20rights%20law%20is%20too%20ambitious%20%E2%80%94%20even%20utopian%20%E2%80%94%20and%20too,that%20fact%20and%20move%20on.
19 C. Hillebrecht, Domestic Politics and International Human Rights Tribunals: The Problem of Compliance (2014). See Keith, supra note 11; L. C. Keith et al., ‘Is the Law a Mere Parchment Barrier to Human Rights Abuse?’, (2009) 71(2) Journal of Politics 644; E. J. Powell and J. K. Staton, ‘Domestic Judicial Institutions and Human Rights Treaty Violation’, (2009) 53 International Studies Quarterly 149.
20 See Lupu, supra note 10.
21 A. M. Clark, Diplomacy of Conscience: Amnesty International and Changing Human Rights Norms (2001); M. Finnemore and K. Sikkink, ‘International Norm Dynamics and Political Change’, (1998) 52(4) International Organization 887; K. Sikkink, The Justice Cascade: How Human Rights Prosecutions Are Changing World Politics (2011); see Simmons, supra note 12.
22 See Chayes and Chayes, supra note 9.
23 Ibid., at 183.
24 Ibid., at 184–7.
25 C. D. Creamer and B. A. Simmons, ‘Ratification, Reporting, and Rights: Quality of Participation in the Convention against Torture’, (2015) 37(3) Human Rights Quarterly 579, at 590 (emphasis in original).
26 See Chayes and Chayes, supra note 9; A. Chayes et al., ‘Managing Compliance: A Comparative Perspective’, in E. B. Weiss and H. Jacobson (eds.), Engaging Countries: Strengthening Compliance with International Environmental Accords (1998), at 39; A. Chayes and A. H. Chayes, The New Sovereignty: Compliance with International Regulatory Agreements (1995).
27 See Hafner-Burton, supra note 8, at 597. The original quote is ‘[t]he behavior is almost always caused by purposeful disobedience by actors who choose defection from the rules’ (emphasis added).
28 See Chayes et al., supra note 26.
29 See Börzel and Risse, supra note 13; Risse, supra note 7.
30 See Börzel and Risse, ibid., at 66.
31 T. A. Börzel et al., ‘Obstinate and Inefficient: Why Member States Do Not Comply with European Law’, (2010) 43(11) Comparative Political Studies 1363.
32 Ibid., at 1375–6. The authors consider veto players because veto players hinder the central authorities form changing existing policies that are unfavourable to human rights protection. They include GDP per capita because it indicates the resources states can tap to ensure compliance. They also look at bureaucratic efficiency because it indicates a state’s capability to mobilize resource it has.
33 W. M. Cole, ‘Mind the Gap: State Capacity and the Implementation of Human Rights Treaties’, (2015) 69(2) International Organization 405.
34 See Simmons, supra note 12.
35 See Creamer and Simmons, supra note 25.
36 See Keck and Sikkink, supra note 12.
37 An exception is M. Lake, ‘Organizing Hypocrisy: Providing Legal Accountability for Human Rights Violations in Areas of Limited Statehood’, (2014) 58(3) International Studies Quarterly 515. Lake’s case study of the Democratic Republic of Congo shows that extreme state fragility provides an entry point for the international society to intervene, or more specifically, to channel resources and training programs towards domestic judicial section reform.
38 A. T. Guzman, How International Law Works: A Rational Choice Theory (2008), 73.
39 Ibid.; M. Tomz, Reputation and International Cooperation: Sovereign Debt across Three Centuries (2007), 17.
40 R. Brewster, ‘Unpacking the State’s Reputation’, (2009) 50(2) Harvard International Law Journal 231, at 249; R. Brewster, ‘The Limits of Reputation on Compliance’, (2009) 1(2) International Theory 323, at 327.
41 G. Montinola et al., ‘Federalism, Chinese Style: The Political Basis for Economic Success in China’, (1995) 48(1) World Politics 50, at 52.
42 See Risse, supra note 7.
43 P. B. Heyman, ‘The Problem of Coordination: Bargaining and Rules’, (1973) 86(5) Harvard Law Review, at 822–3.
44 See Guzman, supra note 38; see also Heyman, supra note 43.
45 See Hillebrecht, supra note 19.
46 See Heyman, supra note 43.
47 H. Ramos et al., ‘Shaping the Northern Media’s Human Rights Coverage, 1986–2000’, (2007) 44(4) Journal of Peace Research 385.
48 See Keck and Sikkink, supra note 12.
49 Rights and Resources Initiative, ‘Landmark Report Investigates Human Rights Abuses Suffered by Indigenous Communities Affected by Land Conflicts in Indonesia’, 5 February 2016, available at rightsandresources.org/blog/landmark-report-investigates-human-rights-abuses-suffered-indigenous-communities-affected-land-conflicts-indonesia/.
50 J. W. Meyer et al., ‘World Society and the Nation-State’, (1997) 103(1) American Journal of Sociology 144; J. Beckfield, ‘The Social Structure of the World Polity’, (2010) 115(4) American Journal of Sociology 1018.
51 T. S. Barrows, College Students’ Knowledge and Belief: A Survey of Global Understanding (1982); J. Torney-Purta et al., ‘How Adolescents in 27 Countries Understand, Support, and Practice Human Rights’, (2008) 64(4) Journal of Social Issues 857.
52 See Heyman, supra note 43.
53 See Simmons, supra note 12.
54 B. J. Appel, ‘In the Shadow of the International Criminal Court’, (2018) 62(1) Journal of Conflict Resolution 3, at 11; H. Kim and K. Sikkink, ‘Explaining the Deterrence Effect of Human Rights Prosecutions for Transitional Countries’, (2010) 54(4) International Studies Quarterly 939, at 942.
55 N. J. Mitchell, Democracy’s Blameless Leaders: From Dresden to Abu Ghraid, How Leaders Evade Accountability for Abuse, Atrocity, and Killing (2012).
56 Similar to the distinction between national leaders and local authorities in the chance of being put under the spotlight of naming and shaming, research on corporate social responsibility has shown that activist groups are more likely to target larger, influential firms and those that produce branded products. See P. Christmann et al., ‘Globalization and the Environment: Strategies for International Voluntary Environmental Initiatives’, (2002) 16(3) The Academy of Management Review 121; J. R. Hendry, ‘Taking Aim at Business’, (2006) 45(1) Business & Society 47; K. Rehbein et al., ‘Understanding Shareholder Activism: Which Corporations are Targeted?’, (2004) 43(3) Business & Society 239; T. Bartley and C. Child, ‘Shaming the Corporation’, (2014) 79(4) American Sociological Review 653. Studies have also shown that firms that place more value on their brands are more likely to respond to activist requests. See D. L. Spar and L. T. La Mure, ‘The Power of Activism: Assessing the Impact of NGOs on Global Business’, (2003) 45(3) California Management Review 78; B. G. King, ‘A Political Mediation Model of Corporate Response to Social Movement Activism’, (2008) 53(3) Administrative Science Quarterly 395.
57 E. M. Hafner-Burton, ‘Sticks and Stones: Naming and Shaming the Human Rights Enforcement Problem’, (2008) 62 International Organization 689; J. C. Franklin, ‘Shame on You: The Impact of Human Rights Criticism on Political Repression in Latin America’, (2008) 52 International Studies Quarterly 187; M. Krain, ‘J’accuse! Does Naming and Shaming Perpetrators Reduce the Severity of Genocides or Politicides?’, (2012) 56(3) International Studies Quarterly 574.
58 B. R. Schlenker et al., ‘The Triangle Model of Responsibility’, (1994) 101(4) Psychological Review 632, at 632; C. D. Maestas et al., ‘Shifting the Blame: Federalism, Media, and Public Assignment of Blame Following Hurricane Katrina’, (2008) 38(4) Publius: The Journal of Federalism 609.
59 T. J. Rudolph, ‘Institutional Context and the Assignment of Political Responsibility’, (2003) 65(1) Journal of Politics 190; T. J. Rudolph and J. T. Grant, ‘An Attributional Model of Economic Voting: Evidence from the 2000 Presidential Election’, (2002) 55(4) Political Research Quarterly 805; T. J. Rudolph, ‘Who’s Responsible for the Economy? The Formation and Consequences of Responsibility Attributions’, (2003) 47(4) American Journal of Political Science 698.
60 L. N. Cutler, ‘Some Reflections About Divided Government’, (1988) 18(3) Presidential Studies Quarterly 485; Rudolph, supra note 59, at 706; K. M. Leyden and S. A. Borrelli, ‘The Effect of State Economic Conditions on Gubernatorial Elections: Does Unified Government Make a Difference?’, (1995) 48(2) Political Research Quarterly 275; R. C. Lowry et al., ‘Fiscal Policy Outcomes and Electoral Accountability in American States’, (1998) 92(4) American Political Science Review 759; J. A. Lybeck, ‘A Simultaneous Model of Politico-Economic Interaction in Sweden, 1970–82’, (1985) 13 European Journal of Political Research 135; R. K. Weaver, ‘The Politics of Blame Avoidance’, (1986) 6(4) Journal of Public Policy 371.
61 See Rudolph, supra note 59, at 701; K. M. McGraw, ‘Managing Blame: An Experimental Test of the Effects of Political Accounts’, (1991) 85(4) American Political Science Review 1133.
62 See McGraw, ibid., at 1136.
63 See Weaver, supra note 60, at 388.
64 See Maestas et al., supra note 58, at 609.
65 See McGraw, supra note 61, at 1136.
66 See Keck and Sikkink, supra note 12.
67 J. J. Gruffydd-Jones, ‘Citizens and Condemnation: Strategic Uses of International Human Rights Pressure in Authoritarian States’, (2019) 52(4) Comparative Political Studies 579, at 603.
68 See McGraw, supra note 61, at 1133.
69 J. M. Ackerman, ‘Why America Is to Blame for Mexico’s Carnage and Corruption’, Foreign Policy, 26 November 2014.
70 See Kalb, supra note 15, at 93.
71 See 138 Cong. Rec. S4781-01 of 2 April 1992.
72 E. Neumayer, ‘Qualified Ratification: Explaining Reservations to International Human Rights Treaties’, (2007) 36 (2) Journal of Legal Studies 397.
73 L. Blume and S. Voigt, ‘Federalism and Decentralization—A Critical Survey of Frequently Used Indicators’, (2011) 22(3) Constitutional Political Economy 238, at 241–2.
74 See Franklin, supra note 57; see also Hafner-Burton, supra note 57; Krain, supra note 57.
75 J. H. Lebovic, ‘The Politics of Shame: The Condemnation of Country Human Rights Practices in the UNCHR’, (2006) 50 International Studies Quarterly 861; R. Terman and E. Voeten, ‘The Relational Politics of Shame: Evidence from the Universal Periodic Review’, (2018) 13(1) Review of International Organizations 1; F. Koliev, ‘Shaming and Democracy: Explaining Inter-State Shaming in International Organizations’, (2020) 41(4) International Political Science Review 538.
76 Upon the Mexican government’s request for an advisory opinion about the interpretation of foreign nationals’ right to consular access and assistance in death penalty cases, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights ruled in 1999 that ‘Article 36 of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations endows a detained foreign national with individual rights that are the counterpart to the host State’s correlative duties.’ See Advisory Opinion of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights: The Right to Information on Consular Assistance in the Framework of the Guarantees of the Due Process of Law (OC-16/99), para. 84.
77 In a resolution (E/CN.4/RES/2001/68) adopted on 25 April 2001 concerning the question of death penalty, the UN Commission on Human Rights urges all states that have still kept capital punishment to ‘observe the Safeguards guaranteeing protection of the rights of those facing the death penalty and to comply fully with their international obligations, in particular with those under the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations’.
78 See Report of the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions: Mission to the United States of America (E/CN.4/1998/68/Add.3), para. 121.
79 For a detailed description of the incorporation of consular rights in the corpus of customary international law see Brief of Amici Curiae submitted by the European Union to the U.S. Supreme Court in support of Joseph Medellín.
80 K. L. Bell, ‘From Laggard to Leader: Canadian Lessons on a Role for U.S. States in Making and Implementing Human Rights Treaties’, (2002) 5 Yale Human Rights & Development Law Journal 255; P. J. Spiro, ‘Foreign Relations Federalism’, (1999) 70 University of Colorado Law Review 1223–75; see Powell, supra note 15.
81 J. Quigley, Foreigners on America’s Death Rows: The Legal Combat Over Access to A Consul (2018), 32.
82 B. Whitaker, ‘High Court Postpones Execution of Canadian’, New York Times, 11 December 1998.
83 R. Lyman, ‘Aliens’ Rights Are Issue in Texas Death Row Case’, New York Times, 8 December 1998.
84 See Whitaker, supra note 82.
85 See Quigley, supra note 81, at 112; S. Babcock, ‘The Role of International Law in United States Death Penalty Cases’, (2002) 15(2) Leiden Journal of International Law 367–87.
86 L. E. Carter, ‘Compliance with ICJ Provisional Measure and the Meaning of Review and Reconsideration Under the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations: Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.)’, (2003) 25(1) Michigan Journal of International Law 117.
87 Breard v. Netherlands, 949 F. Supp. 1255 (E.D. Va. 1996).
88 Ibid.
89 S. Dest, ‘Federal Habeas Corpus and State Procedural Default: An Abstention-Based Interest Analysis’, (1989) (56) University of Chicago Law Review 263.
90 A. N. Bishop, ‘The Unenforceable Rights to Consular Notification and Access in the United States: What’s changed Since the LaGrand Case?’, (2002) 25 Houston Journal of International Law 1, at 18. Also see Memorial of the Republic of Paraguay, 9 October 1998, available at www.icj-cij.org/public/files/case-related/99/099-19981009-WRI-01-00-EN.pdf.
91 Ibid.
92 Ibid.
93 J. Quigley et al., The Law of Consular Access: A Documentary Guide (2010), 138.
94 Ibid., at 139. Quote from Statement by Governor Jim Gilmore Concerning the Execution of Angel Breard (14 April 1998).
95 V. Epps, ‘Violations of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations - Time for Remedies’, (2004) 11 Willamette Journal International Law & Dispute Resolution 1; L. J. Springrose, ‘Strangers in a Strange Land - The Rights of Non-Citizens under Article 36 of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations’, (1999) 14 Georgetown Immigration Law Journal 185–213, at 186; J. B. Bellinger III, ‘Lawlessness North of the Border’, New York Times, 17 July 2019.
96 See Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mexico v. United States), Advisory Opinions and Orders, Judgment of 31 March 2004, [2004] ICJ Rep. 12, at 66, para. 141.
97 Ibid., at 58, para. 143.
98 Ibid., at 58, para. 142. Also see LaGrand Case (Germany v. United States), Advisory Opinions and Orders, Judgment of 27 June 2001, [2001] ICJ Rep. 466, at 514, para. 125.
99 Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491 (2008).
100 See Babcock, supra note 85, at 375.
101 See Memorial of the Federal Republic of Germany, 16 September 1999.
102 Brief of Amici Curiae the European Union and Members of the International Community in Support of Petitioner, available at www.findlawimages.com/efile/supreme/briefs/04-5928/04-5928.mer.ami.eu.pdf.
103 ‘Amnesty International to March to US Embassy in Madrid on Sunday to Denounce Florida Violation of International Treaty’, US Newswire, 11 December 1999.
104 See Babcock, supra note 85, at 375.
105 See Quigley, supra note 81 at 97.
106 Ibid., at 111.
107 See Amnesty International, AMR 51/76/99, (1999).
108 See Babcock, supra note 85, at 377.
109 See Amnesty International, supra note 107.
110 A. Liptak, ‘U.S. Says It Has Withdrawn from World Judicial Body’, New York Times, 10 March 2005.
111 H. Weinstein, ‘Foreigners on Death Rows Denied Rights, U.S. Says’, Los Angeles Times, 10 December 1998; Lyman, supra note 83.
112 See Amnesty International, AMR 51/34/97 (1997).
113 See Babcock, supra note 85, at 379.
114 A. R. Gonzales and A. L. Moore, ‘No Right at All: Putting Consular Notification in its Rightful Place After Medellin’, (2015) 66(2) Florida Law Review 685, at 701.
115 Ibid., at 701–2.
116 C. A. Bradley, ‘The Federal Judicial Power and the International Legal Order’, (2006) (1) Supreme Court Review 59, at 75.
117 J. G. Ku, ‘The State of New York Does Exist: How States Control Compliance with International Law’, (2004) 82 North Carolina Law Review 457–533, at 513.
118 Counter-Memorial of the United States of America, 27 March 2000, paras. 116–18.
119 Ibid., para. 119. The US government identified the ‘extraordinarily short time between issuance of the Court’s Order and the time set for the execution of Walter LaGrand’ as the other constraining factor.
120 Ibid., para. 121.
121 Ibid., para. 122.
122 S. Djajic, ‘The Effect of International Court of Justice Decisions on Municipal Courts in the United States: Breard v. Greene’, (1999) 23 Hastings International & Comparative Law Review 27, at 78.
123 See Quigley, supra note 81, at 96.
124 Case Concerning the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (Paraguay v. United States), Advisory Opinions and Orders, Order of 9 April 1998, [1998] ICJ Rep. 248, at 158, para. 41.
125 J. Quigley, ‘The Law of State Responsibility and the Right to Consular Access’, (2004) 11 Willamette Journal International Law & Dispute Resolution 39, at 51.
126 O. A. Hathaway, ‘Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference?’, (2002) 111 Yale Law Journal 1935–2042.
127 E. M. Hafner-Burton, ‘International Regimes for Human Rights’, (2012) 15(1) Annual Review of Political Science 265.
128 See Quigley, supra note 125.
129 See Neumayer, supra note 72, at 399.
130 Ibid., at 399.
131 W. Dillinger, Decentralization and Its Implications for Urban Service Delivery (1994); D. Treisman, The Architecture of Government: Rethinking Political Decentralization (2007); P. Bardhan, ‘Decentralization of Governance and Development’, (2002) 16(4) Journal of Economic Perspectives 185.
132 Regarding local governments and human rights, the UN Human Rights Council passed resolutions 24/2 in 2013, 27/4 in 2014, and 33/8 in 2016, see www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/LocalGovernment/Pages/Index.aspx.
133 B. Oomen and M. Baumgärtel, ‘Frontier Cities: The Rise of Local Authorities as an Opportunity for International Human Rights Law’, (2018) 29(2) European Journal of International Law 607.