No CrossRef data available.
We use cookies to distinguish you from other users and to provide you with a better experience on our websites. Close this message to accept cookies or find out how to manage your cookie settings.
We use cookies to distinguish you from other users and to provide you with a better experience on our websites. Close this message to accept cookies or find out how to manage your cookie settings.
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 21 July 2009
The geographical disadvantages faced by land-locked states place them in a particularly vulnerable position: unable to compete on equal trading terms with coastal neighbours, they are highly susceptible to all forms of economic and political ‘aggression’. Such measures produce more than the usual degree of ‘inconvenience’, but can so destabilise the state as to compromise its existence. Equity and the sanctity of ‘statehood’ require the protection of such states by furnishing them transit rights.Not only must international law recognise such rights as existing in one form or another, but must also provide adequate means of securing them. A society unwilling to redress natural imbalances and prepared to perpetuate an inherently unfair system is a society committed to conflict, rather than the maintenance of peace and security.
1. The Greek embargo was lifted on 14/15 October 1995, pursuant to an agreement reached by Greece and Macedonia, after a duration of 20 months.
2. Naulilaa Arbitration (Portugal v. Germany), II RIAA 1013 (1928).
3. Case concerning the Air Services Agreement of 27 March 1946 (United States of America v.France), XVIII RIAA 416 (1978).
4. North Sea Continental Shelf cases (Federal Republic of Germany v. Denmark; Federal Republic of Germany v. The Netherlands), Judgment, 1969 ICJ Rep. 3.
5. R.R. Baxter, Treaties and Customs, 129 HR 27 (1970–1).
6. J. Fawcett, Trade and Finance in International Law, 123 HR 219 (1968–1).
7. S. Marks, Transit Rights in Lesotho, 16 CLB 329 (1990).
8. See D.H. Anderson, Further Efforts to Ensure Universal Participation in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 43 ICLQ 886 (1994). He notes that the reason for the great delay in the entry into force of the Convention was the dispute over the deep-sea mining provisions in the Convention, showing that there was consensus ad idem on the other provisions: Article 125 being the one relevant for present purposes.
9. 7LNTS11.
10. This Charter never entered into force and has, as a consequence, never been published in the UNTS.
11. Emphasis added.
12. See597UNTS3.
13. Emphasis added.
14. UN Doc. A/CONF.62/122 (1982). See also 21 ILM 1261 (1982).
15. S.C. Vasciannie, Land-locked States and Geographically Disadvantaged States in the International Law of the Sea 206 (1990).
16. See Marks, supra note 7, at 329.
17. Id., at 339.
18. In 1965, Zambia only blocked Rhodesian goods to implement Security Council Resolutions and in 1970 India blocked goods from Nepal due to a trade relations dispute.
19. UN Doc. S/RES/402 (1976).
20. Conference on Yugoslavia Arbitration Commission, Opinion No. 6,92 ILR 182 (1993).
21. See UN Doc. A/RES/1028, at 12 (1957).
22. Emphasis added.
23. See A. Cassese, International Law in a Divided World, para. 88, 1st ed. (1990). He opines that this is a general principle, given the fact that it is enshrined in a number of important treaties and resolutions of international organisations: Article 2(2) of the UN Charter; Article 26 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties; 1970 Declaration on Friendly Relations; and Article 300 of the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. See also Nuclear Tests case (Australia v. France), Judgment, 1974ICJ Rep. 268: “One of the basic principles governing the creation and performance of obligations, whatever their source, is the principle of good faith”.
24. See L. Oppenheim (R.Y. Jennings & A.D. Watts, Eds.), I International Law 1272, 9thed. (1992).
25. See McNair, A.D., So-Called State Servitudes, 6 BYIL 111 (1925).Google ScholarSee also Rights of Passage Over Indian Territory case (Portugal v. India), Judgment, 1960ICJ Rep. 125, where the servitude was necessary to exercise sovereignty. A land-locked state would fulfil this criterion since it would not be able to function at all as a state, without such passage providing its vital trade-links. On the distinction between ‘economic’ and ‘sovereign’ rights, See the North Atlantic Fisheries Arbitration (Great Britain v. United States) 1916II RIAA 173 (1910).
26. Rights of Passage over Indian Territory case (Portugal v. India), Preliminary Objections, 1957 ICJ Rep. 125.
27. D.P. O'Connell, The Law of Succession 49–63 (1956). See also O'Connell, , Reconsideration of the Doctrine of International Servitude, 20 Can.Bar Rev. 810 (1952).Google Scholar
28. J.L. Brierly (C.H.M. Waldock, Ed.), The Law of Nations 191, 6th ed. (1963).
29. Case concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear(Cambodiau Thailand), Judgment, 1962ICJ Rep.6.
30. Case concerning the Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso v. Republic of Mali), Judgment, 1986 ICJ Rep. 554.
31. Bowett, D.W., Estoppel Before International Tribunals andits Relation to Acquiescence, 33 BYIL 176 (1957) (emphasis added).Google Scholar
32. Case concerning Sovereignty Over Certain Frontier Land (Belgium v. The Netherlands), Judgment, 1959 ICJ Rep. 209, at 227.
33. Case concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v.United States of America), Judgment, 1986 ICJ Rep. 14 (para. 202).
34. Id.
35. Id., at para. 205.
36. Id., at para. 203. See also the Declaration on the In admissibility of Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of States and the Protection of Their Independence and Sovereignty, UN Doc. A/RES/2131, at 11 (1965) (hereinafter Declaration on Inadmissibility of Intervention). See further the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among States in Accordance With the Charter of the United Nations, UN Doc.A/RES/2625, at 121 (1970) (hereinafter Declaration on Friendly Relations).
37. Emphasis added.
38. See Nicaragua case, supra note 33, at para. 203.
39. See UN Doc. A/RES/3281, at 50 (1974). See also 14 ILM 251 (1975), Art. 32.
40. See Nicaragua case, supra note 33, at para. 245 (emphasis added).
41. Bowett, D.W., Economic Coercion and Reprisals by States, 13 VJIL 108 (1972).Google Scholar
42. Elagab, O. Y., Coercive Economic Measures Against Developing Countries, 41 ICLQ 682 (1992).CrossRefGoogle Scholar
43. Neff, S., Boycott and the Law of Nations: Economic Warfare and Modem International Law in Historical Perspective, 59 BYIL 114–115 (1988).Google Scholar
44. See Nicaragua case, supra note 33, at para. 205.
45. Id., at para. 188.
46. UNCIO, Summary Report of 11th Meeting of the Committee, 1/1, Doc. 784 1/1/27 (1945).
47. E. Hambro & M. Goodrich, Charter of the United Nations, Commentary and Documents 70, 2nd and revised ed. (1949).
48. I. Brownlie, International Law and the Use of Force by States 362 (1963).
49. See UN Doc. A/AC/125/L.21 and L.22 (1966): Submissions of Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and eight African states at the Special Committee on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among States.
50. Kelsen, H., Collective Security Under International Law, 49 International Law Studies No. 5, at 57 (1957).Google Scholar
51. Paust, J.J. & Blaustein, A.P., Tbe Arab Oil Weapon-a Threat to International Peace, 68 AJIL 417(1974).CrossRefGoogle Scholar
52. Brosche, H., The Arab Oil Embargo and United States Pressure Against Chile,7 Case Wes. Res.JIL 23 (1974).Google Scholar
53. J. Fawcett, Law and Power in International Relations 115 (1982).
54. UN Doc. A/RES/3314, at 142 (1974).
55. Report of the Sixth Committee of the General Assembly on the Question of Defining Aggression, UN Doc. A/RES/9890, at para. 9 (1974).
56. This right is presumed to have been established in Section 2, supra.
57. See Nicaragua case, supra note 33, at para. 195.
58. J. Stone, Aggression and World Order: a Critique of United Nations Theories of Aggression 94–95 (1958). See also Brownlie, supra note 48, at 362.
59. See UN Doc. A/RES/3314, supra note 54.
60. See Nicaragua case, supra note 33, at para. 195.
61. 199 Hansard, House of Lords, cols. 1348–59 (1956).
62. Levenfeld, B., Israel/s Counter-Fedayeen Tactics in Lebanon: Self-Defence and Reprisal Under Modern International Law, 21 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 15 (1982).Google Scholar
63. M. McDougal & F. Feliciano, Law and Minimum World Public Order 240–241 (1961).
64. See Stone, supra note 58, at 94–95.
65. See Brierly (Waldock, Ed.), supra note 28, at 414.
66. 1950 Yearbook of the United Nations 226.
67. Committee I, commenting upon Article 2(4), reported the “use of arms in legitimate self defence remains admitted and unimpaired”, 6 UNCIO Doc. 459 (1944).
68. See Nicaragua case, supra note 33, at para. 176.
69. See Brownlie, supra note 48, at 280.
70. See Hansard, House of Lords, supra note 61.
71. D.P. O'Connell, I International Law 303 (1970).
72. Article 33, ILC Draft Ankles on State Responsibility, 1976–11 YILC 75 et seq.
73. C. Tacitus, De Agricola, Chapters 1–3, reproduced in A. Hutton, R.M. Olgivie & U.U.Peterson (Eds.) Agricola, Germania et Dialogus de Oratoribus (1970).