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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 21 July 2009
In a recent interview with a Dutch newspaper, Lord Owen, until the beginning of June Co-Chairman of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia, said:
[W]e were instructed by the conference to make recommendations on the establishment of a war crimes tribunal. We decided that this tribunal should be completely disconnected from the negotiating process. It should have a life of its own in order to enable us the negotiators for the UN and the EU to say that we had nothing to do with it in case the matter would be brought up to us.
1. NRC/Handelsblad, 10 June 1995.
2. The Limits of UN Enforcement, Fourth Cornelis van Vollenhoven Memorial Lecture, 6 June 1995, Leiden University (not yet published) (emphasis added).
3. General Yamashiia case, 327 U.S. Supreme Court Reports 1, reproduced in 40 AJIL 432 (1946).
4. A.ĎAmato, Peace v. Accountability in Bosnia, 88 AJIL 500 (1994).
5. “The peace negotiators must have a realistic fear of being prosecuted if the war crimes tribunal is to become a credible bargaining chip”. Id., at 505.
6. Shraga, D. & Zacklin, R., The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 5 EJIL 361 (1994).CrossRefGoogle Scholar
7. UN Doc. S/RES/808 (1993) (emphasis added).