Article contents
Domestic Courts as Agents of Development of International Immunity Rules
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 31 July 2013
Abstract
This paper explores the role of domestic courts in the development of international immunity rules. It assesses how domestic immunity decisions take meaning in the process of law formation and law determination, and examines whether the distinct influence of domestic-court decisions (as compared to international-court decisions) in that process results in a different role, and concomitant different rules, in the process of interpretation of rules of international law. The paper argues that while domestic courts are as a matter of international law bound by the same rules of interpretation as international courts, they are particularly well placed to address access to court concerns raised by immunity rules and may play a prominent role in the development of international law in this field in the years to come.
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- INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PRACTICE: Symposium on Domestic Courts as Agents of Development of International Law
- Information
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- Copyright © Foundation of the Leiden Journal of International Law 2013
References
1 See Friedmann, W., The Changing Structure of International Law (1964), 146–7Google Scholar; Higgins, R., Problems and Process: International Law and How We Use It (1994), 208–9Google Scholar; Jennings, R. Y., ‘The Judiciary, International and National, and the Development of International Law’, (1996) 45 ICLQ 1CrossRefGoogle Scholar, at 2; Reinisch, A., ‘The International Relations of National Courts: A Discourse on International Law Norms on Jurisdictional and Enforcement Immunity’, in Reinisch, A. and Kriebaum, U. (eds.), The Law of International Relations – Liber Amicorum Hanspeter Neuhold (2007), 289Google Scholar at 309; H. Fox, The Law of State Immunity (2008), 20; A. Nollkaemper, National Courts and the International Rule of Law (2011), 10; Roberts, A., ‘Comparative International Law? The Role of National Courts in Creating and Enforcing International Law’, (2011) 60 ICLQ 57CrossRefGoogle Scholar, at 69.
2 This approach was first espoused in early Italian and Belgian state immunity decisions. See, for Belgium, L'Etat du Pérou v. Kreglinger PB 1857-2-348 (Tribunal de commerce d'Anvers and Cour de Bruxelles, 1857); Rau, Vanden Abeele et Cie v. Duruty PB 1879-2-175 (Commercial Tribunal Ostend, 1879); S.A. des Chemins de Fer liégeois-luxembourgeouis v. l'Etat néerlandais PB 1903-I-294 (Cour de cassation, 1903). For Italy see Morellet v. Governo Danese Giu. It. 1883-I-125 (Corte di Cassazione di Torino, 1882); Guttieres v. Elmilik 11 F.It. 1886-I-913 (Corte di Cassazione di Firenze, 1886); Typaldos, Console di Grecia a Napoli v. Manicomio di Aversa Giu. It. 1886-I-1-222 (Corte di Cassazione di Napoli, 1886).
3 Notably, most of the immunity issues listed by Lauterpacht to corroborate his argument that domestic courts have an important role to play in the development of international law have in the meantime been clarified. See Lauterpacht, H., ‘Decisions of Municipal Courts as a Source of International Law’, (1929) 10 BYIL 65, at 87–8Google Scholar.
4 R v. Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate and Others, ex parte Pinochet Ugarte, [1999] 1 All ER 577; ILR, Vol. 119, 136 (Pinochet No. 3).
5 This issue had already been discussed in a couple of US and UK cases and in a considerable body of scholarly opinion. See, for an overview, R. van Alebeek, The Immunity of States and Their Officials in International Criminal Law and International Human Rights Law (2008), 316–62.
6 Greece, Supreme Court Germany v. Prefecture of Voiotia, Representing 118 Persons from Distomo Village, Petition on Cassation Against Default, No. 11/2000, 4 May 2000, ILDC 287 (GR 2000). The Greek Special Supreme Court, however, halted this development with its judgment in Germany v. Margellos, 17 September, 6/2002, 2002, ILDC 87 (GR 2002).
7 E.g., Italy, Court of Cassation, Ferrini v. Germany, Appeal Decision, No. 5044/4, 11 March 2004, ILDC 19 (IT 2004); Italy, Court of Cassation, Germany v. Mantelli and Others, Preliminary Order on Jurisdiction, No. 14201/2008, 29 May 2008, ILDC 1037 (IT 2008) one of 12 identical decisions issued on the same day. (No. 14201/2008, No. 14202/2008, No. 14203/2008, No. 14204/2008, No. 14205/2008, No. 14206/2008, No 14207/2008, No. 14208/2008, No. 14209/2008, No. 14210/2008, No. 14211/2008, and No. 14212/2008); Italy, Court of Cassation, Germany v. Amministrazione regionale della Vojotia, Grecia, Case No. 14199, 29 May 2008, Rivista di Diritto Internazionale 92 (2009), 594; Italy, Court of Cassation, Criminal Proceedings against Milde, Appeal judgment, Case No. 1072/2009, 13 January 2009, ILDC 1224 (IT 2009); Italy, Court of Cassation, Germany v. Autonomous Prefecture of Vojotia, Final Appeal Judgment, No. 11163/2011, 20 May 2011, ILDC 1815 (IT 2011).
8 E.g., Mantelli, supra note 7, at para. 11.
9 Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany v. Italy, Greece Intervening), Judgment of 3 February 2012, para. 86 (not yet published) (hereafter Jurisdictional Immunities case).
10 See also, for this argument Roberts, supra note 1, at 70; Pavoni, R., ‘Human Rights and the Immunities of Foreign States’, in de Wet, E. and Vidmar, J. (eds.), Hierarchy in International Law: The Place of Human Rights (2012), 71CrossRefGoogle Scholar at 75.
11 See supra note 2.
12 ‘Each deviation contains the seeds of a new rule’. D'Amato, A., The Concept of Custom in International Law (1971), 98Google Scholar.
13 See supra note 9.
14 Certain German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia (Germany v. Poland), Merits, Judgment of 25 May 1926, PCIJ Rep. [Series A] No. 7, at 19. See also Frontier Dispute (Benin v. Niger), Judgment of 12 July, [2005] ICJ Rep. 90, at 110, para. 28.
15 International Law Association (ILA), Committee on Formation of Customary (General) International Law, Statement of Principles Applicable to the Formation of General Customary International Law, Final Report (2000), Principle 9, at 17; B. Conforti, International Law and the Role of Domestic Legal Systems (1993), 50–1. See in this sense also Case Concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Belgium), Judgment of 14 February, [2002] ICJ Rep. 3, at 24, para. 58; Jurisdictional Immunities case, supra note 9, para. 55.
16 Lauterpacht supra note 3, at 82–3; Lauterpacht, H., The Development of International Law by the International Court (1958), 20Google Scholar; Francioni, F., ‘International Law as a Common language for National Courts’, (2001) 36 Texas International Law Journal 587Google Scholar, at 593. Cf. Nollkaemper, supra note 1, at 268: ‘In principle, national case-law can qualify as both state practice or as opinio iuris’.
17 See Art. 38(1)(b) Statute of the International Court of Justice (annexed to the Charter of the United Nations), 26 June 1945, UNCIO 15, 355.
18 Nollkaemper, supra note 1, at 269.
19 In the sense of ‘subsidiary means’ discussed below, ibid., at 270.
20 North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (Federal Republic of Germany/Denmark; Federal Republic of Germany/Netherlands), Judgment of 20 February 1969, [1969] ICJ Rep. 3, at 44, para. 77.
21 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1155 UNTS 331. See Gardiner, R. K., Treaty Interpretation (2008), 228–9Google Scholar.
22 Preliminary Report by Mr Sompong Sucharitkul, Special Rapporteur, on the topic of jurisdictional immunities of states and their property, UN Doc. A/CN.4/323 (1979), para. 23.
23 See, e.g., Friedmann, supra note 1, at 147. Cf. more in general the Resolution of the Institut de droit international on The Activities of National Judges and the International Relations of Their State (1993), Art. 4.
24 Jurisdictional Immunities case, supra note 9, para. 55. See also McElhinney v. Ireland, Decision of 21 November 2001, ECHR App. No. 31253/96, para. 27. In many other immunity-related cases the European Court of Human Rights, however, does not discuss domestic-court decisions when assessing the scope of state immunity under customary international law, but refers to the relevant international conventions instead (1962 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, 500 UNTS 95; but also the 2004 United Nations Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Property, UN Doc. A/RES/59/38, still to enter into force). See e.g., Manoilescu and Dobrescu v. Romania and Russia, Decision of 3 May 2005, ECHR App. No. 60861/00; Treska v. Albania and Italy, Decision of 29 June 2006, ECHR App. No. 26937/04; Sedelmayer v. Germany, Decision of 10 November 2009, ECHR App. No. 30190/06; Cudak v. Lithuania, Judgment of 23 March 2010, ECHR App. No. 15869/02; Guadagnino v. Italy and France, Decision of 18 January 2011, ECHR App. No. 2555/03; Sabeh El Leil v. France, Decision of 29 June 2011, App. No. 34869/05; Wallishauser v. Austria, Decision of 17 July 2012, ECHR App. No. 156/04.
25 I. Brownlie (Rapporteur Institut de droit international), Contemporary Problems Concerning the Jurisdictional Immunity of States, Preliminary Report (1987), (1987) 62-I AIDI 13, at 16. In the context of treaty interpretation see Gardiner, supra note 21, at 229.
26 Cases cited at note 7 supra.
27 See Pavoni, R., ‘A Decade of Italian Case Law on the Immunity of Foreign States: Lights and Shadows’, (2009) 19 IYIL 73Google Scholar, at 81; Gattini, A., ‘The Dispute on Jurisdictional Immunities of the State before the ICJ: Is the Time Ripe for a Change of the Law?’, (2011) 24 LJIL 173CrossRefGoogle Scholar, 176.
29 ILA Statement of Principles, supra note 15, at 18. See also Oppenheim, L., ‘The Science of International Law: Its Task and Method’, (1908) 2 AJIL 313CrossRefGoogle Scholar, at 339.
30 In the context of treaty interpretation see Gardiner, supra note 21, at 229: ‘it is . . . necessary to see where ultimate authority to interpret treaties lies within the state to be sure that a court's judgment does truly represent the interpretative position of the state’.
31 Fox, supra note 1, at 175; Higgins, supra note 1, 208; Lauterpacht, supra note 16, at 20; ILA Statement of Principles, supra note 15, at 18. Judge Keith wrote in his Separate Opinion in the Jurisdictional Immunities case, supra note 9, para. 4: ‘I do of course appreciate that it is unusual in the practice of this Court and its predecessor to draw on the decisions of national courts. But, as appears from the Judgment in this case, the Court, for good reason, does give such decisions a major role. In this area of law it is such decisions, along with the reaction, or not, of the foreign State involved, which provide many instances of State practice. Further, the reasoning of the judges by reference to principle is of real value.’ (emphasis added).
32 See on judicial dialogue on immunity law A. Reinisch, supra note 1. See on transnational judicial dialogue in general Slaughter, A.-M., ‘A Typology of Transjudicial Communication’, (1994) 29 University of Richmond Law Review 99Google Scholar; Slaughter, A.-M., ‘A Global Community of Courts’, (2003) 44 Harvard International Law Journal 191Google Scholar; Waters, M. A., ‘Mediating Norms and Identity: The Role of Transnational Judicial Dialogue in Creating and Enforcing International Law’, (2005) 93 Georgetown Law Journal 487Google Scholar; Young, K. G., ‘The World, through the Judge's Eye’, (2009) 28 Australian Year Book of International Law 27Google Scholar.
33 See Nollkaemper, supra note 1, at 270.
34 See Roberts, supra note 1, at 91.
35 B. N. Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process (1921), 103–4; Hart, H. L. A., The Concept of Law (1965), 132Google Scholar.
36 Kelsen, H., Law and Peace in International Relations (1942), 163–4Google Scholar; Koskenniemi, M., From Apology to Utopia: The Structure of International Legal Argument (1989), 20Google Scholar.
37 In fact, Montesquieu arguably did not mean to reduce judges to a machine; see e.g. K. M. Schönfeld, Montesquieu en ‘la bouche de la loi’ (1979).
38 von Bogdandy, A. and Venzke, I., ‘Beyond Dispute: International Judicial Institutions as Lawmakers’, in von Bogdandy, A. and Venzke, I. (eds.), International Judicial Lawmaking: On Public Authority and Democratic Legitimation in Global Governance (2012), 3 at 9CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
39 See e.g., Lauterpacht, supra note 16; Weeramantry, C. G., ‘The Function of the International Court of Justice in the Development of International Law’, (1997) 10 LJIL 309CrossRefGoogle Scholar; A. Boyle and C. Chinkin, The Making of International Law (2007), 268; Shany, Y., ‘No Longer a Weak Department of Power? Reflections on the Emergence of a New International Judiciary’, (2009) 20 EJIL 73CrossRefGoogle Scholar. A. von Bogdandy and I. Venzke even speak of ‘law-making’ in this respect; see supra note 38.
40 See section 2.2infra.
41 Lauterpacht, supra note 3, at 83.
42 Friedmann, supra note 1, at 147. See esp. Benvenisti, E., ‘Judicial Misgivings Regarding the Application of International Law: An Analysis of the Attitudes of National Courts’, (1993) 4 EJIL 159CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Benvenisti, E., ‘Reclaiming Democracy: The Strategic Uses of Foreign and International Law by National Courts’, (2008) 102 AJIL 241CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Benvenistis, E. and Downs, G. W., ‘National Courts, Domestic Democracy, and the Evolution of International Law’, (2009) 20 EJIL 59CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Brownlie wrote in this respect that ‘the value of [domestic court] decisions varies considerably, and many present a narrow national outlook or rest on a very inadequate use of the sources’. See I. Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law (2008), 23.
43 Shany, Y., ‘An Old House with New Bricks, or a New House of Old Cards? On National Courts, the International Rule of Law, and the Power of Legal Imagination’, (2012) 4 Jerusalem Review of Legal Studies 50, at 58CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Wouters, J., ‘Customary International Law before National Courts: Some Reflections from a Continental European Perspective’, (2004) 4 Non State Actors and International Law 25, at 36CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
44 Shany, supra note 43, at 55.
45 E. M. Borchard quoted in Kunz, J. L, ‘The Nature of Customary International Law’, (1953) 47 AJIL 662CrossRefGoogle Scholar, at 668.
46 The examples are countless. During the colloquium this author discussed three: Canada, Quebec Superior Court, Kazemi and Hashemi v. Islamic Republic of Iran and Others, 25 January 2011, in which the personal immunity of a head of state was disregarded; Italy, Tribunal of Milan, Public Prosecutor v. Adler and Others (‘Abu Omar’ case), First Instance Judgment, No. 12428/09, 1 February 2010; ILDC 1492 (IT 2010), in which Art. 41 of the 1963 Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (596 UNTS 261) was misinterpreted; Netherlands, Court of Appeal The Hague, Stichting Mothers of Srebrenica, 30 March 2010, LJN: BL8979, in which the ‘reasonable alternative means’ doctrine of the ECtHR was given a disconcerting twist.
47 United States: Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, Public Law 94–583, 90 Stat. 2891, reproduced in (1976) 15 ILM 1388.
48 Cf. Yelin, L. S., ‘Head of State Immunity as Sole Executive Lawmaking’, (2011) 44 Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 911Google Scholar.
49 In Samantar v. Yousuf and Others, 560 US (2010); ILDC 1505 (US 2010) the US Supreme Court ruled that individual state officials are not covered by the FSIA. This decision arguably reinforces the controlling force of executive suggestions of immunity in respect of all (former) government officials.
50 1908 Code Of Civil Procedure (Act No. 5 of 1908).
51 The or other staff of a same applies to ‘rulers’ and ambassadors or envoys foreign state (Art. 86(4)). Cf., however, India, Supreme Court, Harbhajan Singh Dhalla v. Union of India, 5 November 1986, 92 ILR 530, for the possibility of judicial scrutiny of the executive refusal to consent.
52 Art. 21(1) State Immunity Act 1978 c. 33; see, e.g., HRH Sultan of Pahang v. SSHD [2011] EWCA Civ. 616, [2011] All ER (D) 243.
53 Diplomatic Privileges Act 1964 (c. 81). See Khurts Bat v. The Investigating Judge of the German Federal Court and The Government of Mongolia and The Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs [2011] EWCH 2029 (Admin).
55 See for recent thinking on the relationship between the international and domestic legal orders Nijman, J. and Nollkaemper, A. (eds.), New Perspectives on the Divide between National and International Law (2007)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and for an examination of the practice of 27 states Shelton, D. (ed.), International Law and Domestic Legal Systems; Incorporation, Transformation, and Persuasion (2011)Google Scholar.
56 Shany, supra note 43, at 62, refers in this respect to the ‘incorporation paradox’.
57 United States: Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, supra note 47.
58 UK, State Immunity Act 1978; Singapore, State Immunity Act 1979; Pakistan, State Immunity Ordinance 1981; South Africa, Foreign States Immunity Act 1981; Canada, State Immunity Act 1982; Australia, Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act 1985; Argentina, La Ley 24.488, Inmunidad Jurisdiccional de los Estados Extranjeros ante los Tribunalos Argentinos 1995; Israel, Foreign States Immunity Law 2008; Japan, Act on the Civil Jurisdiction of Japan with Respect to a Foreign State 2009. See also Section 86(1) of the Indian Code of Civil Procedure and the interpretation thereof in India, Supreme Court, Mirza Ali Akbar Kashani v. United Arab Republic, 1965, 64 ILR 489.
59 Wet Internationale Misdrijven, Staatsblad (Official Gazette) 2003, 270.
60 Ibid., Art. 16(a). See in similar terms Art. 1 bis(1) of the Belgian Code de procédure pénal.
61 See e.g., Fang and Others v. Jiang and Others, (2007) NZAR 420; ILDC 1226 (NZ 2006), where the High Court of New Zealand emphasized that the House of Lords in the Jones case applied international law, even though their examination took place in the context of UK immunity legislation, at para. 31.
62 Art. 16(a) Wet International Misdrijven.
63 Cf. Shelton, supra note 55, at 18–20.
64 Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corporation, 488 US 428 (1989) 434.
65 Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Argentina, 965 F 2d 699 (9th Cir. 1992) 718. See also United Kingdom, Court of Appeal, Al-Adsani v. Government of Kuwait, (1996) 107 ILR 536, 548 (per Lord Ward).
66 1984 Convention against Torture and Other Cruel Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 1465 UNTS 85.
67 Bouzari and Others v. Iran, 71 OR (3d) 675 (Ont CA); ILDC 175 (CA 2004). See also Quebec Court of Appeal, Islamic Republic of Iran v. Hashemi, 15 August 2012, 2012 QCCA 1449, paras. 41–42.
68 Islamic Republic of Iran v. Hashemi, supra note 67 at paras. 66–67.
69 Art. 94 Dutch Constitution; Supreme Court, 18 September 2001, LJN: AB1471, NJ 2002, 559.
70 See for examples D. Shelton, ‘Introduction’, in Shelton supra note 55, 1 at 13–14.
71 Thai-Europe Tapioca Service Ltd v. Government of Pakistan, [1976] 1 LR 1.
72 Trendtex Trading Corporation v. Central Bank of Nigeria, [1977] QB 529.
73 Ibid., 572.
74 Thai-Europe Tapioca Service Ltd v. Government of Pakistan [1976] 1 LR 1, at 8.
75 See also Nollkaemper, supra note 1, at 218–19.
76 See HR Rep. 94–1487, 1976 USCCAN 6604, at 6606; 15 ILM (1976) 1398, at 1402.
77 Verlinden BV v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 US 480 (1983) 486. See in this sense, Caplan, L. M., ‘State Immunity, Human Rights, and Jus Cogens: A Critique of the Normative Hierarchy Theory’, (2003) 97 AJIL 741CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and more in general Finke, J., ‘Sovereign Immunity: Rule, Comity, or Something Else?’, (2010) 21 EJIL 853CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
78 Dole Food Co. v. Patrickson, 538 US 468 (2003) 479.
79 Supra note 49.
80 See Italy, Constitutional Court, Soc. Immobiliare Soblim v. Russel 62 RDI 797 (1979); Italy, Court of Cassation, Cargnello v. Italy, 20 June 2005, ILDC 557 (IT 2005).
81 See Italy, Court of Cassation, Comina v. Kite, 1922, (1924) 16 RDI 173, at 174.
82 Chile, Supreme Court, Walter Szurgelies Hoyer et al. v. First Counsellor of the Embassy of the Federal Republic of Germany and Manfred Gerhard Skrabs et al. v. Consul of the Federal Republic of Germany, 1988, discussed in Vicuña, F. Orrego, ‘Diplomatic and Consular Immunities and Human Rights’, (1999) 40 ICLQ 34CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
83 US, Supreme Court of Connecticut, Fernandez v. Fernandez, 19 July 1988, 545 A2d 1036 (Conn 1988), ILDC 1385 (US 1988).
84 France, Conseil d'état, Dame Burgat et autres, 1976, 104 (1977) JDI 630; Tizon et Millet, 1984, 31 (1985) AFDI 928; Administrative Court of Appeals of Paris, 16 July 1992, (1992) RGDIP 238. See in this sense also Schermers, H. G., ‘Diplomatic Immunity in Modern International Law’, in Denters, E. and Schrijver, N. (eds.), Reflections on International Law from the Low Countries in Honour of Paul de Waart (1998), 156 at 162Google Scholar; A. Tanzi, L'immunità dalla giurisdizione degli agenti diplomatici (1991), 189.
85 See Prosecutor v. Furundžija, Judgement, Case No. IT-95–17/1, T.Ch., 10 December 1998, para. 196: ‘the law applied was domestic, thus rendering the pronouncements of the British courts less helpful in establishing rules of international law on this issue’.
86 See note 65 and accompanying text supra.
87 Court of Appeal of New South Wales, Zhang v. Zemin, 5 October 2010, [2010] NSWCA 255.
88 See example in note 65 supra. Another example is provided by House of Lords, Jones v. Ministry of the Interior of Saudi Arabia and Aziz, 14 June 2006, Appeal Judgment, [2006] UKHL 26, ILDC 521 (UK 2006), where the reliance on Art. 6 ECHR forced the court to have regard to the scope of the rule under customary law.
89 R v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Adan [2001] All E.R. 593, 617 (Steyn LJ).
90 Knop, K., ‘Here and There, International Law in Domestic Courts’, (1999) 32 New York University Journal of International Law and Politics 501, at 503Google Scholar.
91 See ibid., at 506, for the term translation. Also Nollkaemper, supra note 1, at 218.
92 Nollkaemper, ibid., at 219.
93 Federal Republic of Germany, Federal Constitutional Court, Claim against the Empire of Iran Case, (1963) 45 ILR 57, at 80. See also Federal Republic of Germany, Federal Supreme Court, Church of Scientology Case (1978), 65 ILR 193, 196–7.
94 Israel, Supreme Court, Canada v. Edelson, 3 June 1997, 131 ILR 279, ILDC 577 (IL 1997), para. 29.
95 Ibid., para. 23.
96 See Claim against the Empire of Iran Case, supra note 93, at 80: ‘National law can only be employed to distinguish between a sovereign and a non-sovereign activity of a foreign State insofar as it cannot exclude from the sovereign sphere, and thus from immunity, such State dealings as belong to the field of State authority in the narrow and proper sense, according to the predominantly-held view of States. In this generally recognizable field of sovereign activity are included transactions relating to foreign affairs, and military authority, the legislature, the exercise of police authority, and the administration of justice’.
97 See esp. the practice of France where regard is had to the domestic-law division of competence between civil and commercial courts on the one hand and administrative tribunals on the other. Discussed in Fox, supra note 1, at 507–8.
98 See ‘International Law in National Courts: Discussion’, in Crawford, J. and Young, M. (eds.), The Function of Law in the International Community: An Anniversary Symposium (2008)Google Scholar, Proceedings of the 25th Anniversary Conference of the Lauterpacht Centre for International Law, contribution by C. Greenwood. Available at http://www.lcil.cam.ac.uk/25th_anniversary/book.php.
100 Friedmann, supra note 1, at 148.
102 Benvenisti, ‘Reclaiming Democracy’, supra note 42, at 242.
103 Shany, Y., ‘Dédoublement fonctionnel and the Mixed Loyalties of National and International Judges’, in Fontanelli, F., Martinico, G., and Carrozza, P. (eds.), Shaping Rule of Law through Dialogue: International and Supranational Experiences (2010), 29 at 36Google Scholar.
104 See Cassese, A., ‘Remarks on Scelle's Theory of “Role-Splitting” (dédoublement fonctionnel) in International Law’, (1990) 1 EJIL 210CrossRefGoogle Scholar, at 218–19 on the link between the doctrine and reality, and at 215–17 on the ideological underpinnings of the doctrine.
105 Cf., for a similar finding on the other side of the coin, Berman, supra note 99, at 327: ‘Pluralism is thus principally a descriptive, not a normative, framework’.
106 Benvenisti, E., ‘Comments on the Systemic Vision of National Courts as Part of International Rule of Law’, (2012) 4 Jerusalem Review of Legal Studies 42, at 45CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
108 The notion of secondary rules is used here in the sense of Hart, supra note 35, at 92: ‘secondary rules . . . specify the ways in which the primary rules may be conclusively ascertained, introduced, eliminated, varied, and the fact of their violation conclusively determined’.
109 Franck, T. M., ‘Legitimacy in the International Legal System’, (1988) 82 AJIL 705CrossRefGoogle Scholar, at 758; Charney, J. I., ‘Universal International Law’, (1993) 87 AJIL 529CrossRefGoogle Scholar, at 533–4; Nollkaemper, A., ‘Internationally Wrongful Acts in Domestic Courts’, (2007) 101 AJIL 760Google Scholar, at 779; Nollkaemper, supra note 1, at 226.
110 Cases cited at note 7 supra.
114 Roberts, supra note 1, at 64.
115 Ibid., at 70.
116 While Roberts herself argues against ‘rigidly separating’ the law-creation and law-enforcement functions of domestic courts. Ibid., at 68.
117 In fact, many authors arguing that the Ferrini case violates international law admit that it may trigger a change in the law of state immunity. See Focarelli, C., ‘Denying Foreign State Immunity for Commission of International Crimes: The Ferrini Decision’ (2005) 54 ICLQ 951, at 957CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Gattini, A., ‘War Crimes and State Immunity in the Ferrini Decision’, (2005) 3 Journal of International Criminal Justice 224CrossRefGoogle Scholar, at 241–2; Fox, supra note 1, at 156–7.
118 See, e.g., Akehurst, M., ‘Custom as a Source of International Law’, (1974–5) 47 BYIL 1Google Scholar, at 8; van Hoof, G. J. H., Rethinking the Sources of International Law (1983), 100Google Scholar; Bederman, D. J., Custom as a Source of Law (2010), 160CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
119 Jennings, R. Y., ‘The Judiciary, International and National, and the Development of International Law’ (1996) 45 ICLQ 1CrossRefGoogle Scholar, at 3.
120 See note 31 supra.
121 Interestingly, Roberts concedes that ‘national court decisions are often given greater weight than the practice of a single State would suggest because they are treated as a subsidiary means of identifying international law rather than as State practice per se’. Roberts, supra note 1, at 63.
122 Jurisdictional Immunity case, supra note 9.
123 See case law mentioned in note 7 supra.
124 Jurisdictional Immunity case, supra note 9, paras. 98–104.
125 Ibid., para. 101.
126 Lowe, V., ‘The Politics of Law-Making: Are the Method and Character of Norm Creation Changing?’, in Byers, M. (ed.), The Role of Law in International Politics: Essays in International Relations and International Law (2000), 207Google Scholar at 214.
127 See ILC, Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and Expansion of International Law, Report of the Study Group of the International Law Commission, Finalized by M. Koskenniemi, UN Doc A/CN.4/L.682 (2006), para. 36 et seq.
128 Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (New Application: 2002) (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Rwanda), Judgment of 3 February 2006, [2006] ICJ Rep. 3, 86 (Judge Ad Hoc Dugard, Separate Opinion), para. 13, see also para. 12.
129 Art. 6 ECHR has been interpreted to guarantee the right of access to court. Golder v. United Kingdom, Decision of 21 February 1975, ECHR App. No. 4451/70, paras. 28–36.
130 Al-Adsani v. United Kingdom, Judgment of 21 November 2001, ECHR App. No. 35763/97, paras. 55–56: ‘The Convention should so far as possible be interpreted in harmony with other rules of international law of which it forms part, including those relating to the grant of State immunity. . . . It follows that measures taken by a High Contracting Party which reflect generally recognised rules of public international law on State immunity cannot in principle be regarded as imposing a disproportionate restriction on the right of access to court as embodied in Article 6 § 1’. Only Judge Rozakis dissented from this approach, which has since been consistently followed by the Strasbourg court. See, e.g., Kalogeropoulou and Others v. Greece and Germany, Decision of 12 December 2002, ECHR App. No. 59021/00. In later cases the ECtHR has indeed confirmed that the grant of state immunity beyond the requirements of international law does violate Art. 6: see Cudak, supra note 24; Guadagnino, supra note 24; Sabeh El Leil, supra note 24; Wallishauser, supra note 24.
131 See e.g., Nordeide, R., ‘The ECHR and Its Normative Environment: Difficulties Arising from a Regional Human Rights Court's Approach to Systemic Integration’, in Fauchald, O. K. and Nollkaemper, A. (eds.), The Practice of International and National Courts and the (De-)Fragmentation of International Law (2012), 117 at 133–4Google Scholar; Van Alebeek, supra note 5, at 397–406. See also the text accompanying note 31.
132 Supra note 4.
133 The Privy Council, The Philippine Admiral 1975, 64 ILR 90, at 109. Cf. also UK, High Court of Admiralty, The Charkieh, 1873, (1872–1875) LR 4A & E.59; Egypt, Cour d'appel mixte d'Alexandrie, Hall v. Bengoa, 1920, 48 JDI 1921 270, at 272: ‘l'immunité de juridiction dans ce cas serait la négation de la justice puisqu'elle priverait du secours de celle-ci les individus dont les intérêts se trouvent en conflit avec les intérêts privés du dit Etat’; US, 2nd Cir. Court of Appeals, Victory Transport Inc. v. Comisaria Gen. De Abestecimientos y Transportes, 1964, 336 F. 2d 354, at 357; Canada, Quebec Court of Queen's Bench, Venne v. Democratic Republic of the Congo, 1968, 5 DLR (3d) 128, at 143–4: ‘`an absolute and universal immunity could be a source of injustice’; Canada, Quebec Court of Appeal, Zodiak International Products Inc. v. Polish People's Republic, 1977, 64 ILR, at 58; UK, House of Lords, I Congreso del Partido, [1983] 1 AC 244, at 262 (per Lord Wilberforce); India, Supreme Court, Harbhajan Singh Dhalla v. Union of India, 1986, 92 ILR 530.
134 See esp. Waite and Kennedy v. Germany, Decision of 18 February 1999, ECHR App. No. 26083/94, para. 68: ‘a material factor in determining whether granting [an international organization] immunity from . . . jurisdiction is permissible under the Convention is whether the applicants had available to them reasonable alternative means to protect effectively their rights under the Convention’. See, e.g., Tomonori, M., ‘Denying Foreign State Immunity on the Grounds of the Unavailability of Alternative Means’, (2008) 71 Modern Law Review 734CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Fox, H., ‘State Immunity and other Norms of International Law: Possible Methods of Accommodation’, in Erauw, J., Tomljenović, V., and Volken, P. (eds.), Liber Memorialis Petar Šarčević; Universalism, Tradition and the Individual (2006), 545 at 563Google Scholar.
135 Germany, Federal Constitutional Court, Italian Military Internees Case, Joint Constitutional Complaint, 28 June 2004, BVerfG, 2 BvR 1379/01, ILDC 438 (DE 2004).
136 Badr, G. M., State Immunity: An Analytical and Prognostic View (1984), 135CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
137 Van Alebeek, supra note 5, at 96.
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