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The parliament of the world? Reflections on the proposal to establish a United Nations Parliamentary Assembly

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  06 April 2020

Rossana Deplano
Rossana Deplano*
Affiliation:
University of Leicester - Law School, University Road, LE1 7RH Leicester – Leicestershire, United Kingdom
*
Email: rd279@leicester.ac.uk
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Abstract

On 5 July 2018, the European Parliament adopted a recommendation to the Council endorsing a proposal for the establishment of a United Nations Parliamentary Assembly. Conceived as a new primary organ of the United Nations (UN), the Parliamentary Assembly aims at complementing the work of the General Assembly by giving direct representation to the peoples of the world and passing binding legislation. This article reconstructs the historical roots of the proposal and speculates about the possible legal implications for both the UN and its member states stemming from the establishment of an elected citizens’ chamber within an intergovernmental organization. An argument is made that in order to achieve the stated goals of the model of United Nations Parliamentary Assembly endorsed by the European Union (EU), the required institutional changes to the UN system would be so radical as to effectively repudiate it in favour of a newly established system of international co-operation.

Keywords

democracyglobal governanceUN Parliamentary Assemblyworld lawworld parliament
Type
ORIGINAL ARTICLE
Information
Leiden Journal of International Law , Volume 33 , Issue 3 , September 2020 , pp. 577 - 599
Copyright
© Foundation of the Leiden Journal of International Law 2020

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References

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11 Ibid., at 9.

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35 See the outcome of the UN Parliamentary Assemblyʼs First International Meeting held in Geneva in 2007, available at en.unpacampaign.org/meetings/november2007/, accessed 1 April 2019.

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37 See Declaration of Buenos Aires, supra note 8, para. 5.

38 See Conclusions regarding policies, supra note 21.

39 See The Proposal, supra note 19.

40 See Report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs and Security, supra note 2.

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42 Ibid., at 6, para. 14 (emphasis added).

43 Ibid., at 13.

44 Ibid., at 13–14.

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48 See supra Section 2 discussion.

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50 See P6_CRE(2005)06-08_DEF_EN, ibid., statement by Nirj Deva, at 47; P6_CRE(2005)09-28_DEF_EN, ibid., statement by Alexander Lambsdorff, at 66, and statement by Manuel António dos Santos, at 72.

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53 See PE462.624v01-00, supra note 51, Amendment 120, at 71 (tabled by Jo Leinen, Elmar Brok, Alexander Alvaro, and Andrew Duff).

54 See P7_TA(2011)0255, supra note 52, point (bf) (emphasis added).

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58 See P7_TA(2011)0255, supra note 52.

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60 Inter-Parliamentary Union Council, Preparations for the 3rd World Conference of Speakers of Parliament (15 February 2010), CL/186/13-R.1, Annex I, at 2, para. 7.

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64 Committee on Foreign Affairs of the European Parliament, Recommendation to the Council (5 June 2013), 2013/2034(INI).

65 Committee on Foreign Affairs of the European Parliament, Draft Report (29 April 2013), PE506.222v01-00, Amendment 104 (tabled by Graham Watson, Jo Leinen, Andrew Duff, and Franziska Keller).

66 Committee on Foreign Affairs of the European Parliament, Draft Report (15 September 2016), PE582.127v01-00, Amendment 255 (tabled by Jonás Fernández).

67 European Parliament, Recommendation to the Council concerning the 72nd session of the United Nations General Assembly (5 July 2017), P8_TA(2017)0304, point (bm).

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72 See Leinen and Bummel, supra note 1.

73 Ibid., at 369–70; Heinrich, supra note 8, at 10, 20.

74 For a chronological list of resolutions see www.un.org/en/sections/documents/general-assembly-resolutions/index.html, accessed 1 April 2019.

75 Arguably, the foremost example is the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, UNGA Res 217A(III).

76 For an analysis of political influence at the General Assembly see D. Panke, Unequal Actors in Equalising Institutions: Negotiations in the United Nations General Assembly (2013).

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78 See Bummel, supra note 28, at 9.

79 A. Strauss, ‘Overcoming the Dysfunction of the Bifurcated Global System: The Promise of a Peoples Assembly’, (1999) 9 Transn’l L & Contemporary Problems 489, at 490 (referring to the lack of democracy at the international level ‘the most glaring anomaly of the global system today’).

80 See Bummel, supra note 28, at 9. For similar remarks see A. Strauss, ‘On the First Branch of Global Governance’, (2007) 13 Widener Law Review 347.

81 E. Childers and B. Urquhart, ‘Renewing the United Nations System’, (1994) 1 Development Dialogue 176.

82 See Bummel, supra note 1, at 17.

83 Ibid., at 16 (emphasis added).

84 See Heinrich, supra note 8, at 10–11 (emphasis added).

85 See Childers and Urquhart, supra note 81, at 176.

86 See, for instance, Nerfin, M., ‘The Future of the United Nations System: Some Questions on the Occasion of an Anniversary’, (1985) 1 Development Dialogue 5Google Scholar, at 24 (advocating the creation of a ‘Citizens Chamber’ at the UN General Assembly); Heinrich, supra note 8, at 20. See also Leinen and Bummel, supra note 1, at 27–41.

87 As discussed infra.

88 The Campaignʼs website lists the name of 441 academics endorsing the proposal to establish a UN Parliamentary Assembly, available at en.unpacampaign.org/supporters/overview/?mapcountry=allpro&mapgroup=pro, accessed 1 April 2019.

89 As discussed in supra Section 2.

90 Falk, R. and Strauss, A., ‘Globalization Needs a Dose of Democracy (The International Herald Tribune, 1999)’, in Falk, R. and Strauss, A. (eds.), A Global Parliament: Essays and Articles (2011), 29Google Scholar, at 31 (‘The global assembly could usefully contribute to the creation of planetary norms by expressing views on critical issues of global policy…’ (emphasis added)).

91 See Schwartzberg, supra note 4, at 79 (emphasis added).

92 See Franck, supra note 3, at 484.

93 Ibid., (emphasis added). For a similar proposition in relation to a reformed General Assembly see Habermas, J., ‘The Constitutionalization of International Law and the Legitimation Problems of a Constitution for World Society’, (2008) 15 Constellations 444CrossRefGoogle Scholar, at 451.

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95 Reparations for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion of 11 April 1949, [1949] ICJ Rep. 174, para. 182. With specific regard to implied powers of the Security Council see Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276, Advisory Opinion of 21 June 1971, [1971] ICJ Rep. 16, para. 52. For a commentary see Blokker, N., ‘International Organizations or Institutions, Implied Powers’, in Wolfrum, R. (ed.), Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law VI (2009), at 18–27Google Scholar.

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110 As discussed in supra Section 2.

111 See Heinrich, supra note 8, at 32. See also Schwartzberg, supra note 4, at 56, 79 (recognizing a co-decision power with the General Assembly).

112 See Heinrich, ibid., at 32 (arguing that resolutions passed with certain majority in both the UN General Assembly and the UN Parliamentary Assembly ‘could be accorded some higher status, conceivably even the status of binding international law in some situations’).

113 See supra note 6.

114 See Namibia Advisory Opinion, supra note 106, at 45.

115 For instance, in Lockerbie, the ICJ held that two resolutions of the Security Council adopted under Ch. VII of the UN Charter could not have made Libyaʼs application inadmissible, since they had been adopted after the date of the filing of the application before her. Hence, they did not supersede, as such, the rights that Libya was claiming. See Lockerbie case (Libya v. United States), supra note 105, para 43.

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117 See Schwartzberg, supra note 4, at 69.

118 Ibid., at 80.

119 Ibid., at 81.

120 Ibid., at 18, 63–4.

121 See UN Charter, supra note 23, Art. 4(2).

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127 See Schwartzberger, supra note 4, at 18, 90–4.

128 See Strauss, supra note 80, at 390. See also Falk and Strauss, supra note 90, at 43.

129 Ibid., at 23.

130 See Haviland and Entezam, supra note 6, at 29–30 (also quoting from UNCIO VII, at 36–7).

131 See Zweifel, supra note 122, at 74, 80 (pointing out that it is unrealistic to expect the General Assembly to represent world public opinion).

132 See Heinrich, supra note 8, at 22.

133 Ibid., at 9–10.

134 Treaty on European Union, Art. 14(2) reads: ‘The European Parliament shall be composed of representatives of the Unionʼs citizens. They shall not exceed seven hundred and fifty in number, plus the President. Representation of citizens shall be degressively proportional, with a minimum threshold of six members per Member State. No Member State shall be allocated more than ninety-six seats …’ (emphasis added). See also Schwartzberg, supra note 4, at 17, 23; Bummel, supra note 28, at 11, 25–31 (discussing models to elect the UN Parliamentary Assembly).

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153 Ibid., at 25.

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159 Ibid., at 380.

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161 See Leinen and Bummel, supra note 1, at 380 (emphasis added).

162 See Falk and Strauss, supra note 155, at 193.

163 See Strauss, supra note 79, at 496, 499–500.

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172 Message on the occasion of the Fifth International Meeting of the Campaign for a United Nations Parliamentary Assembly, 17 October 2013, available at en.unpacampaign.org/393/martin-schulz-european-parliament-may-serve-as-a-model-for-a-un-parliamentary-assembly/, accessed 1 April 2019.

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174 A. M. de Zayas, Report of the Independent Expert on the promotion of a democratic and equitable international order, UN Doc. A/HRC/24/39 (1 July 2013), para. 49.

175 United Nations Development Program, Human Development Report (2013), at 112.

176 UNGA, Decision 49/747, UN Doc. A/49/747 (9 December 1994).

177 UNGA, Cooperation Between the UN and the Inter-Parliamentary Union, UN Doc. A/51/402 (25 September 1996), annex.

178 UNGA, Res. 72/278, UN Doc. A/RES/72/278 (23 May 2018), para. 14; and UNGA, Res. 57/32, UN Doc. A/RES/57/32 (20 January 2003), para 1.

179 UN Secretary-General, Report on the Cooperation between the United Nations and the Inter-Parliamentary Union, UN Doc. A/55/996 (26 June 2001), para. 5.

180 Ibid., para. 13(a).

181 UNGA, Res. 70/298, UN Doc. A/RES/ 70/298 (9 August 2016), para. 4.

182 ICAPP Charter, Art. 1(c).

183 UNGA Sixth Committee, Summary record of the 8th meeting, UN Doc. A/C.6/66/SR.8 (5 January 2012) (statement by the representative of Korea).

184 UNGA Sixth Committee, Summary record of the 8th meeting, UN Doc. A/C.6/66/SR.8 (5 January 2012) (statements by the representatives of Venezuela, Cuba, and Argentina).

185 UNGA Sixth Committee, Summary record of the 11th meeting, UN Doc. A/C.6/67/SR.11 (20 December 2012) (statement by the representative of the Russian Federation); and UNGA Sixth Committee, Summary record of the 12th meeting, UN Doc. A/C.6/71/SR.12 (2 November 2016) (statement by the representative of Syria).

186 See, for instance, UNGA Sixth Committee, Summary record of the 11th meeting, UN Doc. A/C.6/70/SR.11 (9 November 2015) (statement by the representative of Argentina).

187 See ICAPP Charter, supra note 182, Art. 2.

188 Letter dated 11 August 2015 from the representatives of Australia, Cambodia, Japan, Nepal, The Philippines, the Republic of Korea and Sri Lanka to the United Nations to the Secretary-General, UN Doc. A/70/194 (18 August 2015), at 7. See also UNGA Sixth Committee, Summary record of the 11th meeting, UN Doc. A/C.6/70/SR.11 (9 November 2015) (statements by the representatives of Korea and the Philippines qualifying the ICAPP as a quasi-intergovernmental organization).

189 See, for instance, the Final adoption of the general budget of the European Union for the financial year 2008, 2008/165/EC, Euratom (14 March 2008), at 189, para. 1004.

190 European Parliament, Debates, P7_CRE(2011)09-12 (12 September 2011), at 9 (statement by Niccolò Rinaldi).

191 ‘Parliamentary Conference on the World Trade Organization’, available at www.ipu.org/our-impact/global-governance/parliamentary-conference-world-trade-organization, accessed 1 April 2019.

192 Wheatley, S., ‘A Democratic Rule of International Law’, (2011) 22(2) EJIL 525CrossRefGoogle Scholar, at 529; Scholte, J. A., ‘Civil Society and Democracy in Global Governance’, (2002) 8 Global Governance 281CrossRefGoogle Scholar, at 291.

193 See supra note 134; Schwartzberg, supra note 4.

194 ‘How can citizens of states without democratic elections be represented?’, available at en.unpacampaign.org/proposal/faq/, accessed 1 April 2019.

195 ‘How could a Parliamentary Assembly contribute to national democratization?’, ibid.

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199 UNGA, Res. 60/251, UN Doc. A/RES/60/251 (3 April 2006), paras. 7–8.

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201 Ibid., at 9.

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205 See Keohane, supra note 197, at 344.

206 See Wheatley, supra note 198, at 244.

207 Maisley, N., ‘The International Right of Rights? Article 25(a) of the ICCPR as a Human Right to Take Part in International Law-Making’, (2017) 28(1) EJIL 89CrossRefGoogle Scholar, at 110–11.

208 European Comissionʼs ‘Consultations’, available at ec.europa.eu/info/consultations_en, accessed 1 April 2019.

209 For information on European Citizenʼs Initiative, see ec.europa.eu/citizens-initiative/public/welcome, accessed 1 April 2019.

210 For a discussion of transnational digital constitutionalism see Celeste, E., ‘Digital constitutionalism: a new systematic theorisation’, (2019) 33(1) International Review of Law, Computers & Technology 76CrossRefGoogle Scholar.